K.N. Singh, J. - (1.) THE Petitioner filed the present writ petition in 1973 praying for a writ of mandamus directing the State of U.P. and the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Lucknow, to fix his salary as Assistant Engineer and also to place his name above Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in the seniority list of Engineers.
(2.) AFTER the coming into force of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976, an application was made on behalf of the State Government with a prayer that the petition be disposed of as having abated under Section 58(2) of that Act, on the ground that the Petitioner has an alternative remedy of raising his claim before the Services Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976. The Petitioner also filed an application for the amendment of the writ petition and raised grounds challenging validity of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act. Both these applications have been heard by us at some length. Section 58(2) of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act lays down that every pending petition before a High Court which could not be admitted by the High Court under the provisions of Article 226 as substituted by Section 38 of the Act if such petition had been made after the appointed day, shall abate and any interim order shall stand vacated Article 226 as amended by this Act specifically prohibits the entertainment of a writ petition if an alternative remedy is available to the Petitioner. The Petitioner had no doubt an alternative remedy to raise his claim, before the Services Tribunal on the appointed day (1st February 1977) and, as such, the petition is liable to abate.
(3.) SRI G.N. Kunzru, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, is ultra vires the State Legislature. He urged that the State Legislature had no legislative competence to enact a law creating special tribunal to hear and decide the dispute raised by public servants. Having given our anxious consideration to the submission made by the learned counsel, we find no merit in the submission. Articles 245 and 246 read with Schedule VII lay down the area and the extent of legislative competence of the Central as well as State legislatures. The State Legislature is exclusively competent to enact laws in respect of matters mentioned in List II of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule is as under: State Public Service; State Public Service Commission. This entry confers exclusive jurisdiction on the State Legislature to enact laws relating to public servants as well as to State Public Service Commission. The State Legislature in the instant case has enacted the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, which contains provisions for adjudication of claims of public servants by a tribunal constituted under the Act to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The entry "State Public Service" contemplates enactment of laws covering entire field relating to public service. It is well settled principle that while considering the extent of the legislative competence of a legislature with respect to an entry contained in the Seventh Schedule the entry must be given its wide amplitude. The entry "State Public Services" in its wide amplitude contemplates enactment of laws covering various aspects of public service which may contain provision for creation of public services, procedure of recruitment, conditions of service as well as the procedure and manner for the adjudication of any grievance raised by a member of the public service. The enacting clause of Article 309 contemplates making of laws by the State Legislature regulating recruitment, conditions of service of persons appointed to public service and, posts in connection with the affairs of the State. Any provision made by a legislature for the adjudication of the claims raised by a public servant would be in respect of conditions of service. In our opinion, the State legislature had full jurisdiction to enact the U.P. Public Service (Tribunals) Act, 1976, and as such, the Act is valid.;