- (1.) Heard Mr. K.S. Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.K.S. Chauhan, the Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the Staterespondents.
(2.) The petitioner has sought a direction for consideration and passing of appropriate orders on his claim in light of a letter dated 20 July 2016 issued by the Mines Inspector and addressed to the Director Geology and Mining Directorate, Department of Mining, Government of U.P. The communication refers to the fact that the mining lease granted in favour of the petitioner could not be worked for a period of 14 March 2013 to 25 June 2013 and thereafter in the course of obtaining the environment clearance. It is further held out in this communication that the total obstructed period of the lease worked out to 1 year 7 months and 26 days. The Mines Inspector, on the basis of the above, sought directions from the Director, to proceed in the matter accordingly. Before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the mining lease could not be worked on account of certain supervening circumstances which were beyond the control of the petitioner. It was contended that during the various periods which find mention in the communication dated 20 July 2016, the petitioner could not undertake mining operations for reasons clearly beyond his control. These, in his submission, were on account of the time spent in obtaining an environmental clearance and other restraints placed by the respondents. The prayer therefore made is that the obstructed period of the lease should be added to the original term granted under the mining lease and consequently the petitioner be permitted to work the mining lease for a further period of 1 year 7 months and 26 days.
(3.) Referring to the pleas taken by the Staterespondents in their Counter Affidavit, the learned counsel submitted that the restraint imposed by this Court in terms of the order dated 20 June 2016 passed upon Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No. 28916 of 2016 (Vijay Kumar Dwivedi Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) would have no application inasmuch as the same related to leases and permissions granted subsequent to 31 May 2012. Learned counsel contended that since the lease in favour of the petitioner had come to be executed on 13 January 2012 and therefore admittedly prior to 31 May 2012, the order of this Court dated 20 June 2016 would not stand in the way of the respondents favourably considering the prayer of the petitioner for grant of an additional period to carry on mining operations. It was lastly submitted that the power to accord such benefit to the petitioner flows from Rule 68 of the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 and therefore the State Government has the requisite authority and jurisdiction to grant extension of the lease period which had come to be obstructed on account of the acts of the respondents. We find that the issue raised for our consideration is no longer res integra and has been authoritatively ruled upon by a Division Bench of the Court in Mohammad Yunus Hasan Vs. State of U.P. & 4 Others, 2016 5 ADJ 365(DB). As is evident from a reading of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Mohammad Yunus Hasan, that was also a case where a lease for excavation of minor minerals had been granted prior to 31 May 2012 and the petitioner therein had sought extension of the term of the lease on account of the fact that an order cancelling the same was ultimately set aside after almost two years in appeal by the Commissioner. Negativing the claim raised therein the Division Bench observed as under: "Since, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner revolves around the interpretation of Rule 68 of the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963, it would be appropriate for this Court to deal with the said provisions itself at the first instance. Rule 68 of the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 read as follows: "68. Relaxation of rules in special cases. The State Government may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded authorised in any case the grant of any mining lease or the working of any mine for, the purpose of winning any minerals on terms and conditions different from those laid down in these rules." From a simple reading of the aforesaid Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, it is apparent that it confers a discretionary power upon the State Government i.e. "if it is of the opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded, authorize in any case the grant of any mining lease or the working of any mine for, the purpose of winning any minerals on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the Rules". In our opinion the crucial words under Rule 68 are "in the interest of mineral development". Rule 68 does not confer a power upon the State Government, to extend the term of the lease beyond the contracted period, without following the procedure prescribed under Chapter II & IV of the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963. The main object of Rule 68 is to provide special power to the State Government in the interest of mineral development and not to compensate the loss if any caused to a lease holder because of an order of the competent authority terminating the lease for whatever reasons it may be. Rule 68 cannot be read in the manner to suggest that the State Government, without forming any opinion that it is in the interest of mineral development to grant leases, can extend the term of an expired lease on the ground that certain loss has been caused to the lease holder because of curtailment of the term of the lease granted. Even otherwise, we may record that the terms and conditions on which the lease was earlier granted to the petitioner in the year 2006, have now gone a sea change, as already noticed in the judgments in the case of Nar Narain Mishra Vs. State of U.P. and others (supra) and Sukhan Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra). We are more than satisfied that in the facts of the case, it would not be fair and just to direct any extension of the term of the lease in favour of the petitioner, for the period it stood curtailed because of the order of District Magistrate referred to above. At the same time, we are conscious of the fact that if any loss has been caused to the petitioner because of any alleged illegality in order of the District Magistrate, he can always approach the State Government seeking compensation or may file a civil suit for the purpose, but direction for extension of the term of the lease in the changed scenario, would not be just and appropriate. Counsel for the petitioner had also placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Provash Chandra Dalui and another Vs. Biswanath Banerjee and another, 1989 AIR(SC) 1834, specifically paragraph 12 as well as upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Swarup Chaturvedi Vs. State of U.P. and others,2007 102 RevDec 574, specifically paragraph 13 wherein the judgment of the Provash Chandra Dalui and another Vs. Biswanath Banerjee and another (supra) has been applied for the proposition that extension of lease only mean prolongation of the term of the lease whereas renewal means a new lease, for fresh term. There can be no dispute with regard to the legal position, which has been so explained by the Apex Court but the right of extension of the lease, must either flow from a statutory provisions or from the terms of the lease which has been executed between the parties. In the facts of the case, no such provision has been brought to the notice of the Court. Therefore, what is being prayed for in the facts of the case, is execution of a fresh lease for the period, the petitioner could not operate his earlier lease because of the order of the District Magistrate. We may also record that under the lease which was executed between the parties, there was no provision for extension of the term of the lease. At least, no such clause has been brought to the notice of the Court. The distinction between extension of a lease and renewal of the lease is also required to be kept in mind. The legal position in that regard stand settled under the judgment in the case of State of U.P. and others Vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead) through L.R.S., 2004 1 SCC 1, ref. Para 13, relevant portion whereof reads as follows: "13. ...........There is a difference between an extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed, as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. However, option for renewal consistently with the covenant for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the terms thereof and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties............." We are also of the opinion that the judgments of the Apex court in the case of Beg Raj Singh Vs. State of U.P and others (supra) and J.P. Yadav Vs. Kanhaiya Singh and others (supra) as also the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Rajendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others (supra) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable in the facts of the present case as also in view of the change in law regarding grant of mining leases subsequent to the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Deepak Kumar and other Vs. State of Haryana and others (supra). For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any good ground to issue any mandamus for deciding the application of the petitioner, with the prayer for grant of extension of lease." As is evident from the principles enunciated by the Division Bench in Mohammad Yunus Hasan, a prayer for extension of lease is neither referable to Rule 68 which was held to be clearly inapplicable for consideration of such requests. The Division Bench has further noted that no provision of the lease executed between the parties warranted or mandated an extension of the term of the lease in case it came to be obstructed by an act of the respondents. It was further noted that the right to seek extension of the lease period must flow either from statutory provisions or from and under the terms of the lease itself. The judgment of the Division Bench in Mohammad Yunus Hasan squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench in Mohammad Yunus Hasan had clearly refused to issue a mandamus for deciding the application of the petitioner therein for grant of extension of lease.;