YASHWANT VARMA,J. - (1.) Heard Sri K.K. Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner. Although the respondents are represented by Sri S.M. Nazar Bokhari, learned counsel has not appeared in both calls of the writ petition. The writ petition itself being of 2012 is therefore taken up for final disposal. Sri Arora, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays that this petition be treated as being one under Article 227 of the Constitution. The oral prayer so made is granted. The Court also notes that despite time having been earlier granted, no counter affidavit in opposition has been filed on behalf of the respondents. The challenge in the instant writ petition is to an order dated 18 January 2012 passed by the Revisional Court under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act 1. The judgment of the Revisional Court set aside the order passed by the Trial Court allowing a suit for eviction instituted by the petitioner under the provisions of the 1887 Act. The petitioner is a Waqf and the owner of the properties situate at Rampur in which the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were stated to be tenants. The petitioner alleged that the respondents had not only defaulted in the payment of rent but had also sublet the premises in question and consequently by a notice called upon them to hand over vacant possession of the premises, failing which it was held out that the petitioner would institute proceedings for their eviction. On 14 July 2003, the respondents submitted a reply to the notice issued by the petitioner. It becomes significant to note here that in the notice, the respondents did not deny the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was further asserted therein that they were not in arrears of rent and that after the death of his father rent had continually been paid to the petitioner. The petitioner ultimately instituted proceedings under the Act for the eviction of the respondents. It is at this stage that in the written statement for the first time the respondents asserted that the tenanted premises had initially been occupied by their father and that after his death the respondents continued to occupy the premises in question and had also expended substantial sums of moneys on its repair and upkeep. They then asserted that by virtue of an oral Hibba they became owners in possession of the premises in question. It is significant to note that in paragraph 6 in which this plea was taken, the respondents neither disclosed as to who made the Hibba or in whose presence nor did they assert or disclose the date on which this oral Hibba is stated to have been made in their favour. The Trial Court set the matter for hearing and framed as many as eight issues including issue nos. 1 and 2 on the question as to whether the respondents were the tenants of the petitioner and that whether their occupation in the tenanted premises was valid in the eyes of law. After taking into account the stand taken by parties as evidenced in their pleadings filed before it as well as the evidence placed on record, the Trial court entered a categorical finding that the respondents were in fact the tenants of the petitioner. It also recorded a finding that the property in question was a Waqf property and therefore the petitioner was the owner of the property in question. Similarly, it answered issue no. 2 in favour of the petitioner herein. Having held against the respondents, the Trial Court ultimately passed an order for their eviction together with a direction for recovery of arrears of rent. This judgment of the Trial Court rendered on 1 August 2011 was assailed by the respondents in revision. The Revisional Court has proceeded to set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and has accepted the contention of the respondents primarily on the score of jurisdiction. It has firstly held that there was a dispute between the parties with regard to ownership and secondly that therefore the Small Causes Court stood denuded of jurisdiction to deal with the suit. It has essentially rested its judgment on Section 23 of the Act and has held that in the fitness of things the Trial Court should not have proceeded under the provisions of the 1887 Act and should have in fact returned the plaint for presentation before the appropriate civil court. It is these grounds which have weighed with the Revisional Court to hold against the petitioner and to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Sri Arora, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has highlighted the fact that in the initial reply which was submitted by the respondents to the notice they had not disputed the ownership or title of the petitioner. He also sought to highlight the fact that at no stage or at least till the filing of the written statement in the proceedings before the Trial Court did the respondents deny or dispute the fact that the property in question belonged to the petitioner Waqf and that they had occupied the premises in question and had also regularly paid rent till such time as the default occurred. He submitted that the Trial Court upon due consideration of the material evidence placed before it had recorded findings of fact in favour of the petitioner which clearly did not merit any interference in revision. It was his further submission that in the absence of a specific and substantial plea or dispute raised in respect of ownership and title the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court cannot be said to be ousted. It was contended that in order for a dispute of the nature which is contemplated under Section 23 be said to exist it must be held that it is one which is substantial and of some moment. Sri Arora, also placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by learned Judges of this Court as also the Supreme Court to submit that it is well recognised that the Small Causes Court is conferred a discretion under Section 23 to return a plaint. He also referred to the fact that it has been settled by a series of precedents that the Small Causes Court can adjudicate and rule upon an issue of title incidentally. In view of the above, it was his submission that the judgment of the Revisional Court clearly suffers from grave and palpable errors of law and fact and therefore deserves to be corrected by the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is more than evident that prior to the proceedings being initiated under the 1887 Act and at a time when the respondents were first called upon to respond to the claims of the petitioner, no dispute was raised with respect to the tenanted premises being either Waqf property or in respect of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents. This assumes significance in light of the fact that the receipt of the notice for ejectment constituted the first occasion for the respondents to