T. S. Misra, J. - (1.) ROOP Krishna Seth borrowed a sum of Rs. 3000/- from one Shanti Swarup on 1st September, 1968 agreeing to re-pay the same on demand with interest at 6 per cent, per annum and executed a pronote for the same. ROOP Kishore Seth took a further loan of Rs. 3000/- from the said Shanti Swarup on 2nd September, 1958 agreeing to pay the same on demand with interest at 6 per cent, per annum and executed a pronote for the same. Shanti Swarup died on 16th January, 1960. He was not survived by any heir to succeed to his property hence in view of the provisions of section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act his property devolved on the Government. ROOP Kishore Seth had failed to repay the said two debts to Shanti Swarup. The State of U. P., therefore, filed a suit No. 59 of 1969 for the recovery of the loan advanced by Shanti Swarup on 1st September. 1968 with interest therein. That suit was decreed by the trial court. Against that decision ROOP Kishore Seth filed First Appeal No. 23 of 1971 which was also dismissed. He has now preferred Second Appeal No. 173 of 1972 from that decree.
(2.) SIMILARLY the State of U. P. filed the Suit No. 58 of 1969 against Roop Kishore Seth for the recovery of the loan dated 2nd September, 1968 together with interest thereon. That suit was also decreed by the trial court. Roop Kishore filed an appeal, First Appeal No. 24 of 1971 from that decree which was also dismissed. He has preferred Second Appeal No. 186 of 1972 against that decision. Since both these second Appeals Nos. 173 of 1972 and 186 of 1972 raised common question of law they are being disposed of by one judgment. The learned counsel for the appellant urged only one point before me in both the appeals, namely, the suit was barred by time and the courts below have erred in holding otherwise. According to the appellant the limitation for the suit was to be computed under Article 35 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 which corresponds to Article 73 of the Old Limitation Act and if once the time starts running no subsequent inability or disability to institute a suit could stop it as provided by Section 9 of the Limitation Act. It was submitted that under Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or under Article 73 of the Old Limitation Act the time for filing a suit on a promissory note runs from the date of the promissory note, namely, in the instant cases 1st September 1958 and 2nd September, 1958 and the period of limitation prescribed for such a suit is three years. Hence the aforesaid limitation for filing two suits expired on 1st or 2nd September, i.e. the limitation for filing Suit No. 59 of 59 expired on 1st September, 1961 and the limitation for filing Suit No. 58 of 1959 expired on 2nd September, 1961. As both these suits were filed on 6th October, 1961 they were barred by time. For the State of U. P. it was urged that the limitation for filing the suit should be computed in accordance with Art. 112 of the Limitation Act 1963 under which the period of limitation for the suit is thirty years. It may be mentioned here that under the old Limitation Act a suit by the Government could be filed within a period of sixty years as provided by Article 149 of that Act. Both the courts below have concurrently held that Article 112 of the Limitation Act of 1963 governed the said two suits and as the limitation prescribed under Article 112 is thirty years both the suits were filed within limitation.
(3.) THE short question involved in these appeals, therefore is whether Article 112 of the Limitation Act of 1963 would govern the two suis out of which these appeals have arisen or the provisions of Article 35 of the Act would apply. THE said two Articles of the Limitation Act read as follows : Both the suits were filed for recovery of loans and were based on two pronotes in question. Had Shanti Swarup filed the said suits Article 35 would undoubtedly have applied and the period of limitation for such suits would have been three years. The suits were, however, not filed by Shanti Swarup, the creditor. He had died on 16th January, 1960, a few months before the expiry of three years calculated from the dates of the advancement of the loans. He died without leaving any heir qualified to succeed to his property in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. It seems that before the courts below it was urged that Shanti Swarup was not governed by the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. But this contention did not find favour with the courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant in both the appeals did not press before me this point. It is thus no more in dispute that Shanti Swarup was governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 29 of that Act provides that "If an intestate has left no heir qualified to succeed to his or her property in accordance with the provisions of this Act, such property shall devolve on the Government ; and the Government shall take the property subject to all the obligations and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject". Shanti Swarup having died without being survived by any heir qualified to succeed his property in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 his property accordingly devolved on the Government. The State of U.P., therefore, became entitled to recover the debts advanced by Shanti Swarup. The State Government also, therefore, became entitled to file suits for recovery of those debts within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act. The recovery of the two loans in question by instituting suits had not become barred by time on 16th January, 1960 when Shanti Swarup had died. The remedy to recover the said loans was, in other words, not barred by limitation on 16th January, 1960 when the said loans devolved on the the State Government. The State Government then became entitled to recover the debts from Roop Kishore Seth. Admittedly the suits were not filed within a period of three years from the date of the advancement of the loan. Could the suit be filed within a period of thirty years from the date of the advancement of the loan under Art. 112 of the Limitation Act ? In my view if the right of the deceased private person has, before the escheat to the Government, been extinguished by the operation of limitation the escheat cannot revive it. Where the claim of a private person was barred by time on the date of his death the devolution of his property on the Government, i.e. escheat to the Government shall not enable, the Government to take resort to Article 112 to make the suit within limitation. Where, however, the period of limitation had not expired on the date of the demise of the private person that is on the date of the devolution of his property by escheat on the Government under section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Government, in my view, will be entitled to avail itself of the provisions of Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Different considerations arise in the case of the State and there is a distinction between claims by the Government and those of private individuals. Article 112 governs any suit, (except the suit before the Supreme Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction), filed by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, and the period of limitation for a suit filed by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, and the period of limitation would begin to run against a like suit by a private person. The period of limitation for a suit based on pronote by a private person begins to run from the date of the pronote. So the period of thirty years would commence from the date of the pronote under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. It was not in dispute that both the suits were filed within the period of thirty years. They were, therefore, rightly held to be within limitation.;