- (1.) R. K. Gulati, J. This is a tenant's writ petition and arises from proceedings under Section 21 (1-A) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972) hereinafter referred to as "the Act. "
(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts are that the third respondent, Sultan Jahan Adeeb was an Operator in the Telephone Exchange at Mussoorie. She retired from service on 31-3-1983. After retirement, on 24-4- 1984 she along with her mother arrayed as respondent No. 4, purchased an accommodation known as "sussex Cottage" located at King Craig Library', Motor Road, Mussoorie, through a registered sale deed which was in the occupation and in the tenancy of the petitioner. The third respondent filed an application before the Second respondent, namely, the Prescribed Authority, Deh radun, for the release of the said accommodation in her favour on the allegations, inter-alia that she was in Government ser vice as Junior Supervisor, at Telephone Ex change, being a Government servant, she was allotted an official accommodation for her residence at posts and Telegraph Holiday Home, Mussoorie, which she had vacated on 15-9-1984 on account of cessa tion of her employment. She asserted that the accommodation in question was pur chased for her permanent residence after her retirement; she had invested her entire fund, security and other saving in the pur chase of the said property ; despite several oral requests the tenant-petitioner has not vacated the premises in dispute; she had no other place to live in Mussoorie other than the building in dispute and temporarily she was living with her married daughter. The tenant-petitioner contested the application for release. However, by an order dated 26-7-1988 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application for release. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against that order was also dis missed on 17-6-1989 by the District Judge, Dehradun. Feeling still aggrieved the petitioner has preferred this writ petition seeking quashing of the aforesaid two or ders, and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge. Both, the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority have recorded categorical finding that the provisions of sub- section (1-A) of Section 21 were at tracted to the present case inasmuch as the third respondent was a Government Ser vant and was allotted a public building for her residence which she had vacated on ac count of cessation of her employment. The correctness of those findings of fact recorded by the aforesaid authorities were not disputed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
(3.) THE learned counsel however, ar gued that the remedy under Section 21 (1-A) was not available to the third respondent who had purchased the property in dispute after her retirement knowing fully well that it was a tenanted property occupied by the tenant-petitioner. It was submitted that the third respondent cannot be permitted to disturb the tenant, i. e. the petitioner on the ground that she was entitled to the special advantage conferred on her by Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. THE argument was that the remedy under Section 21 (1-A) was not available to a landlord who subsequent to his or her retirement acquires the tenanted accommodation as its landlord by transfer, purchase or otherwise. According to the learned counsel the protection under those provisions was available only to such employees who were landlords while still in employment and availed the benefit or protection after retirement in respect of a tenancy subsisting during their service. In order to re-enforce the submissions, the learned counsel referred to the provisions contained in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act and also to the proviso attached to Section 21 (1-A), It is the cessation of the employment, urged the learned counsel, and not the use and oc cupation of a public building/government accommodation which was required to be vacated or had been vacated, was relevant for the entertainment of an application under Section 21 (1-A) of the Act, THE learned counsel for the petitioner went on to argue that the present Act was a benefi cial legislation for tenants to provide protections to them against their eviction except for situations provided under the Act and, therefore, Section 21 (1-A) should be construed strictly bearing in Kind the pur port and the objection of sub-section (1) of Section 21. It was also the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that sub section (1-A) should be read as proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 because it provides for exception to the provisions contemplated under that sub-section. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon tie two decisions of this Court in J. C. Gupta and others v. District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1978 ALJ 1306 and Kalyan Rai Saxena v. IInd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1982 (1) ARC 363. The U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was promulgated as it would be evident from the preamble of the Act, in the interest of general public for the regulation of letting, rent and eviction of tenants from certain classes of building situated in the urban areas and the matters connected therewith. Sub-section (1-A) was inserted by the U. P. Amendment Act No. 22 of 1976. That provision reads as under: " (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this sub section may also be given by a landlord in occupa tion of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction of such application shall take effect only on the date of the actual cessation. ";