Mufti, J. - (1.) THE petitioner was a permanent and confirmed Head Mistress of the Hudson Memorial Girls Junior High School, Kanpur, which is a recognised institution under U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972. THE employment of the petitioner was subject to the terms and conditions of an agreement dated 12th December, 1966. On 21st May, 1974, she was suspended from service and a charge-sheet was given to her for alleged acts of insubordination and neglect of duty. She was asked to submit her explanation within a period of ten days. She did not submit her explanation. She asked for extension of time, which was rejected. THE inquiry was conducted ex-parte and the charges were found proved against her. Ultimately, the managing committee of the school, by its resolution dated 8th June, 1974, dismissed the petitioner from service. THE petitioner applied for review. THE review application was considered and rejected by the committee of management on 20th July, 1974, after giving personal hearing to the petitioner. THE petitioner filed an appeal before the Director of Education, which as alleged by the petitioner, is still pending. Meanwhile, she has filed this writ petition and challenged the validity of the order of dismissal. Before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the order primarily on the ground that the procedural safeguards provided in the rules were not complied with and, alternatively, on the ground that the dismissal was for reasons unauthorised by the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 12th December, 1966, which, he said, had the statutory backing of the U. P. Education Code, under which the form of agreement has been prescribed for teachers, like the petitioner, employed in recognised educational institutions. For the principal argument the learned counsel relied on Uttar Pradesh Basic Schools (Staff) Rules 1972, framed under the U. P. Basic Education Act, 1972. THEse rules, however, apply to the teachers and employees of the institutions belonging to or wholly maintained by the Board of Basic Education and not to the institutions belonging to or maintained by private parties, even though such institutions may be recognised under the Basic Education Act. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot take any help from these rules to assail the order. It is true that a separate set of rules called the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Recruitment and conditions of service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975, have been framed under the Act in order to regulate the conditions of service of the teachers serving in the recognised basic schools. But the petitioner cannot take help from them either. THE reason is that those rules came into force in July, 1975, whereas the petitioner was dismissed a year before in July, 1974. THE challenge based on violation of rules fails. Coming to the alternative argument it may be conceded that the contract of service executed by the petitioner is in Form VI, appended to the Education Code of Uttar Pradesh, which is the form of contract prescribed by the Code for teachers employed in their recognised educational institutions of the State. But the Code is merely a compilation of administrative orders and instructions regulating the terms and conditions on which the Government or the subordinate authorities would grant aid and recognition to various educational institutions in the state. Without anything else, the provisions of the Code or of the contract of employment prescribed there under cannot have statutory force. THEre is nothing in the Basic Education Act or elsewhere in law to lend that force or flavour to the provisions of the Code or to that of the contract in relation to the institutions recognised or maintained by the Board of Basic Education. That is what distinguishes the decision of this court in Managing Committee of Krishak Higher Secondary School Raise v. Isham Singh 1965 A.L.J. 1116 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner from the present case. In that case the court was called upon to determine the validity of the order of dismissal of the Principal of a Higher Secondary School recognised under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. By clause (c) of section 15 of the Intermediate Education Act, the Board of High School and Intermediate Education was empowered to make regulations to provide for conditions of the recognition of institutions for purposes of its examinations. THE regulations so made, inter alia, provided that the rules of the Education Code of Uttar Pradesh including Appendix VI shall apply to all institutions recognised by the Board in so far as they are not inconsistent with these regulations. On this ground it was held by this court that the Education Code including Appendix VI formed part of the regulations and that disregard thereof shall amount to disregard of a statutory provision. Clearly, the judgment cannot be treated as an authority for the proposition that the U. P. Education Code has statutory force or flavour in its applicability to the basic schools covered by the U. P. Basic Education Act. As such the contract of employment relied on by the petitioner cannot be given the status of statutory instrument incorporating the conditions of service. Accordingly, even if it were assumed that the order of dismissal contravenes the terms of the contract, the dismissal cannot be held to be in breach of statutory provision entitling the petitioner to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. THE learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued in the end that in any view of the matter, the rights and obligations were created by an executive order of the Government, prescribed, as the form of the contract was, by such order, and, as such, they were enforceable in the writ proceedings. For this argument he relied on the decisions in Union of India