assert and raise the issue of title in case it was seriously disputed. In fact far from disputing the title of the petitioner there was for all purposes a tacit admission of a landlord tenant relationship as is evident from the reply to the statutory notice served upon the respondents. In their reply to the notice, the respondents asserted and admitted that their father had occupied the premises and that upon his demise they had continued in occupation thereof. More fundamentally, this Court notes that the fact that the property belonged to and vested in a Waqf was also not disputed by the respondents in their reply to this notice. The dispute of title itself came to be raised only when a written statement was filed before the Trial Court. In this also the respondents only asserted that they had come to attain title and possession of the premises in question by virtue of an oral Hibba. As noted above, the written statement neither carried details of who had allegedly executed this Hibba in favour of the respondents nor did they even disclose the date on which this Hibba allegedly came to be made in their favour. The issue of wether Waqf property could be alienated by way of an oral Hibba is of course another aspect on which this Court must hold against the respondents. However, while leaving that issue for deliberation hereinafter and returning to the judgment of the Revisional Court, this Court finds that the Court below has clearly and palpably erred in proceeding to interfere with findings of fact which stood recorded by the Trial Court. As one reads the order of the Revisional Court it appears to have proceeded upon the misconception that any issue or dispute of title would denude the Small Causes Court of jurisdiction to try the suit. At the very outset, it bears note that Section 23 of the Act does not mandate that a Small Causes Court must return a plaint immediately upon a dispute in respect of title being raised. As rightly submitted by Sri Arora, and as is evident from the principles enunciated in the judgments relied upon, all that Section 23 does is to confer a discretion in the Small Causes Court to not delve into a dispute of title itself and relegate the parties to the ordinary remedies available before a regular civil court. This itself flows from a plain construction of the language employed in Section 23 which hedges the exercise of power by using the expression ".......which such a Court cannot finally determine.......". The legislature has taken care while framing Section 23 to ensure that the Small Causes Court, bearing in mind the nature of functions it has to discharge under the 1887 Act, is not bogged down by long winded and complicated disputes of title. It is this legislative intent which informs Section 23 . It is therefore more than clear and apparent that Section 23 confers a discretion on the Small Causes Court to return a plaint where a dispute in respect of title is raised which it finds is of such a complicated or complex character that it would be more appropriate to be decided by a regular civil court. The Court must also necessarily bear in mind that the expression "proof or disproof of a title to immoveable property......" in this context cannot mean any frivolous or unsubstantiated claim. A bare denial of title without a substantial plea in support thereof cannot fall within the category of disputes envisaged in the statute. A dispute in order to fall within the mischief of Section 23 must necessarily mean a serious, substantial and complex issue of title and possession which is at least prima facie borne out from the material on record and which may impel the Small Causes Court to veer towards forming an opinion that the issues raised justifies relegation of the parties before it to institute appropriate proceedings before the regular Civil Court. A dispute which neither carries even prima facie weight nor is borne out from a simple and cursory reading of the pleadings and the material placed before the Court cannot fall within the class of disputes which would stand covered by Section 23 . This, of course, is apart from the well settled principle that the Small Causes Court could have gone into the issue of title, albeit, incidentally. The Court in arriving at the above conclusion draws sustenance from the principles enunciated by the Court in Pratap Singh Vs. IXth Add. District Judge Fatehpur2 "6. The object of the section is to enable the Small Causes Courts to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in small causes suit when the right of the plaintiff and the relief claimed by him depend upon the proof or disproof of a title to an immovable property or other title which the small causes court cannot finally determine and to return the plaint to be presented to a court having jurisdiction to determine the title. In effect, the rights to, or interests in immovable property are elaborately excluded, but as questions of this character may arise incidentally in small causes suits, a facultative provision is made by Section 23 enabling the Small Causes Court to send the matter to ordinary civil court but not obliging it to do so. 7. A Small Causes Court is expected to try suits of comparatively simple character and, therefore, suits involving question of title should not be entertained by that court. Section 23 is intended to enable the Courts of Small Causes to save their time by returing the plaints in suits which involve enquiry into the question of title. This section is designed to meet the cases in which judge, Small Causes court is satisfied that the question of title raised is so intricate and difficult that it should not be decided summarily but in ordinary court in which evidence is recorded in full and the decision is open to appeal. The underlying principle under Section 23 seems to be that where it is considered advisable by a Small Causes Court that a final decision on a question of title, which decision would, if given by an original court, ordinarily be subject to appeal and even to second appeal and which decision would ordinarily be res-judicata between the parties, should be given in the particular case before a Small Causes Court, by an original court, the Small Causes Court though competent to decide incidentally the question of title in that particular case might exercise with discretion, the power of returning the plaint to be presented to the original court which would have jurisdiction to so decide on that title finally. Obviously, the section is designed to meet the cases in which the Judge, Small Causes Court is satisfied that the question of title raised is so intricate and difficult that it should not be decided summarily but in an ordinary court in which evidence is recorded in full and decision is open to appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlady placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Ravindra Pal Gupta v. Addl . District Judge. Dehradun, 1996 (27) ALR 35; Jagannath Prasad v. 12th Addl. District Judge. Kanpur, 1996 (28) ALR 310 and Mushir Khan alias Masshan v. XIIth Addl . District Judge. Moradabad and others. 