R. A. Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS is the State's application for review of our judgment dated 10.7.1995. The Stamp Reporter of this Court has reported that this application is beyond time by 241 days. The State has accordingly filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.
(2.) WE have heard Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, Additional Advocate General for the State applicant, Sri R. N. Singh, Sri L. P. Naithani and other learned counsel for the opposite parties. According to the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the application for certified copy of the Judgment dated 10.7.1995 was moved on 24.7.1995, which was supplied to the applicant on 20.12.1995. What is the date on which the certified copy of the judgment was ready has not been stated in the affidavit. It has, however, been stated that the review application was not moved immediately after 20.12.1995, because another Division Bench has referred the same matter to a Full Bench and the Full Bench delivered its judgment on 22.3.1996. The review application was accordingly filed on 6.4.1996. Two questions arise in this case, namely, (i) whether the State has given plausible explanation for condonation of delay in moving the application, and (ii) whether this Court could review its judgment dated 10.7.1995 merely on the ground that the law laid down by it has been overruled later on by a Full Bench in another case. Both the questions, being interlinked with each other, are being decided together.
(3.) IT is settled that this Court can review its judgment given under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the ground for such a review is made out. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and others, AIR 1979 SC 1047 has, in this connection laid down as under : "IT is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of the diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produce by him at the time when the order was made ; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record Is found ; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground ; it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court." A Division Bench of this Court in Allahabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Lalji Srivastava, 1996 (1) Local Bodies and Education Service Reporter 109, has after considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows : The grounds on which this Court can review its Judgment under Article 226 of the Constitution, are almost the same which have been set out in Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). In fact Supreme Court in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmal Kumar Chaudhury, 1995 (1) SCC 178 : 1995 (1) JCLR 97 (SC), has relied upon the case of A. T. Sharma v. A. P. Sharma (supra) while considering the scope of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code." We have been informed by the learned counsel for the parties that the S.L.P. filed against the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench has been rejected. Therefore, this Court can review its judgment under Article 226 of the Constitution almost on the same grounds which have been set out in Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the C.P.C. Explanation to the Rule 1 of Order XLVII, which is reproduced below, bars the review of a decision on the ground that the question of law on which the decision is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of the superior Court in any other case : "Explanation.-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment." In view of the above Explanation, the review application filed by the State is not maintainable. Presuming that the said Explanation is not applicable to writ jurisdiction, the principles contained therein can and should be applied, while considering an application for review of a decision of this Court given under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court in Gyan Chandra Dwivedi v. Ilnd Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, AIR 1987 All 40, while holding that it is not permissible to review a judgment on the ground that a question of law on which it is based has been overruled by a larger Bench or a higher Court, has relied upon the said Explanation and the principle contained therein and in this connection has laid down as follows : "This Explanation was added on the recommendation of the law Commission to put an end to the controversy which had arisen as regards whether a judgment could be reviewed merely on the ground that the decision on a question of law on which the same was founded has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court. Almost all the High Courts, save for the solitary exception of Kerala High Court, were unanimous in their opinion that the fact that the view of law taken in a judgment has been altered by a subsequent decision of a Supreme Court in another case should not afford a valid ground for the review of the judgment. See Liaqat Husain v. Mohammad Razi, AIR 1944 Oudh 198 ; Lachmi v. Chisa, AIR 1960 Punj 43 ; Patel Naranbhai v. Patel Gopaldas, AIR 1972 Guj 229 ; Venkataswami Raddigar v. Thirukamu Reddiar, (1977) 2 Mad LJ 524. IT, therefore, Order XLVII, Rule 1 is applied to the present case, it is apparent that the review petition would be liable to be dismissed upon the plain terms of Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1. Learned counsel for the Landlord, however, placed strong reliance on Explanation to Section 141 of the Civil P.C. Section 141 enacts that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as may be in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction, Explanation to Section 141 was however, added by the Central Act 104 of 1976 and it provides : "In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution." IT was urged that in view of this Explanation Order LXVII would not apply to writ petitions. I am unable to agree. Even if it is assumed that Order XLVII, Rule 1 may not in terms apply to review of judgment and orders passed in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. I see no reason why the principle underlying the same should not be invoked while considering an application for review of a judgment of a High Court rendered under Article 226 of the Constitution. Clause (c) to Order XLVII, Rule 1 merely embodies all those principles which the Courts of law have repeatedly recognised as grounds on which a judgment may be legitimately reviewed. Incidentally, these are also the grounds which find mention in the above quoted decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aribam Taleshwar Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 (supra) as the grounds on which High Court may review their judgments and orders passed under Article 226. Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 merely explains and outlines the scope and ambit of the expression, in my view, "error apparent on the fact of the record." That being so, I see no good ground whatever for not applying the principle underlying the Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 to writ petitions also. That Explanation, in my view, enshrines a very salutary principle which is of general application, namely, that finality attaching to judgments ought not to be disturbed except by way of appeal or on recognised grounds of review set out hereinabove and approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision cited above." The review application of State filed in the instant case is, therefore, misconceived and is not maintainable. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, has however, in this connection made two submissions, namely, (i) that if the Court can review the judgment on the ground of the change of law with retrospective effect there is no justification for not reviewing the judgment on the ground that the law laid down by the decision, which is sought to be reviewed has been overruled by a larger Bench or higher Court ; and (ii) that the law laid down by the Full Bench is binding on all and, therefore, it is the duty of this Court to review its earlier judgment. Both the contentions are devoid of merit and cannot be accepted.;