- (1.) DR. B. S. Chauhan, J. This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 5-7-2006 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Lalganj, District Mirzapur where by the earlier resident certificates granted in favour of Smt. Pooja, the petitioner and one Smt. Smrita Devi have been cancelled.
(2.) THE petitioner claims to be a resident of village Khamhariya Suryavansh, Post Halia, Tehsil Lalganj, District Mirzapur and pursuance to the advertisement issued on 26-10-2005 for selection of Shiksha Mitra, she alongwith Smrita Devi and. Smt. Vandana Mishra submitted applications and a merit list was prepared in which the quality point marks awarded to the petitioner were highest and she was selected for the said post. For the purposes of selection, the petitioner had submitted a domicile certificate showing her as a resident of village Khamhariya Suryavansh, Post Halia, Tehsil Lalganj, District Mirzapur. A complaint was however made by one Smt. Vandana Mishra, who was also an applicant for selection of Shiksha Mitra that the domicile certificate issued to the petitioner was not correct. An enquiry was conducted and thereafter the domicile certificate Issued in favour of the petitioner was cancelled by the order dated 5-7-2006, which is impugned in the present writ petition. A perusal of the order clearly shows that for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner was a resident of the aforesaid village or not, the Naib Tehsildar submitted a detailed report and thereafter the Tehsildar issued notices to the petitioner, Smt. Smrita Devi and Smt. Vandana Mishra, fixing 14-2- 2006 for producing evidence. The parties appeared before the Tehsildar on 21-3-2006. They were also heard by the Tehsildar on the said date. The matter was thereafter adjourned fixing 28-3-2006 on which date the petitioner also appeared before the Tehsildar. The impugned order clearly shows that after considering the evidence on record including the report submitted by the Naib Tehsildar, a finding has been recorded that the petitioner was a permanent resident of village Gambhirapur not of the aforesaid village village Khamhariya Suryavansh. In fact the husband of the petitioner had also been issued a resident certificate in the year 2004 showing that he was a permanent resident of village Gambhirapur. The Tehsildar has also referred to the Government Order dated 18-2-2003 which clearly provides that for issuance of a permanent resident certificate, the person must be living for at least a period of three years. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has, however, submitted that proper opportunity was not given to the petitioner before passing the order dated 5-7-2006. This submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in the impugned order, it has clearly been mentioned that the notice had been given to the petitioner and the petitioner had appeared before the Tehsildar on 21-3-2006 and 28-3-2006. This fact has also been stated in paragraph 5 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Smt. Vandana Mishra. In fact the claim of being resident/domicile of village Khamhariya Suryavansh is based only on a gift deed made in favour of grand-father of the petitioner's husband in the year 1963 and also on the basis of the entry of the petitioner's name in the voter list of the said village and in the family register. On the basis of the same, it has been submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the voter list and family register, being public documents, are admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. In support of his contention, a very heavy reliance has been placed by Shri Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the judgment of this Court in Swami Prasad v. Prescribed Authority & Ors. , 1979 RD 135, wherein it has been held that a family register is a public document being prepared in ordinary course of business by a person concerned and the entry in that register should ordinarily be accepted.
(3.) UNDOUBTEDLY, such a document is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act being a public document prepared by the Government official in exercise of his official duty. However, the question does arise as what is the authenticity of the said entry for the reason that admissibility of a document is one thing and probity of it is different. In State of Bihar & Ors. v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh & Ors. , AIR 1983 SC 684, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with a similar contention and held as under : "admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another -these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight of its probative value may be nil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Where a report is given by a responsible officer, which is based on evidence of witnesses and documents and has a statutory flavour in that it is given not merely by an administrative officer but under the authority of a Statute, its probative value would indeed be very high so as to be entitled to great weight. . . . . . . . . . . The probative value of documents which, however ancient they may be, do not disclose sources of their information or have not achieved sufficient notoriety is precious little. " Therefore, a document may be admissible whether the entry contained therein has any probative value may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The aforesaid legal proposition stands fortified by the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Prasad Sharma v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 326; Ram Murti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 SC 1029; Harpal Singh & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361. In these cases, it has been held that even if the entry was made in an official record by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duty, it may have weight but still may require corroboration by the person on whose Information the entry has been made and as to whether the entry so made has been exhibited and proved.;