- (1.) SABHAJEET Yadav, J. By means of this petition the petitioner has sought relief of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 21. 3. 2006 passed by respondent No. 1 contained in Annexure-1 of the writ petition and order dated 2. 12. 2005 and 19. 9. 2005 passed by respondents contained in Annexures-2 and 8 of the writ petition and further relief in the nature of mandamus has been sought for directing the respondents No. 1 to 4 decide all the applications according to the Rule 9 (2) of U. P. Minor and Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1963 hereinafter referred to as '1963 Rules' and restrain the respondent No. 5 from mining operation in respect of disputed mining lease.
(2.) THE relief sought in the writ petition rests on the fact that the petitioner has applied for grant of mining lease in Zone 16 Khand Sankhya 100 measuring 30 acres in respect of vacant notified area situated in District Kaushambi after completing all necessary formalities as contemplated under 1963 Rules. THE respondent No. 5 has also submitted application for grant of mining lease on the same day i. e. 1. 12. 2004. A true copy of the application of the petitioner in form MM-1 is on record as An-nexure-5 of the writ petition. Along with this application the petitioner has also annexed the chalan of deposit of requisite fee, domicile certificate, character certificate, Form MM-14, certificate of financial resources of Rs. 8,00,000/-, certificate of technical services, an affidavit in support of no dues certificate and to show that the petitioner is also an auction lease holder and has special experience about mining work. It is further stated that respondent No. 5 has neither any experience about the mining work nor he has better financial resources than the petitioner. After submission of the aforesaid application a chart scheduled was prepared by the competent authority as required under the rules. In chart schedule the petitioner having been recommendation by the authorities and respondent No. 5 has no such recommendation by any authority. It is further stated that even the petitioner having preferential right under Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules but in spite of it, recommendation was made by Additional District Magistrate/district Magistrate for grant of mining lease in favour of respondent No. 5 vide order of Additional District Magistrate dated 19. 9. 2005 and order of District Magistrate dated 21. 9. 2005. THE same are on record as Annexures-8 and 9 of the writ petition. THE aforesaid recommendation was sent after deciding the applications of all applicants on 19. 9. 2005. A general notice dated 14. 11. 2005 of all rejected applications were pasted on the notice board of Mines Office, Kaushambi on 27. 11. 2005, whereas Rule 8 (b) of 1963 Rules specifically provides that if application for grant of mining leasjj is refused, the reasons therefore should be recorded and communicated to the applicant. In the present case no reason has been communicated to the petitioner and only for information notice has been pasted on notice board. Being aggrieved against illegal and arbitrary action and order dated 19. 9. 2005 and 14. 11. 2005 for grant of mining lease in favour of respondent No. 5 the petitioner filed a revision under Rule 78 of 1963 Rules. During the pendency of revision an application was moved for amendment in the prayer for setting aside the impugned order dated 2. 12. 2005 and amendment application has been allowed. Thereafter revision filed by the petitioner was ordered to be listed on 20. 12. 2005 by respondent No. 1 before Special Secretary but no order was passed on the stay application. Since the application of stay was not disposed of, therefore, the petitioner has filed Writ Petition No. 5996 of 2005 earlier before this Court and Revisional authority was directed either to dispose of stay application or hear the revision finally on 20. 12. 2005. Unfortunately, the aforesaid order was served to the Counsel for the petitioner on 22. 12. 2005. Thereafter period was extended by this Court up to 17th January, 2006 or any early date fixed. It is stated that without application of mind the revision of petitioner has been rejected vide order dated 21. 3. 2006 contained in Annexure-1 of the writ petition, hence this petition. At the strength of assertions made in the pleadings of writ petition, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the applications of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 5 were of the same date, therefore, in view of the proviso to Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules, the authorities were under legal obligation to take into consideration the matter specified under sub-rule 2 of the said Rules while granting the lease but while considering the claim of petitioner vis-a-vis respondent No. 5, the authorities have utterly failed to consider the legal impact and effect of proviso to Rule 9 (1) and Rule 9 (2) of 1963 Rules and has granted lease to the respondent No. 5, against which the revision filed by petitioner has also been rejected, though the petitioner has better claim for grant of mining lease than the respondent No. 5 in respect of matters specified under sub-rule 2 of Rule 9 of the said Rules. While refuting the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel and learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 have submitted that, it is no doubt true that the applications moved by the petitioner as well as respondent No. 5 were of the same date but petitioner's application was initially incomplete and defective and under Rule 6 (2) of the said Rules the petitioner was given opportunity to remove the defects and complete his application and still he could not cure the discrepancies pointed out by the authorities. Therefore, the application of the petitioner was liable to be rejected but even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner has cured the defect subsequently, on receipt of the notice in that eventuality his application shall be treated to be of the date on which he has completed his application in all respects and cured the discrepancy pointed out by the authorities concerned and the same cannot be treated to be of same date on which the respondent No. 5 has made his application for grant of mining lease, therefore, the proviso to Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules would not come into play and application of respondent No. 5, being earlier in point of time, the same has preferential right of consideration and action of respondents State functionaries cannot be faulted with while granting mining lease in favour of respondent No. 5.
