SHIV KUMAR Vs. STATE OF U P THRU SECY AND 2 OTHERS
LAWS(ALL)-2017-5-560
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on May 08,2017

SHIV KUMAR Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF U P THRU SECY AND 2 OTHERS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Ref: Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application No.151184 of 2017 For the reasons stated in affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application, as the same constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing special appeal, the delay condonation application is allowed and the Special Appeal is treated to have been filed well within time.
(2.) Ref: Special Appeal Shiv Kumar has preferred present Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules assailing the judgment and order dated 21.9.2016 passed by learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.45535 of 2016 (Shiv Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & 2 others) wherein he has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of laches with following observations:- "The present writ petition is barred by laches. It will be noticed that in the order dated 3.12.2015 the only direction is to decide the petitioner's representation dated 1.9.2015. The claim of the petitioner had never been decided on merit. It is this representation dated 1.9.2015 which has been decided by the respondents by the impugned order dated 24.5.2016. This order does not give any fresh cause of action to the petitioner to challenge the selection made in the year 2008. It is quite clear that by challenging the order on his representation the petitioner is seeking to rake up the old issue regarding selection of 2008 after more than eight years. Cause of action has accrued in 2008 and the petitioner had approached the Court for the first time through Writ Petition No.65666 of 2015 in 2015. In the case of C. Jacob V. Director of Geology and Mining and another, 2008 10 SCC 115 wherein the Supreme Court has held that for the purposes of limitation the Court has to see as to when the original cause arose and in any case no fresh cause of action arises on the decision of the representation. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 14 read as under: "9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 10. Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of acknowledgement of a jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action. 12........ 13........ 14. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for "consideration". If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing "consideration" of such claims." Further on the question of laches, the Supreme Court in Kamini Kumar Das Chaudhary vs. State of West Bengal and others, 1972 AIR(SC) 2060 in Para 11 of the said judgment has held as under:- "11. We may mention that the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court had, treating the case as one for a mandamus to reinstate the appellant, relied upon the statements in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 11, page 73 article 133 that "except in a case where the delay is accounted for Mandamus will not be granted unless applied for within a reasonable time after the demand and refusal". The Division Bench had also referred to Farris on "Extraordinary Legal Remedies" (page 228), to hold that not only, on an analogy from the Statute of limitation in civil cases, a reasonable period may be indicated for applications for Writs of Mandamus, but relief may be refused on the ground of acquiescence and presumed abandonment of the right to complain inferred from inordinate delay. It rightly observed that laches is a well established ground for refusal to exercise the discretion to issue a Writ." In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed as the claim of the petitioner pertains to the year 2008 which is barred by laches."
(3.) It appears from the record that the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Mirzapur, issued an advertisement dated 16.6.2008 inviting applications for filling up 2003 posts of Safai Karmi under the Panchayati Raj Department in District Mirzapur. The petitioner-appellant being fully qualified and eligible applied for consideration of his candidature in pursuance of the aforementioned advertisement in question under SC category. The interview was held from 21.8.2008 to 29.8.2008. The petitioner-appellant moved an application on 21.8.2008 requesting the respondents to permit him to appear in the interview. Again he had moved a representation on 1.9.2015 asking the respondents to consider his candidature for appointment on the post of Safai Karmi. When no heed was paid on his representation, he had approached this Court by preferring Writ Petition No.65666 of 2015 (Shiv Kumar vs. State of UP and ors) with a limited prayer to decide his representation dated 1.9.2015. The said writ petition was disposed of on 3.12.2015 asking the second respondent to consider and decide his representation dated 1.9.2015 in accordance with law within three months. In compliance thereof, the claim of the petitioner had been considered and rejected by the second respondent on 24.5.2016.;


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