HARIHAR PRASAD Vs. UDAIBIR SINGH
LAWS(ALL)-1977-8-40
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on August 08,1977

HARIHAR PRASAD Appellant
VERSUS
UDAIBIR SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Hari Swarup, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale. The plaintiff filed the suit on the allegation that the defendant had entered into an agreement with him for sale of his holding on deposit of ten times the rent within two months from the date of the agreement. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had neither deposited the ten times of the rent to obtain bhumidhari rights in the land nor had executed the sale deed. The defendant denied that there was any such contract of sale and contested the suit on other pleas also. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit and passed a decree directing the defendant to execute the sale dead after obtaining the bhumidhari sanad in respect of the land in dispute within two months from the date of the decree. THIS was made subject to the plaintiffs depositing a sum of Rs. 1000/- towards the sale price as this was the balance left with the plaintiff in order to purchase the land. According lo the finding of the trial court the agreement had been entered into for sale of the land for Rs. 5500/- and the defendant had already been paid Rs. 4500/-.
(2.) THE defendant went up in appeal. In appeal the decree was modified and the operative portion of the judgment was in the following terms : "THE appeal is dismissed with costs with the further observation that in case the revenue authorities do not grant the Bhumidhari Sanad the plaintiff-respondents shall be entitled to recover in execution a sum of Rs. 4500/- as well as the costs of both the courts from the appellant." 2a.THE defendant has filed the present appeal against that decree. Learned counsel for the appellant has attacked the decree on a number of grounds, His contention Is that the contract was void as it was in respect of transfer of rights which did not exist on the date of transfer. He has further contended that the contract was a fraud on the statute as the statute had prohibited the transfer of sirdari rights, ft has also been contended that the contract was not specifically enforceable as the right to acquire bhumidhari rights depended on orders to be passed by a statutory authority acting under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. THE other contention is that the contract was unenforceable because it was vague and did not mention that the vendor had to acquire bhumidhari sanad. THE only thing stated in the agreement was that ten times the rent will be deposited. Mere deposit of ten times of the rent was not sufficient to give the transferror a right to transfer the holding. THE further argument that has been advanced is that in the plaint there was no assertion that the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to purchase the land. THE only assertion was that the plaintiff was still ready "to get the sale. The last contention raised by the learned counsel is that the suit was liable to be dismissed as it was premature. The submission is that the alleged agreement was dated May 19,1969 and provided two months time to the transferor to execute the sale. The suit had been filed on July 11, 1969, i.e. before the expiry of the two months period envisaged by the agreement. There appears prima facie merit in each one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. However, in view of the fact that the suit had been instituted before the expiry of the two months' period contemplated by the agreement, the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground that it was premature. I accordingly do not consider it necessary to deal with the other points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant for purposes of the decision of the appeal.
(3.) ARTICLE 54 of Schedule E to the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation for a suit for specific performance of a contract. The time for filing of the suit begins to run from : "the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused." In the present case as the date was fixed as two months from the date of the agreement, the limitation will commence running from 19-7-1960 and the suit could not have been filed before the date had expired. Clause (e) of rule 1 of Chapter VII of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the plaint shall contain the facts constituting the cause of action and the date when it arose. In the case of specific performance of a contract the cause of action arises only after the time for the performance of the contract expires. In the present case, the time to perform the contract had not expired till 11-7-1969 when the suit was filed. The plaintiff thus had no cause of action for maintaining the suit under Sestion 9 of the Specific Relief Act.;


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