1999 (4) AWC 2900. urged that since the trial court has exercised its jurisdiction not to return the plaint but to proceed withthe suit, there is no justification to interfere with the discretion which has been exercised in accordance with law and which has further been affirmed by the revisional court. Much emphasis was laid on the fact that it is open for the trial court to go into the question of title as set up in defence incidentally and therefore, the trial court was not required to return the plaint merely on the basis of pleadings of the parties. A passing reference was also made to the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Jagannath Prasad v. XIV Addl District Judge. Kanpur, 1997 (1) ARC 89, in which it has been held that the mere fact that in the written statement the defendant claims the title in himself is not sufficient for establishing that question of title is involved in the suit, as well as, another decision Jialal v. XIth Additional District Judge, Meerut, 1994 (23) ALR 281, in which it was ruled that a suit by landlord against a tenant is cognizable by Judge Small Causes Court on limited questions and the Court, though cannot decide the question of title, it can decide the suit on the strength of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant. To countervail the above submissions. Sri Naqvi appearing on behalf of the petitioner, placed reliance on Ram Jiwan Misra v. Smt. Kallu and others, 1980 ARC 522 and Iqbal Ahmad v. VIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others , 1999 (37) ALR 176. In Ram Jiwan Misra's case, celebrated decision of this Court in Bhola v. L. Chaman Lal was referred to. The gamut of all these decisions is that the Small Causes Court, in a summary proceeding, should not venture to decide the intricate question of title, which of necessity warrants full dressed regular trial and in such a situation the parties should be driven to get their rights established before the regular Court." (emphasis supplied) Again in Bhagmani Devi Vs. VIII ADJ3 the Court observed: "32. Upcoming to other decisions where it has been observed that question of title if incidentally had arisen may be gone into by the Small Causes Court. I find that in Ram Sevak Vs. Pramod Kumar (supra) a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment was filed by one Ram Krishna Agarwal against Ram Sevak which was decreed ex-parte. The restoration application was allowed and the suit was restored. During pendency of suit, Ram Krishna Agarwal, the plaintiff died. Based on a Will of Ram Krishna Agarwal his wife Smt. Gomti Devi was substituted who also died issue-less. Consequently, one Hari Narain, brother of Ram Krishna Agarwal succeeded the property and after his death Pramod Kumar, the respondent in that writ petition was substituted on the basis of the Will. The petitioner Ram Sevak in his written statement stated that property belong to a Trust and Ram Krishna Agarwal was merely Sarvarakar of the Trust and not owner of the suit property. He was paid rent regularly in the capacity as Manager of the Trust. Ram Sevak also challenged the Will executed by Ram Krishna Agarwal. The suit was decreed holding that the property in question originally belonged to Ram Krishna Agarwal and ultimately got transferred to Pramod Kumar. Therein tenant did not dispute that he was tenant in the building in question and also to the effect that Ram Krishna Agarwal was collecting rent. He only tried to dispute the capacity in which Ram Krishna Agarwal was collecting rent. In these circumstances, this Court referring to the Apex Court's decisions in Shamim Akhtar Vs. Iqbal Ahmad Khan and others, 2001 (42) ALR 131 (SC), and this Court's decision in Bashir Ahmad Vs. Ist Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 2000 (40) ALR 741, observed that the question of title could also have gone incidentally. The mere denial by a tenant-respondent about the relationship of landlord and tenant would not avoid eviction proceeding before the Small Cause Court." (emphasis supplied) The more fundamental flaw, which this Court finds in the judgment of the Revisional Court is its abject failure to return or record its finding in respect of issue nos. 1 and 2 which had been answered in favour of the petitioner. While proceeding to hold that there existed a dispute of title the Revisional Court neither arrives at any conclusion nor records any findings which would have negatived what was found by the Trial Court. The judgment of the Revisional Court is not based upon its considered conclusion that the property did not belong to a Waqf. It also does not refer to or rely upon any material which was taken into consideration by the Trial Court and on the basis of which it came to the conclusion that there did exist a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents and that there had been a default in the payment of rent leaving the respondents open to the spectre of eviction. In the considered view of this Court, the Trial Court had come to record its findings categorically against the petitioner on the above two aspects and therefore rightly came to the conclusion that the Small Causes Court did not stand divested of jurisdiction. A mere allegation in paragraph 6 of the written statement is all that appears to have weighed and overshadowed the exercise of discretion by the Revisional Court. On the aforesaid score also, this Court finds itself unable to sustain the judgment and order of the Revisional Court and is of the firm and considered opinion that the same suffers from grave and manifest errors which warrant invocation of the powers of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution for consequential correction. The Court has noted above that the premises in question belonged to a duly registered Waqf. There was no material before the courts below which may have evidenced to the contrary. The courts below would have done well to bear in mind the provisions of section 27 of the Waf Act, 1954 as also Section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995 both of which provisioned for a detailed procedure for decision on the question of whether a particular property was waqf property or not and in fact conferred finality upon such decisions taken by the Board. For this reason also the Court is of the considered view that the judgement of the Revisional Court is rendered unsustainable in law. For all the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition shall stand allowed. The judgment and order of the Revisional Court dated 18 January 2012 is hereby set aside. The order of the trial court shall consequently stand affirmed and revived. ;