(3.) IN support of his aforesaid submissions learned Counsel for the respondent No. 5 has pointed out that the averments made in paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit sworn by respondent No. 5. For ready reference the averments contained in para 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the counter affidavit are extracted as under: " 3. That before giving para wise reply to the writ petition certain facts are necessary to be brought in the notice of this Hon'ble Court which are. as follows: (a) The petitioner of the present writ petition has not approached this Hon'ble Court with clean hands and averred the things in such a mamier or with an aim to mislead this Hon'ble Court reason being, No Dues Certificate is not enclosed along with the application of the petitioner and hence the receiving Officer has marked the application for the petitioner as incomplete. (b) The petitioner has enclosed an affidavit along with the writ petition stating therein that No Dues Certificate is not being provided by the authorities despite repeated requests, meaning hereby it is admitted case of the petitioner that No Dues Certificate, was not there along with the application of the petitioner but the same has not been enclosed with any document. To show or to demonstrate that he has tried his level best to get the copy of the No Dues Certificate from the authorities, he simply prepared an affidavit and filed it just to escape from attaching the liability of annexing the No Dues Certificate. To the best of the knowledge of the deponent the petitioner has not approached any authorities for the purposes of issuance of No Dues Certificate in his favour. (c) The Rule 6 of the U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession Rules), 1963 deals with the documents required to be accompanied with the application for grant of mining lease and sub-rule 2 of Rule 6 clearly says that if the application is not complete in any respect or is not accompanied by the fee deposited or documents mentioned in sub-rule (1) the same will be treated to be received on the date, the application is completed, meaning hereby though the application filed by the petitioner and the deponent on the very same date but the application of the petitioner was incomplete due to non availability of document shown as per Rule 6 (1) (d ). To the best of the knowledge of the deponent it has not been completed or the No Dues Certificate has been annexed with the application then the receipt of the application will be treated from the date of formality was completed. Obviously the same would be subsequent to the application made by the deponent and if the application of the deponent is received prior to the application moved by the petitioner (in complete application not treated as received till the discrepancy be removed, treated to be received on the date that discrepancy was removed) then the deponent has rightly been given the lease for mining as per Rule 9 (1 ). IN the present case, the Rule (2) does not come into play or attracted. It is only attracted if the applications are moved on the same date and treated to be received on the same date, which is not the case here. (d) The petitioner has wrongly got form MM-14 served/issued in his favour, reason being it is to be issued in favour of particular caste and not to every one so the issuance of form MM-14 is not of any advantage to the petitioner. (e) For the facts and reason stated above, the present writ petition is devoid of merits and the petitioner has also not approached with clean hands before this Hon'ble Court, hence he is not entitled for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. " 6. IN reply to the submissions made by learned Counsel for the respondents, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has further submitted that Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules specifically provides that if any application is incomplete in any respect or is not accompanied by fee, deposit or documents mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of 1963 Rules, the District Officer is under statutory obligation to give 15 days notice requiring the applicant to complete the application in all respects or to deposit the fee or furnish documents within such time as may be specified in such notice. IN case the applicant removes the defects or cures the discrepancies pointed out by the authorities or completes his application and furnishes the required documents or deposits fee etc. required by such notice within stipulated period of time, his application shall be treated to be in order and considered and only in case he fails to do so within specified time, such application shall not be considered or in other words can be rejected by the authority concerned. And since the petitioner has cured the discrepancies pointed by the authorities in his application, consequently his application was found in order and was considered by the authorities concerned and once his application was found in order, it was obligatory upon the concerned authorities to treat his application as registered on the date when it was made to the District Officer and it cannot be treated to be of the date when he has removed or cured the defects pointed out by the authorities. At any rate on treating the application of petitioner of the date when he had cured the discrepancies or defects in moving such application would virtually defeat the very purpose and object of Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules. Since the petitioner has better eligibility condition and financial resources than the respondent No. 5, therefore, while considering the application for grant of mining lease the authorities were bound to have regard of the preferential rights of consideration of the petitioner over respondent No. 5 under the proviso to Rule 9 (1) of the said Rules. IN support of his submission learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Jumma Ram v. State of U. P. and others. 