R.S. Pathak, J. - (1.) THE Petitioners challenge the order of the Board of Revenue, allowing the revision application filed by the Respondent No. 4 under the UP Encumbered Estates Act. The revision application was heard by Sri Ram Kinker Singh, a Judicial Member of the Board of Revenue, who by his order dated 2 -1 -1963 allowed the revision application subject to the concurrence of the other Judicial Member. The case was then laid before Sri R.R. Mathur, another Judicial Member, but Sri Mathur in the view that the concurrence of another member of the Board was unnecessary, returned the case to Sri Ram Kinker Singh. Thereupon, Sri Ram Kinker Singh, as Judicial Member, made an order in terms of his earlier judgment.
(2.) THE Petitioners contend that the view taken by Sri R.R. Mathur that the concurrence of another member was unnecessary is contrary to law. Reliance has been placed upon Rule 190 of the UP Revenue Court Manual which provides, Where the Board has distributed its revisional business among the Members, the order of a single Member shall be the order of the Board: Provided that no decree or order coming up before the Board in revision shall be modified or reversed without the concurrent judgment of two Members and in such event the judgment or order shall be signed by both the Members concurring therein. It is pointed out that although Rule 190 is contained in a body of rules to which is superscripted the heading "Revisions Under Section 275 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act", there is nothing in the body of the rules to suggest that it deals only with revision applications under that Act. The submission of the Petitioners is that the heading must be ignored and consideration must be confined to the terms of the rule. It seems to me that the contention must be rejected. The procedure for filing, entertaining and disposing of revision applications is set out in Rules 185 to 190. It is true that specifically there is no provision in the rules themselves stating that they apply only to revision applications Under Section 275 of the UP Tenancy Act. But if regard be had to the body of rules as a whole it would be clear that they provide only for revision applications Under Section 275 of the UP Tenancy Act. In particular, Rule 187 specifically speaks of revision applications Under Section 275 of the UP Tenancy Act. Then it must be remembered that the rules have been made by the Board of Revenue for regulating its internal procedure. The intention of the Board must be discerned from all that has been set out in the body of the rules. It is true that the intention of each rule must be gathered from the language in which it is couched, but in my opinion there is nothing to prevent the court from construing the compass of the rules by reference to the heading which, it is not disputed, was expressly inserted by the Board. Another consideration prompts me to the conclusion that the rules must be confined to revision applications Under Section 275 of the UP Tenancy Act. Rules 191 to 196 deal with references and revisions Under Section 218 and 219 of the UP Land Revenue Act. Then follows Rule 197 and that rule provides for the maintenance of a register in respect of cases falling into two categories only, cases under the UP Tenancy Act and cases under the UP Land Revenue Act. No provision has been made for the maintenance of a register in cases of revisions or references under any other statute. Having regard to the significant provisions of Rule 197 it is clear that Rules 185 to 196 were intended to apply to revisions and references under the UP Tenancy Act and the UP Land Revenue Act alone. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the Petitioners that Rules 190 governs the disposal of a revision application under the UP Encumbered Estates Act. The alternative contention of Learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that the concurrence of two members of the Board was necessary by virtue of Section 8 of the UP Land Revenue Act. Section 8, it seems to me, cannot be applied in the case of a revision application under the UP Encumbered Estates Act. It speaks of an appeal, a reference Under Section 218 of the UP Land Revenue Act and a revision Under Section 219 of that Act. It is urged that the revision application under the UP Encumbered Estates Act must be considered to be an appeal. That submission has no force either. All revision applications he Under Section 46(2) of the UP Encumbered Estates Act and it is clear from the language of that provision that the legislature intended to refer to a proceeding in the nature of a revision application and not in the nature of an appeal. Moreover, Ch. VI of the UP Encumber ed Estates Act, which contains Section 46(2), specifically refers in its various provisions to an appeal and a revision separately and there can be little doubt that the legislature when it enacted these provisions did not intend a revision to be taken for an appeal, I am of the view that it was not necessary for another member of the Board to express his concurrence with the judgment of a member in order that the judgment of that member be considered as final in law. The judgment of the first member was sufficient to dispose of the revision application. The second contention of the Petitioners is that the proceeding in the revision application had abated because of the omission to implead the legal representatives of Mohammad Shibli, one of the judgment -debtors. It is urged that the view of the Board to the contrary is erroneous. The contention is without force. Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to revision applications. It applies to suits and to appeals which in fact are the continuation of the suits out of which they arise. A revisional proceeding is not a continuation of the suit. It is clear that the revision application arises out of execution proceedings. Order XXII Rule 12 specifically States that Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII will not apply to execution proceedings. The Petitioners rely upon those provisions of Order XXII and in my opinion such reliance is misconceived. The second contention of the Petitioners is also rejected.
(3.) IT is then urged that the Board has, erred in holding that the entries made after the abolition of Zamindari were alone to be considered for determining the rights of the parties. Now the Board has come to that view on the reasoning that new rights had been created upon the abolition of Zamindari and no Amaldaramad could to made without looking into the existing entries in the records of rights. I have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and I am unable to say that the view taken, by the Board is manifestly erroneous in law.;