Per Jagdish Sahai, J. - (1.) THIS special appeal is directed against the judgment of Oak, J. (as he then was), dated 9 October, 1961, allowing. Writ Petition No. 3164 of 1958 filed by the respondent, Sharif Ahmad Nagrami (hereinafter referred to as Nagrami).
(2.) NAGRAMI was in the service of the New India Insurance Company, Ltd., Bombay, as an inspector. After the enforcement of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the business of the aforesaid company was taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). The petitioner thereafter came in the employment of the Corporation. He was prosecuted before a magistrate, first class, for offences punishable under S. 406, Indian Penal Code. The magistrate convicted him under S. 406, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 500, in default to suffer imprisonment for one year. On 26 February, 1957, the Divisional Manager dismissed Nagrami from service. On 5 March, 1957, Nagrami informed the Corporation of his acquittal and on 21 March, 1957, he made an application for the withdrawal of the dismissal order. On 2 August, 1957, the Branch Manager informed Nagrami that the order of dismissal could not be withdrawn. On 14 October, 1957, Nagrami filed an appeal before the executive committee. Life Insurance Corporation, Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the executive committee). On 28 May, 1958, the executive committee dismissed the appeal and by means of a letter dated 23 June, 1958, the Divisional Manager informed Nagrami that his appeal had been dismissed on 28 May, 1958. The petitioner then filed. Writ Petition No. 3164 of 1958 in this Court on 28 October, 1958. Oak J., allowed the petition on the ground that Nagrami could not be dismissed under Regn. 40 of the (Staff) Regulations of the Corporation because on the date when the order of his dismissal was passed, he was not under an order of conviction. The learned single Judge held that, that being the position, there was violation of statutory regulation and for that reason the order of dismissal was liable to be quashed. Oak, J., repelled the plea made on behalf of the Corporation that inasmuch as the executive committee which dismissed the appeal of Nagrami was located outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, no writ could be issued to it and even though the order of dismissal was passed by the Divisional Manager who was functioning within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Court could not grant any relief to Nagrami. In this appeal which has been filed by the Corporation, Sri S. D. Agarwal has made two submissions before us: firstly, that the learned single Judge has misread the provisions of Regn. 40, and secondly, that in view of the circumstance that this Court had no jurisdiction to quash the order of the executive committee, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. We proceed to consider the submission seriatim. Regulation 40 reads: "40. (1) An employee who is arrested for debt or on a criminal charge shall be liable to be placed under suspension from the date of his arrest and shall be allowed the payments admissible to an employee under suspension under Cl. (4) of Regn. 41 until the termination of the proceedings against him, when an adjustment of his pay and allowances shall be made according to the circumstances of the case and in the light of the decision as to whether his absence is to be accounted for as a period of duty or leave, the full pay and allowance being given only in the event of the employee being acquitted of all blame and treated as on duty the period of his absence. 'An employee who is committed to prison for debt or is convicted of a criminal offence shall be liable to dismissal'. (2) All such cases shall be reported to the executive committee as soon as practicable. Explanation, - In this regulation the expression 'termination of proceedings' shall mean the decision of the lowest Court which first finally disposes of the case. Similarly committal or conviction shall mean committal or conviction by the lowest Court which first disposes of the case and it shall be open to the Corporation to dismiss an employee who is committed to prison or who is convicted of a criminal charge as from the date of the order of the lowest Court which finally dealt with the case." [Herein italicized by us.] It has been contended by Sri S. D. Agarwal that the learned single Judge ignored the explanation. It is true that the explanation has not been noticed by Oak, J., in his judgment. He has, while dealing with Regn. 40, observed as follows: "It is true that the petitioner was initially convicted by a magistrate on 29 September, 1956. But he was acquitted in appeal on 12 February, 1957. It is significant that the order of acquittal was passed in appeal before the petitioner was dismissed from service (26 February, 1957). In view of the petitioner's acquittal on 12 February, 1957, it was impossible to say that he had been convicted on 29 September, 1956. On 26 February, 1957, it was impossible to dismiss the petitioner from service under Regn. 40 on the simple footing that he had been convicted of a criminal offence. The true position was that the petitioner's conviction had been set aside in appeal."
(3.) IN support of this observation Sri Naithani, who has appeared for Nagrami, has placed reliance upon the following decisions of this Court under Cl. (a) to the proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India: (1) R. S. Das v. Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad [A.I.R. 1960 All. 538]; (2) Divisional Superintendent, Nothern Railway, Allahabad v. Ram Saran Das [1961 - I L.L.J. 147]; and (3) Kunwar Bahadur v. Union of India [1968 - II L.L.J. 16]. We have carefully perused the provisions of Regn. 40, those of Art. 311(2), proviso(a), as also the authorities mentioned above. In our opinion, the authorities have no application to the case before us which is governed by Regn. 40 and not by Art. 311(2), proviso(a). There is no provision similar to the explanation to Regn. 40, in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The explanation makes it absolutely clear that whether or not a person has been convicted for the purposes of Regn. 40 would be determined on the basis of the order of conviction passed by the lowest Court. The explanation does not provide that for the determination of the question whether or not a person has been convicted, the order of the last Court to such appeal or revision might have been taken would be considered.;