- (1.) ASHOK Bhushan, J. Heard Sri A. D. Saunders, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner.
(2.) BY this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Tribunal not to proceed with Adjudication Case No. 61 of 2006, Shree Nath v. Bishop Johnson School and College, Allahabad, pending before him till such time as the Hon'ble Supreme Court decides the reference made in the case of State of U. P. v. Jai Bir Singh. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding the issue raised in the writ petition are; petitioner is a minority educational institution. A reference has been made by order dated 15th June, 2004 by the Additional Labour Commissioner, U. P. , Allahabad as to whether the termination of services of respondent No. 3 with effect from 10th January, 2004 is valid or not. On the basis of the reference Adjudication Case No. 61 of 2004 has been registered before the Industrial Tribunal, which is proceeding with the adjudication of the said case. A written statement has been filed by the petitioner before the Industrial Tribunal taking the plea that the petitioner's educational institution is not an industry, hence adjudication cannot proceed. In the written statement it was stated that earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 3213 has been referred by another Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in State of U. P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2005 (2) LBESR 736 (SC) : (2005)5 SCC 1, hence till the reference is decided by the Apex Court the adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal be stayed. The petitioner's case is that in spite of the said written statement and objection having been taken by the petitioner, the Industrial Tribunal is proceeding with the adjudication and has not stayed the proceedings. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for the abovementioned relief. Sri A. D. Saunders, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in view of the earlier Constitution Bench judgment in Bangalore Water Supply's case (supra), the term "industry" as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 included the educational institutions also but the correctness of such view has been doubted by another Constitution Bench Judge in State of U. P. v. Jai Bir Singh's case (supra) and the matter has been referred for consideration to the Larger Bench. He submits that in view of the doubt expressed by another Constitution Bench in the above case, the Industrial Tribunal cannot proceed with the adjudication on the premise that the law declared by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply's case (supra) is a good law.
(3.) I have considered the submissions of Counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The issue, which has been raised in this writ petition, is as to whether the law laid down by the Apex Court is not to be followed in case the correctness of said judgment is doubted by another co-ordinate Bench and a reference has been made to consider the said judgment by Larger Bench. The question is as to whether by reference made to a Larger Bench for consideration of a judgment of Supreme Court, the said judgment is denuded of its authority as laid down in Article 141 of the Constitution and as to whether the said law is not to be followed till the reference is answered. Article 141 of the Constitution lays down that the law laid down by the Apex Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding. The Apex Court in (1998)8 S. C. C. 275, C. N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan and Ors. , made following observations in paragraph 6 : " (6 ). . . . . Indeed it is a matter of judicial discipline that requires that when this Court states as to what the law on the matter is, the same shall be binding on all the Courts within the territory of India. This mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution is not based on any doctrine of precedents, but is an imprimatur to all Courts that the law declared by this Court is binding on them. If that is so, it was not open to the High Court to consider the effect of the decisions in Rattan Arya case, its scope, what was decided therein and whether there could be any distinction between that decision and the decision rendered in D. C. Bhatia case. The clear pronouncement made by this Court in Shobha Surendar case was that D. C. Bhatia case was applicable with reference to Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and, therefore, in view of that decision, the High Court's decision was upset in another matter where the High Court had followed the Padmanabha Rao case. In effect, Padmanabha Rao case stood impliedly overruled. Thus, it was not at all open to the High Court to have tried to explain the decision of this Court and ought to have implicitly followed the decision of this Court. The law declared by this Court is clear that D. C. Bhatia case was applicable to the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. So it was not open to the learned Judge to take any other view in the matter. Thus we are of the view that the direction issued by the High Court to the parties to work out their remedies under the Rent Control Act is not at all correct. ";