Yashoda Nandan, J. - (1.) TWO questions have been referred to this Bench for opinion by a learned single Judge of this Court in the Civil Revision which came up for hearing before him.
(2.) THE material facts giving rise to this Civil Revision and the Reference are that the opposite party instituted a suit against the applicant for his ejectment from the shop in dispute and for recovery of a certain amount as arrears of rent. The claim was based on the allegations that the applicant was in arrears of rent for not less than four months and had failed to pay the same to the opposite party within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand and further that the applicant had sub -let the premises in suit without the permission in writing of the landlord. These pleas fell within the purview of Section 20(2)(a) and (e) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The suit was instituted sometime in September, 1972. It was decreed ex -parte on the 16th August, 1973, but subsequently the ex -parte decree was set aside and the suit was restored to its original number on the 8th December, 1973. On the 10th December, 1973, after restoration of the suit the court passed an order to the effect that the written -statement be filed by the 7th January, 1974 and fixed 28th February, 1974 as the date for final hearing of the suit. No written statement was filed by the applicant on the date fixed. On the 28th February, 1974 an application was made by the Defendant -applicant for extension of time for filing written -statement. The application was allowed and the 4th April, 1974 was fixed as the date for filing of the written -statement. On the 4th April, 1974 the applicant filed his written -statement and on the same date filed a tender for the amounts contemplated by Section 20(4) of the Act. The tender was passed by the court on the 23rd April, 1974 and the applicant deposited the money on the same day. Evidence was recorded on the 6th February, 1975 and since it was a suit of the nature of small causes no issues were separately framed on any particular date, except during the dictation of the judgment. The suit was resisted on the pleas that the applicant was not in arrears of rent as alleged by the Plaintiff, that he had not sub -let the premises in dispute and consequently was not liable to ejectment from the premises in dispute or for a decree for arrears of rent. The Judge, Small Cause Court, believed the Plaintiff's case and decreed the claim for the ejectment of the applicant as also for arrears of rent. Aggrieved by the order of the Judge, Small Cause Court, the applicant preferred a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act. The revisional court took the view that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act and was not liable to eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. The court below, however, maintained the decree of the trial court since it upheld the finding that the applicant was liable to ejectment on the ground mentioned in Section 20(2)(e) of the Act. The applicant preferred a revision to this Court. When the revision came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, he found the finding recorded by the court below with regard to the plea of sub -letting by the Defendant unsustainable and consequently reversed that finding. The opposite -party supported the decree of the court below and contended that the view taken by the learned District Judge on the interpretation of Section 20(4) of the Act was erroneous and deserves to be reversed. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff -Respondent placed reliance before the learned Single Judge on the decision of K.C. Agrawal, J. in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal : 1975 AWC 489 in support of his contention. The learned single Judge was not inclined to agree with the view expressed by K.C. Agrawal, J. in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal since in his opinion it was in conflict with the decisions of this Court in Jagannath Prasad v. Smt. Chandrawati, 1969 ALJ 881, Ganesh Prasad v. Smt. Saraswati Devi, 1973 ALJ 268, Kamta Prasad Jain v. Om Prakash, 1966 ALJ 1108 and Mewa Ram v. Ablak, 1936 ALJ 1401. The learned Single Judge also noticed a conflict of views on the question as to which is the first date of hearing of a suit within the meaning of Section 20(4) of the Act. The cases brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge have been mentioned in the Referring order. None of the cases which were cited before the learned single Judge had taken note of the Explanation introduced in Section 20(4) of the Act by the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976) hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act. He consequently referred the following two questions for decision by a larger Bench: (1) Whether the deposit of money contemplated by Sub -section (4) of Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 by tender in Court is sufficient to give the Defendant the benefit of Sub -section (4) of Section 20 of the Act? (2) Whether the 'first hearing' of the suit, when the case is adjourned from time to time, is the date when the written statement is filed or the date on which the issues are framed or any other date - While framing the second question apparently the learned tingle Judge had in mind the Explanation added to Section 20(4) of the Amending Act since he has specifically made a mention of it in the Referring Order. After we had heard this Reference for sometime on the questions referred, counsel for the parties agreed that since admittedly In the present case a tender for the amount contemplated by Section 20(4) of the Act was made by the Defendant -applicant on the date for filing of written statement, the question as to whether the date on which issues are framed or any other date is the date of first hearing did not arise for consideration in the case. They consequently made a joint request that the second question as referred be reframed in the following terms: Whether the explanation added by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 to Sub -section (4) of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is retrospective in its operation. We consequently have reframed the second question as above and propose to answer the question as reframed. As far as the first question is concerned, in our opinion in view of Rule 275 of the General Rules (Civil), 1957, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that a tender, which is in fact a credit of some kind upon the treasury, is a deposit in court made by the Defendant of the amount mentioned in Sub -section (4) of Section 20 of the Act as it stands amended by the Amending Act. Rule 275 of the General Rules (Civil) to which a reference has been made is in the following terms: Payments of money to, or through a civil court shall be made in cash or by postal money -order or by cheques drawn on a recognised bank or by credit of some kind upon the treasury. Currency notes of any circle in the Union of India shall be received in payment of Government dues, e.g., sums payable to the Government under decrees and order, sums deposited under Section 379(1) of Act No. XXXIX of 1925 and duties and penalties paid under Section 35 of Act No. II of 1899. It shall not be obligatory to receive a currency note of any circle if it is necessary to give change. The rule equates a "credit of some kind upon the treasury" with cash, postal money -order and cheques drawn on a recognised bank. A tender drawn on the treasury or the State Bank has been put on a par with other various kinds of payments mentioned in Rule 275 as quoted above. The fact that the court passed an order accepting the tender on a later date and the money was deposited on the same dale will make no difference and the deposit in court shall be deemed to be on the date when the tender was presented before the court. If the tender was a bona -fide one and there was no allegation or proof that the applicant was not in a position to deposit the money on the tender being passed by the court the deposit in court must be deemed to be on the date when the tender was presented in court. This is the view that has been taken by this Court in various decisions, which we shall presently advert to, though no specific mention has been made in Rule 275.
(3.) A Division Bench of this Court in Mt. Gomti v. Lachman Das Champa Ram : AIR 1934 All. 817 held that, According to the rule of practice which has been made with due regard to the administrative convenience of the court cash is not received by the Court, but is to be deposited in the treasury. Tender is merely an offer to the Court of payment or if it is prepared to accept the amount therein entered. If for its own convenience the Court directs the person offering payment to deposit elsewhere, the person liable to pay should be deemed to have done his part of the undertaking when he offered to pay.;