Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - (1.) THE matters which have been referred to this Full Bench relate to court-fee.
(2.) SAGUN Chandra and Smt. Raieshwar Devi, plaintiffs-respondents in First Appeal No. 301 of 1959, filed suit No. 3 of 1957 in the court of the Civil Judge Farrukhabad, for a declaration that a sale deed dated October 16. 1952 was unauthorised, void, illegal, and ineffective against the plaintiffs, and it did not bind them or effect their one-third share in the property purporting to have been hold under it. Smt Ram Piari, plaintiff-respondent in First Appeal No. 302 of 1959, filed in the same court suit no 48 of 1956 for a similar declaration in her own favour in respected of the same sale deed A court-fee of Rs 18-12-0. as a fixed court-fee for a suit to obtain a declaratory, decree, was paid on the plaint in both the suits. The Inspector of Stamps raised an objection that additional court-fee was payable on the plaint in the two suits as the reliefs claimed therein were covered by Section 7 (IV-A)(U.P.) of the Court Fees Act. Kunj Behari Lal, who is the vendee under the sale deed and who was the main contesting defendant in the suits, also took an objection that the court-fee paid on the plaints was insufficient. The learned Civil Judge framed an issue on the question of court-fee and gave a finding thereon on 6th September, 1957. He held that Section 7(iv-A) (U. P.) of the Court Fees Act has no application as a sale deed is not an instrument securing property, and that the suits fall under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. His finding, accordingly, was that the court-fee paid on the plaint in the two suits was sufficient. On the same date the learned Judge passed an order that, for the reasons given in the finding recorded by him, the report of the Inspector of stamps was not correct, and directed that information of the order be given to him. No application for revision of this order was filed under Section 6-B of the Court-Fees Act. Both the suits were decreed. Kunj Behari Lal thereupon filed these appeals, paying the same court-fee on the memorandum of appeal as had been paid on the plaint. After examining the record, the Stamp Reporter of this Court reported that the suits giving rise to these appeals really fall within the purview of Clause (2) of Section 7 (iv-A) (U. P.) of the Court Fees Act, and there was, accordingly, a deficiency of Rs. 161-12-0 in the court-fee on the plaint and a similar deficiency on the memorandum of appeal in each of the two cases. There was an objection to the report, and the matters eventually came up before a learned Judge of this Court. The learned Judge found that there was a conflict of authorities on the questions involved and ordered that the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for deciding them. The matter went before a Division Bench, but the Bench thought that the questions should be decided by a Full Bench. That is how they have been referred to this Bench The questions that arise for consideration may be formulated thus:-- "(1) Whether the suits giving rise to these appeals fall under Section 7 (iv-A) (U. P.) or under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act? (2) Whether the decision or order of the Civil Judge dated 6th September 1957 relating to the court-fee payable in the suits has become final? (3) Whether an order directing the plaintiffs-respondents to make good the deficiency in court-fee on the plaint in the two suits can be made by this Court in the appeals arising out of them and what would be the result if the deficiency is not made good?" Question 1.
(3.) SECTION 7(iv-A) applies to suits for 01 involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value. A sale deed cannot appropriately be described as 'an instrument securing money'. Money is certainly paid or promised in exchange for transfer of ownership effected by a sale deed, but securing money is not the object of a sale deed and it does not constitute its essence. What has to be seen, therefore, is whether a sale deed is an instrument securing 'other property having such value.' The Civil Judge, relying on Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Jashpal Singh, AIR 1956 All 168, held that a sale deed is not an instrument securing property In that case a learned single judge of this Court has observed:-- "The expression 'an instrument securing money' obviously means a document creating a charge or hypothecation bond or a mortgage deed or any other document intended to assure payment of money. The expression 'an instrument securing other property' should have, unless the context does not permit it, a similar meaning. A deed of sale hardly secures property. It conveys the property and transfers the title of the property to the transferee." Apart from what has been quoted above nothing else has been said by the learned Judge in support of the view taken by him. There is also no reference to the authorities bearing on the point. Indeed, it has been noted in the judgment that the learned counsel for the State was not able to cite any authority to support the contention that a sale deed was a document securing property within the meaning of Section 7(iv-A), It would appear that there were weighty authorities in support of the contention.;