2007 (103) RD 12 (DB) 7. I have heard Sri U. K. Pathak, learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent and learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5. 8. Having heard the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of record, it appears that the controversy is in very short compass. The questions which arise for consideration of this Court are that as to whether the petitioner's application which was admittedly defective and incomplete on the date it was filed shall be treated to be of the date on which it was filed or of the subsequent date when it was completed in all respects and defects/discrepancies were cured and if so as to whether his preferential right for grant of mining lease under the proviso to Rule 9 (1) was to be considered by taking into consideration the matters specified in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of 1963 Rules or not? 9. IN order to answer the aforesaid questions, first of all it is necessary to have a look on the scheme of statute under which mining lease under Chapter II of 1963 Rules is granted. Rule 5 of said Rules provides provision for making application for grant or renewal of mining lease. Rule 6 provides provision for compliance of certain formalities while making application for grant of mining lease. Rule 7 deals with inquiry in respect of mining lease, Rule 8 deals with disposal of application and Rule 9 deals with preferential rights of certain persons which are extracted as under: " 5. Application for grant or renewal of mining lease: (1) An application in form MM-1 for grant of a mining lease or in Form MM-1 (a) for renewal shall be addressed to the State Government. (2) The application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be submitted in quadruplicate to the District Officer or to the officer authorized in this behalf by the State Government. Such officer shall endorse the receipt of the application on all the four copies entering the place, time and date of receipt. One copy shall be returned immediately to the person presenting the application. (3) The application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be entered in a register of mining lease application in form MM-2. Application fee and deposit for grant of mining lease: (1) Every application for grant of mining lease shall be accompanied by- (a) a fee of one thousand rupees, (b) a deposit of two thousand rupees for meeting the preliminary expenses, other than those specified in Rule 17, and (c) four copies of the codestral survey map on which the area applied for is clearly marked and in case such area is not covered by codestral survey, four copies of topographical survey may on a scale of at least 4" = 1 mile, on which the area applied for is accurately marked. (d) a certificate, issued by District Officer or by such officer as may be authorized by the District Officer in this behalf, showing that no mining dues are outstanding against the applicant; Provided further that such certificate shall not be required where the applicant has furnished an affidavit to the satisfaction of the State Government, stating that he does not hold or had not held any mining lease or any other mineral concession in the territory of the State. (e) a certificate of caste and residence of the applicant, where the application is for mining lease of sand or morrum or bajri or boulder or any of these in mixed state. (f) a character certificate given by the District Officer of the District, where the applicant permanently resides. (2) If the application is not complete in any respect or is not accompanied by the fee, deposit or the documents mentioned in sub-rule (1) the District Officer or the officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, shall, by fifteen days notice require the applicant to complete the application in all respects or, to deposit the fee or furnish the documents within such time as may be specified in the notice and if the applicant fails to do so within the specified time, such application shall not be considered. 9. Preferential right of certain persons- (1) Where two or more persons have applied for a mining lease in respect of the same land the applicant whose application was received earlier shall have a preferential right for the grant of lease over the applicant whose application was received later. Provided that where such application are received on the same day, the State Government may, after taking into consideration the matters specified in sub-rule (2), grant the mining lease to such one of the applicants it may deem fit. (2) The matters referred to in sub-rule (1)are- (a) Any special knowledge or experience in mining operations possessed by the applicant; (b) The Financial resources of the applicant; (c) The nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by the applicant; (d) The conduct of the applicant in carrying out mining operations on the basis of any previous lease or permit and in complying with conditions of such lease or permit, or the provisions of any law in connection therewith; and (e) In respect of mining lease for sand or morrum or bajari or boulder or any of these in mixed state, exclusively found in the river bed, if other things are equal preference shall be given to a person or group of persons, whether incorporated or not who belong to socially & educationally backward classes (such as Mallah, Kewat, Bind, Nishad, Manjhi, Batham, Dhiwar, Themer, Chai, Sorahia, Turha Raikwar, Kaiwrt, Khulwat, Tiyar, Gaudia, (Godia) and Kashyap and other such castes of citizens, as notified by the State Government from time to time who have obtained a certificate in Form MM-14 from the concerned District Officer, or such other Officer authorized in this behalf by the State Government, certifying that such person/persons is/are traditionally engaged in excavation of sand/ morrum for their livelihood and who are resident of the District for which the application has been given. (f) Such other matters as may be considered necessary by the State Government. