TARA DEVI Vs. MUKHYA CHIKITSA ADHIKARI
LAWS(ALL)-1996-8-59
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on August 07,1996

TARA DEVI Appellant
VERSUS
MUKHYA CHIKITSA ADHIKARI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) B. S. Chauhan, J. The petitioner was appointed as Nurse and Midwife vide order dated 13-2-90, which is contained in Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition. The services of the petitioner were terminated vide order dated 22nd April, 1993 and the impugned order ter minating the services of the petitioner, which is contained in Annexure No. 2 to this writ petition, reveals that the petitioner had contained the employment by producing the forget certificate of her qualification and she was not eligible. The petitioner has filed instant writ petition after the lapse of 3 years and 4 months from the date of passing of the impugned order. The first question to be considered by this Court is whether such an enquiry in exercise of extra- ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is required in such a stale claim.
(2.) IN the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Gover nor of Delhi, A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 2077, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has observed that a stale claim cannot be entertained in writ jurisdiction. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Mysore \. V. K. Kangan, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 2190 holding that the party must approach the Court within reasonable time. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has considered this issue in the case of M/s. Tilok Chand Moti Chand and others v. KB. Munshi, A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 898, and held that the petition filed at a belated stage cannot be entertained. Similarly, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case ofrabinder Nath Base v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 470 observed as under:- "it would not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. ' It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Con stitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petition filed after inordinate delay. " The issue of applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act in the writ jurisdiction were considered by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of M. P. Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer and others A. I. R. 1971 Ker. 175 and it observed as under: "the principles underlying statutory provision lies the Limitation Act. . . . . or. . . . . . . applicable to petitions are not to be regarded as embodying technical rules of procedure. They are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice, the securing of which is the very object of Article 226. The principles are principles of repose and pease. Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them, Said Best. C. J. in A. Court v. Cross, (1825) 130 ER 540. "
(3.) IN the case of Union of INdia and others v. Athose Lop Fernandes and others, A. I. R. 1977 Goa 14, it was held that the period of limitation prescribed by the IN dian Limitation Act, 1963 is not strictly applicable in cases ofwrit jurisdiction. The Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Teja Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, A. I. R. 1982 P and H169 has taken the view that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure etc. may be made applicable in the writ juris diction. On the issue of applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act, the Privy Council in case of General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Jan-mahemed Abdul Rahim, A. I. R. 1941 P. C. 6, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harsh ly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time al lowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law. " In the case of Rajendm Singh and others v. Santa Singh and others, A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 2537, the Supreme Court has relied upon the Halsbury's laws of England (Vol. 24) 181 as under: "the policy of Limitation Acts. The Courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of Statutes of limitation, namely (1) that long doremant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a state claim, and (3) that persons of good causes of actions who peruse them with reasonable deligence. ";


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