v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. A I. R. 1968 Sec. 718 and M/s. Jiwat Bai and Sons v. G. C. Batra and others A.I. R. 1976 Delhi 310. In M/s. Anglo Afghan's case (supra) the Textile Commissioner published on October, 10, 1962, a scheme called the Export Promotion Scheme providing incentives to exporters of Woolen Goods. By the Scheme as extended to exports to Afghanistan the exporters were invited to get them selves registered with the Textile Commissioner for exporting woolen goods and it was represented that the exporters will be entitled to import 100 per cent, of the f. o. b. value of the exports. M/s. Indo Afghan Agencies exported to Afghanistan in September 1963, woolen goods of the value of Rs. 5,03.471.73 np. THE Deputy Director in the office of the Textile Commissioner, Bombay issued to them an Import Entitlement Certificate for Rs. 1,99,459/- only. Representations made by them to the Deputy Director and to the Union Government that they be granted Import Entitlement Certificate for the full value of the goods exported failed to produce any response. THE firm moved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Punjab for a writ or order directing the Union of India, the Textile Commissioner and the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Bombay to issue a licence permitting import of wool tops, raw wool, wool waste and rags of the value of Rs. 3,04,012.73 np. THE High Court held that the Export Promotion Scheme specifically provided for granting certificates to import materials of the value equal to 100 per cent of the value of the goods exported, and the firm was entitled to obtain import licences for an amount equal to 100 per cent, of the value unless it was found on enquiry duly made under clause 10 of the scheme that the firm had by "over-invoicing" the goods disentitled them selves to the import licences of the full value; that no such enquiry was made by the Textile Commissioner and that the officer merely proceeded upon his subjective satisfaction that the firm had over-invoiced the goods exported; and that the Union Government acted on irrelevant grounds. THE High Court, therefore, allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order passed by the Textile Commissioner and affirmed by the Central Government imposing cut in the import entitlement by the firm and directed the Textile Commissioner and the Joint Chief Controller of imports and Exports to issue to the firm import certificate for the total amount equal to 100 per cent, of the aforesaid value of the goods exported by them. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision holding that although the case did not fall within the terms of Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. In Jiwat Bai's case (supra) the petitioner had a vending contract with the Railways. THE contract conferred no right of renewal. THE Railway Board revised the policy and empowered the Railways to renew licences of existing vendees, who satisfied requirements for renewal in terms of the revised policy. THE petitioner laid a claim for renewal. THE Railway Authorities declined to grant the renewal and terminated the contract without assigning any reason. THE petitioner moved the Delhi High Court for a writ or order quashing the order and directing the Railway Authorities to renew the licence. THE High Court held that the policy decision of the Railway Board conferred on the petitioner a legal right to the renewal of the licence independently of the contract; that the Railway Authorities were under an obligation to give reasons for declining to grant the renewal and that the declining renewal without disclosing reasons was bad in law. THE High Court, therefore, quashed the impugned order and directed the Railway Authorities to decide the matter by a speaking order. On the authority of these precedents it may be possible to argue that, in appropriate case, the court can grant a writ to compel the performance of a duty by the State or other authority even where there is no statutory provision and the right has been conferred and duty imposed by an administrative order. But it will be idle to contend that the rights and obligations arising out of a contract assume the role and stature of the rights and obligations created by an administrative order, if the terms and conditions of the contract are prescribed by such order. THE precedents nowhere say so, directly or indirectly. On principle too we do not quite see how that can be so. By themselves, the terms and conditions so prescribed have absolutely no force, unless and until they are incorporated into or otherwise become a part of contract between the parties. Without the contract, they have no vitality and can create no right or obligation, in other words, the rights and obligations based on such terms and conditions have their origin in the contract between the parties and not in the administrative order prescribing the same. If that be so, as it really is, no writ can be granted to enforce such rights and obligations. Because the law is well settled that the contractual rights and obligations belong to the domain of private law and cannot be siphoned off into writ jurisdiction even if the party against whom they are sought to be enforced by the state or a statutory authority. THE argument of the learned counsel fails. In what we have state herein before in this judgment we have assumed that the respondent school is a statutory body against which a writ of mandamus could be granted for the reinstatement of a teacher, if it had acted in violation of a mandatory obligation imposed by law in dismissing him. THE learned counsel for the respondent, however, disputed the position that the school was a statutory body. In the view we have taken above on the merits of the petition we do not feel necessary to go into this question. THE writ petition must fail on merits. In the result, we dismiss the petition. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.;