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) and (2), the State Government may, for any special reasons to be recorded grant a mining lease to an applicant whose application was received later in preference to an applicant whose application was received earlier. " 10. From a joint reading of both the sub-rules of Rule 6 of 1963 Rules it is clear that while making application for grant of mining lease under 1963 Rules, the applicant is required to comply with each and every formalities given under Rule 6 (1) (a) to (f) of said Rules. However, if the application is not complete in any respect or is not accompanied by fee, deposits or documents mentioned in sub-rule 1 of Rule 6 of 1963 Rules, the District Officer or the officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf by 15 days notice require the applicant to complete the application in all respects or to deposit the fee or furnish the documents within such time as may be specified in the notice and if the applicant fails to do so within the specified time, such application shall not be considered. It logically follows that if the applicant completes his application or cures the discrepancies in his application, the same shall be considered for grant of mining lease under Chapter II of 1963 Rules but there is nothing to indicate that on removal of such defects and on curing the discrepancies as to whether the application shall be treated of the date on which it was moved defectively or of the date on which discrepancies have been cured? In order to find out accurate answer of aforesaid question it is necessary to examine the true import of Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules. In this connection, I would refer some decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the rule of literal construction of statute and doctrine of Casus Omissus and rule of harmonious construction of statute in some detail. 11. In State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain and others AIR 1965 SC 1296 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that when the words in the statute are reasonably capable of more than one interpretations, the object and purpose of the statute, a general conspectus of its provisions and the context in which they occur might induce a Court to adopt a more liberal or a more strict view of the provisions, as the case may be, as being more consonant with the underlying purpose. But it is not possible to reject words used in an enactment merely for the reason that they do not accord with the context in which they occur or with the purpose of the legislation as gathered from the preamble or long title. The pertinent observation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in para 11 of the decision is extracted as under: " 11. . . . . . . . . . . . Unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court. No doubt, if there are other provisions in the statute which conflict with them, the Court may prefer the one and reject the other on the ground of repugnance. Surely, that is not the position here. Again, when the words in the statute are reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, he object and purpose of the statute, a general conspectus of its provisions and the context in which they occur might induce a Court to adopt a more liberal or a more strict view of the provisions, as the case may be, as being more consonant with the underlying purpose. But we do not consider it possible to reject words used in an enactment merely for the reason that they do not accord with the context in which they occur or with the purpose of the legislation as gathered from the preamble or long title. The preamble may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one meaning, but it can, however, not be used to eliminate as redundant or unintended, the operative provisions of a statute. " 12. In State of Gujarat v. Chatitrbhuj Maganlal, AIR 1976 SC 1697 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that where the language of statute is susceptible of two interpretations, one which promotes the object of provision, comports best with its purpose and preserves its smooth working, should be chosen in preference to the other which introduces inconvenience and uncertainty in the working of the system. The pertinent observation made in para 14 of the decision is extracted as under: " 14. lt is well recognized that where language of a statutory provision is susceptible of two interpretations, the one which promotes the object of the provision, comports best with its purpose and preserves its smooth working, should be chosen in preference to the other which introduces inconvenience and uncertainty in the working of the system. This rule will apply in full force where the provision confers ample discretion on the Government for a specific purpose to enable it to bring about an effective result. " 13. In Polestar and Co. