- (1.) G. R. Mathur, J. Panics have ex changed affidavits, therefore, the writ peti tion is being disposed of finally at the admission stage,
(2.) SMT. Anand Kumari w/o late M. N. Raina (landlord-respondent No. 2) filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred as the Act) for release of the premises which arc in oc cupation of the petitioner-Kripai Singh. Release application was registered as P. A. Case No. 62 of 1988 before the Prescribed Authority, Meerut. The petitioners con tested the release application by filing a written statement. Subsequently he moved an application praying that either the ap plication moved by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act he rejected in absence of any specific order having been passed under Order XIX, Rule 1, C. P. C. or she may be directed to produce herself and her witnesses in Court for the purpose of cross-examination. This application was opposed on behalf of the landlord. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 14- 1-1992 rejected the application. Feel ing aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 2112 of 1992 in this Court which was dismissed by a detailed order on 21-2-1995 after the par lies had exchangee affidavits. Shortly thereafter i. e. on 10-4-1995 the petitioner moved another application before the Prescribed Authority praying that SMT. Anand Kumari (landlord-respondent No. 2) may be directed to appear in Court for the purpose of cross-examination. This ap plication was opposed on behalf of the landlord on the ground (hat a similar ap plication moved by the tenant had been rejected earlier and the validity of the said order had been upheld by the High Court in a writ petition and therefore the second application seeking the same relief was liable to be rejected. The Prescribed Authority held that the order passed in writ petition No. 2112 of 1992 was binding upon him and consequently dismissed the application by the order dated 2-5-1995. It is this order which has been impugned in the present writ petition. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned Coun sel for the petitioner, has submitted that in the earlier application moved by the tenant necessary grounds for issuing a direction to the owner-landlord to appear in Court for purpose of cross-examination had not been disclosed and therefore the said application was rejected but now in the second application moved in that be half on 10-4-1995 the tenant had set out the grounds on which he wanted the landlord to be summoned for purpose of cross-examination and therefore the Prescribed Authority has committed error in rejecting the application. Learned Counsel has further submitted that in writ petition No. 4097 of 1995 - Kushi Ram Dedwalv. Addl. Judge. Small Causes Court, Meerut, a learned single Judge has ex pressed an opinion that the landlord and tenant should be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses whenever such an applica tion is filed and only in exceptional cases right of cross-examination should be refused and has made a reference to a larger Bench by the order dated 15-2-1995 and as the question of law involved in engaging the attention of a Division Bench, the present writ petition deserves to be admitted. In my opinion, the prayer made by the petitioner-tenant for a direction being issued to the landlord to appear in the Court for purpose of cross-examination cannot be accepted now in view of the earlier order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 14-1-1992 by which the similar prayer made by the tenant had been rejected. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority by filing writ petition No. 2112 of 1992 but the said petition was also dis missed by this Court on 21-2-1995. In Sub-hash Chandra Sachdev v. District Judge, Etah and others, 1993 (1)ARC436, relying upon Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deo Rajni Devi, AIR 1960 SC 941, it was held that the orders passed during the progress of the case will operate as res judicata for purposes of both suits and proceedings. It was further held that even where circumstances had changed and the written statement had been got amended it was not open to the tenant to re-open the issue of cross-examination of the witness which had already been concluded by an order of the Court. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid case. It is not the case of the tenant here that subsequent to the passing of the order by which his first application had been rejected there has been any change of circumstance. It may be noticed that earlier writ petition was dismissed on 21-2-1995 and the second application for issuing a direction to the landlord to ap pear in Court for purpose of cross-ex amination was moved shortly thereafter on 10-4-1995. Therefore, there is all the more so reason to entertain such an ap plication. The second application being barred by the principles of res judicata was rightly rejected by the Prescribed Authority.
(3.) SECOND contention of Sri Tendon that in view of reference to a Division Bench the present writ petition deserves to be admitted cannot be accepted in the present case on account of same reason, namely, bar of resjudicata. In view of the rejection of the application at earlier stage wherein a similar prayer had been made and also dismissal of the writ petition, the present application is clearly barred. That apart the attention of the learned Single Judge, who made reference to a large Bench in Kushi Ram Dedwal's case, does not seem to have been invited to a largernumber of decisions of our Court rendered on the point wherein it has been held that if the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of justice to elicit truth he may summon the deponent of the affidavit for the purpose of cross-ex amination and that such direction should be made in exceptional cases and not as a matter of course. I had an occasion to consider this question in Subhash Chandra Sachdev v. District Judge, Etah, 1992 (2) ARC 253, wherein this view was reiterated after close scrutiny of several decisions which have been rendered on this point. Smt. Anand Kumari (landlord-respondent No. 2) had filed the present release application for release of premises in occupation of the petitioner on 10-3-1988 on the ground of her personal need. One of the plea taken by her was that the petitioner was residing in the ground floor while she, alongwith her family, was resid ing on the first floor and on account of her old age and illness she was finding it very inconvenient and troublesome to reside on the first floor. The petitioner initially moved an application on 2-1-1992 for a direction being issued to the landlord for production of herself and her witnesses in Court for purpose of cross-examination. The application was rejected on 14-1-1992 and then the petitioner filed writ petition No. 2112 of 1992 in this Court on 21-1-1992 in which further proceedings in the case were stayed by the order dated 28-1-1992. The writ petition was dismissed on 21-2-1995 and taking notice of the fact that proceedings had remained the Prescribed Authority to decide the case as ex-peditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of four months of the production of a certified copy of the order before him. Shortly thereafter the petitioner moved a second application on 10-4- 1995 which was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 2-5-1995. Thereafter the petitioner filed the present writ petition in this Court on 23-5-1995 and again the proceedings of the case before the Prescribed Authority were stayed. It may be noticed that Rule 15 (3) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regula tion of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules provides that the application for release under Section 21 (1) of the Act shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. The conduct of the petitioner-tenant here shows that he is making all possible efforts to delay the proceedings of the case. It is unfortunate that a release application filed as far back as 10th March, 1988 has not been decided so far. In these cir cumstances, I consider it proper that some heavy cost be imposed.;