- (1.) The present appeal is under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by the claimants who were unsuccessful before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Chatur Singh, husband of the appellant No. 1 and father of the remaining appellants was posted as Lekhpal in Circle Sirsakalan. According to the claim petition, he on 2nd July, 1978, while going to visit the area in his circle, got down from a bus going from Jalaun to Kuthond at a point from where a Kachcha Shramdan road starts for village Bichauli. After getting down from the bus, while he was trying to cross the road, hit by Truck No. UTK 583 belonging to the respondent which was being driven rashly and negligently. He fell down and sustained injuries and was hospitalised in Sadar Hospital, Orai by his brother Harish Chandra Singh and died at 4.00 a.m. on the next day in the hospital. A claim petition No. 1 of 1979 was filed for recovery of Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation on the ground that he was getting salary at the rate of Rs. 400 per month and had also agricultural income to the tune of Rs. 10,000 per year and was aged about 49 years. The claim petition was contested on the pleas inter alia that the accident in which Chatur Singh died took place by some unidentified vehicle and later on with the connivance of the police, the truck in question was involved in the accident and, as such, the respondent is not liable to pay any compensation amount. Other pleas, such as the claimants are not dependents, in any view of the matter, the deceased was covered under Group Insurance Scheme and the application for recovery of the compensation amount under the provisions of U.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is not maintainable, were also taken. The Claims Tribunal framed the following six issues: 1. Whether deceased Chatur Singh died in consequence of accident by truck No. 583 UTK belonging to the State as alleged in para 22 of claim application? 2. Whether all the claimants are legal representatives of the deceased Chatur Singh? 3. Whether the claimants are entitled to get any compensation ? If so, its amount? 4. Whether the claim is barred by Section 61 of Employees State Insurance Act? 5. Whether the claim is time-barred? 6. Whether the defendant is not vicariously liable as alleged? If so, its effect? Issue No. 1 was decided in negative and it was found that the truck No. UTK 583 belonging to the State as alleged in para 22 of the claim petition was not involved in the accident in question. Issue No. 2 was decided in affirmative in favour of the claimants. Issue No. 3 was decided in negative in view of the findings recorded under Issue No. 1. Issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were decided in favour of the claimants. However, the claim petition was rejected on the findings recorded under Issue No. 1.
(2.) The learned Counsel for the appellants submit following two points in support of the appeal: Firstly, there is voluminous evidence on record to show that truck No. UTK 583 belonging to the State was involved in the accident and secondly, the compensation amount determined by the Tribunal, though not awarded, is towards lower side. Taking the first point first, it may be noted that the findings on the said issue went against the claimants principally on the ground that in the F.I.R. lodged by Harish Chandra Singh (PW 7), the brother of the deceased, at Kotwali on the next date of the accident i.e. 3rd June, 1978 under Sections 279/338/304-A, I.P.C., the truck number does not find place therein. The omission of registration number of the truck in the F.I.R. as also the fact that Harish Chandra Singh, the informant was not an eye-witness of the accident weighed heavily against the claimants. The contention of the appellants' Counsel in this regard is that although the registration number of the truck is not mentioned in the F.I.R., but that circumstance is not so vital to negate the appellants' claim in toto. There is overwhelming evidence on the record to show that afore stated truck was involved in the accident, he submits. It is not in dispute that Chatur Singh died on account of road accident. The question to be answered in the appeal is whether there is evidence to show that the truck in question caused the motor accident in which Chatur Singh received fatal injuries. A bare perusal of the F.I.R. dated 3rd July, 1978 would show that the deceased got down from the bus at Kuthond near the newly constructed pucca Shramdan Marg leading to village Bichauli and while crossing road, a Government truck (Sarkari Thela) coming from the side of Madaripur, which was being driven rashly and negligently going towards Jalaun, hit the deceased, with the result he got injuries on his head and body. He fell down and became unconscious. The truck ran away from the spot and the accident was witnessed by Prabhu Dayal son of Shiv Dayal Lohar, Dularey Lal and Sewa Ram all residents of village Harsingpur. These persons informed about the accident at his residence (of the informant) and he rushed to the spot on a tractor. He carried away the injured person (Chatur Singh) to the Sadar Hospital, Orai where he was under medical treatment throughout night and in spite of best efforts made by the doctors he succumbed to death at about 4.00 a.m. on account of injuries. The F.I.R. further states that the informant is not aware about the registration number of the truck, but the witnesses who are presently not available are aware about it.
(3.) A reading of the said F.I.R. clearly shows the factum of the accident and death of the injured person and the truck belonging to the State Government which was responsible for causing the accident finds place in the F.I.R. A reasonable inference can be drawn that from the very inception the involvement of Government truck in the accident has been alleged. Although the registration number of the truck does not find place in the F.I.R. but nonetheless it states that the said registration number is known to the eye-witnesses of the accident who were not present at the time of lodging of the F.I.R. This conduct of the informant is very natural and cannot, for a moment, be said to be cooked up, specially keeping in mind that the brother of the informant who was otherwise hale and hearty received fatal injuries in the accident and throughout the previous night the informant was busy and in attendance of the patient (the injured person) who was fighting with death and died ultimately. There was hardly any time to find out the registration number of the Government vehicle (Sarkari thela) which caused the accident. At this juncture, the learned Counsel for the appellants invited attention of the Court to the case of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. & Ors. v. Tapan Kr. Singh, 2003 6 SCC 175, wherein it has been laid down by the Apex Court that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may not be an eye-witness and he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not know how the occurrence took place. In the case on hand, the injured having died, the first information report could have been lodged only by a person who had come to know about the occurrence i.e. the accident. The relevant paragraph 20 is reproduced below: "20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eye-witness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can.";