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax. New Delhi AIR 1978 SC 897 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that a statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to plain natural meaning of its language and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. The pertinent observation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in para 7 of the decision is extracted as under: " 7. Now, if there is one principle of interpretation more well settled than any other it is that a statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to plain natural meaning of its language and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. This rule of literal construction is firmly established and it has received judicial recognition in numerous cases. " 14. In S. Narayanasivami v. G. Panneer-selvam and others, AIR 1972 SC 2284 in paras 19 and 20 of the decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed asunder: " 19. We think that the view contained in the judgment under appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding them to the relevant statutory provisions, to the effect that the candidates from graduates' constituencies of Legislative Councils must also possess the qualification to having graduated. This contravenes the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail. A logical corollary of that rule is that "a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made" (See Caries on Statute Law-6th Edn. P. 70 ). An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible [see e. g. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459 British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh (1960) 1 SCR 168 = AIR 1959 SC 1331 R. G. Jacob v Union of India. (1963) 3 SCR 800 = AIR 1963 SC 550 Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity (see e. g. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Asad Bharat Finance Co.) AIR 1967 SC 276 In Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1952 SC 362 at p. 365 this Court observed: " No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. " 20. Cases in which defects in statutory provisions may or may not be supplied by Courts have been indicated in well known words such as Sutherland's "statutory Construction" (3rd Ed. Vol. 2) (Paragraph 4924 at pages 455-458) and in Crawford's "construction of Statutes" (1940 Edn.), Only one passage from the last mentioned work need be cited here: (p. 269): " Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed, might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute. " 15. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. National Taj Traders, AIR 1980 SC 485 para 10 of the decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: " 10. The two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the following statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33: " Omissions not to be inferred-It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express, Lord Morsay said: 'it is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do' 'we are not entitled', said Lord Loreburn L. C. , 'to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. A case not provided for in a statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted, and the omission appears in consequence to have been unintentional. " A statute is to be read as a whole-"it was resolved in the case of Lincoln College's case (1595) 3 Co Rep 58b, at page 59b that the good expositor of an Act of Parliament should 'make construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself. Every clause of a statute is to 'be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. ' [per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. r. , 1898 AC 735 (Canada ). In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "an intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts L. J. in Artemiou v. Pro-copiou, (1966)1qb878 "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. l. r. C 1963 AC 557 where at p. 577 he also observed; "this is not a new problem, though out standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges. " Thus, from the aforesaid legal position it is clear that a statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to plain and natural meaning of its language and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute, A statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. In other words, it is duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of the Act passed by the Legislature but it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. Thus two principles of construction of statutes one relating to cases omission and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. According to Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes, it is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and that for that purpose all the parts of the statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 16. Now applying the aforesaid principles of construction of statute in present context of Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules, it is clear that if an application for grant of mining lease is not complete in any respect or is not accompanied by the fee, deposit or documents mentioned in sub-rule 1 of Rule 6, the same shall not be rejected out rightly, but the applicant shall be given opportunity to complete the requirement of sub-rules 1 of Rule 6 of 1963 Rules and when he fails to remove the defects or cures the discrepancies, only then his application shall be rejected, but the consequences flowing from removal of defects or curing the discrepancies in such application are not specifically provided for, though they may be read in by necessary implication. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the logical conclusion, which follows there from is that on completion of such incomplete application or on curing the discrepancies in such application, the same shall undoubtedly be considered by the authority but yet there is another problem in respect of the date from which such application shall be treated to be made before the authority and as to whether it shall be treated to be made from the date on which the discrepancies are cured or from the date on which it was initially made to the authority on defective basis? 17. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that unless an application is moved before the authority in consonance with the requirements of sub-rule 1 of Rule 6 of 1963 Rules, there can be no application in the eye of law. It is only a proper application made in accordance with the said rules, gives right of consideration and not otherwise, therefore, by necessary implication only this much can be held that such application is treated to be made on the date only when it became in order and not earlier to it, stretching further more from the date when such application was made on defective basis, in my considered opinion, would be re-writing of the Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules by adding some more words in the statute creating legal fiction by deeming provision to the effect that on curing the discrepancies in the application the same shall be treated to be made from the date on which it was initially made on defective basis. Such interpretation of the said rule would contravene the well recognized principles of interpretation of statute and would not be permissible, as held by Bombay High Court in Phate S. R. and another v. C. A. Kedar, AIR 1974 Bom. 281 that a deeming fiction cannot be introduced by construction and it is ex-elusive privilege of the Legislature to apply a deeming fiction in given case. A fiction cannot be resorted to for the purpose of interpreting statutory provisions. 18. Besides this, it is also well settled that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. It is no doubt true that it is the duty of the Court to harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by Legislature. But; it is certainly not the duty of Court to stretch the words used by Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute or unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something, which it omitted to express. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances of the case, I have no mariner of doubt to hold that such application shall be treated to be made on the date when the discrepancies are cured by the applicant and not earlier to it, when it was made on defective basis. A defective application is no application in the \eyes of law. It is only that application which is complete in all respects, will be considered for grant of mining lease and for determining preferential right under Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules. If an application lacks essential particulars and is not accompanied by the requisite materials as enumerated in sub-rule 1 of Rule 6, then the application remains incomplete and defective and that will be deemed to have been completed only when necessary particulars are furnished and requisite materials are supplied within time provided in the notice given to the applicant under Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules and not earlier to it. The aforesaid view also finds support from two Division Bench decisions of this Court rendered in Dinesh Pratap Dunvedi v. State of U. P. and others 1995 (25) ALR 68 (DB) and Jumma Ram v. State of U. P. and others 2007 (103)RD12 (DB) 19. The interpretation of Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules, given hereinbefore does neither lead to any absurdity nor make the other provisions of rules unworkable or redundant or irreconcilable with other provisions of rules. The purpose and object of the rules seem to be only this much that any defective or incomplete application made under Rule 5 of the said Rules, which does not conform the requirements of sub-rule 1 of Rule 6 should not be rejected out rightly under sub-rule 2 of Rule 6 of 1963 Rules unless an opportunity is given to the applicant to remove the defects or cure the discrepancies therein. It can not be further stretched that on curing the discrepancies in application on subsequent date, the same shall be treated to be made on the date when it was initially made defectively by relating back with retrospective effect. Such interpretation of Rule 6 (2) would neither be in conformity of well recognized rules of interpretation of statute as indicated herein before nor it would be otherwise justified in given context, therefore the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioner, contrary to it, are misplaced and has to be rejected. The decision of this Court relied by learned Counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, lends support to the case of respondents instead of petitioner. 20. In view of foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the application of petitioner though moved on the same day when the respondent No. 5 has moved the application for grant of lease under Rule 5 of 1963 Rules but his application was not complete in all respects and was not in conformity with Rule 6 (1) of 1963 Rules. Admittedly the discrepancies have been cured by the petitioner subsequently on receipt of notice under Rule 6 (2) of 1963 Rules, therefore, the said application cannot be said to have been made on the same day under the proviso to Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules, accordingly the proviso to Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules will not come into play and matters specified under sub-rule 2 of Rule 9 of 1963 Rules for grant of mining lease were not necessarily required to be considered by the Authority concerned. Therefore, the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is in better financial position and other eligibility condition, in my opinion, is wholly irrelevant and misplaced, thus is liable to be rejected. 21. I have also perused the orders under challenge and order dated 21. 3. 2006 passed by the State Government in revision. In given facts and circumstances of the case, I need not to go into the merits of the order passed by the State Government, as I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has no right to compare with the respondent No. 5 under the proviso to Rule 9 (1) of 1963 Rules. The writ petition is highly misconceived and liable to be dismissed on the grounds aforestated. 22. The writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merits. 23. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition Dismissed. .;