D. K. Seth, J. - (1.) THE petitioner's licence was cancelled by order dated 23rd December, 1989. On appeal, the same was dismissed by order dated 4th June, 1982. THEse two orders have been challenged by means of this writ petition.
(2.) MR. S. K. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner, while challenging the impugned orders, contended that the said orders have been passed on the basis of presumption. There were no material facts available before the authorities to arrive at a conclusion that there was any justified ground to cancel the licence. The question of likelihood is not a ground to be taken into consideration. The allegation that the brother of the petitioner was involved in a criminal case without any allegation as against the petitioner about his involvement or use of the gun in the said incident cannot be a ground for revocation of his licence simply because the petitioner was involved in proceedings under Section 107/116, Cr. P.C. which, according to him, had ended in favour of the petitioner. In support of his contention, he has relied on the decisions in the cases of Udaiveer Singh v. District Magistrate, Farrukhabad and another, 1981 AWC 237 ; Ilam Singh v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut and others, 1986 AWC 1166 and Ram Bahadur Singh v. District Magistrate, Deoria and others, 1991 (1) AWC 291. Relying on the decision in the case of Udaiveer Singh (supra), he contends that involvement in proceedings under Section 107/116, Cr. P.C. cannot be a ground for cancellation of the licence as has been held in the said case. Drawing inspiration from the case of Ilam Singh (supra), Mr. Misra contends that in absence of any material, the licence cannot be cancelled on the ground of safety and security simply on the basis of presumption as has been held in the said case. He contended further that the possibility of abuse or mere suspicion cannot be a ground for cancellation of the licence unless there is positive evidence as was the ratio decided in the case of Ram Bahadur Singh (supra). The learned standing counsel, on the other hand, relying on Section 17 of the Arms Act, contends that it is the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority either to grant the licence or not. There was sufficient material to arrive at the subjective satisfaction. Here it was not a case of mere suspicion or possibility. Admittedly there was an incident of atrocity on Harijans due to which several persons were killed. Therefore, the question does not rest in the realm of possibility or suspicion. There was an incident. Therefore, the satisfaction arrived at being based on materials cannot be substituted by that of the High Court while exercising writ Jurisdiction particularly when the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot undertake the exercise of determination of findings of fact.
(3.) SECTION 17 of the Arms Act provides for variation, suspension and revocation of a licence. The suspension or revocation can be made under subsection (3) which provides several grounds. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of SECTION 17 provides "if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence", it may pass order in writing suspending the licence for such a period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence. Therefore, the licensing authority has Jurisdiction to revoke the licence, as in the present case, provided, according to him, it was necessary for the security of public or public safety. Admittedly, in the present case, there had been an incident of atrocities on Harijans in which the brother of the petitioner was involved. The atrocities on Harijans on account of which there have been several killings is a question of public peace, public safety or security. There is no question of denying the said fact. The licensing authority is in the field and is the best Judge who can assess the situation on the basis of materials which are before him. Such an assessment cannot be substituted by that of this Court which is in no way concerned or does not have any inkling of the situation. This Court cannot undertake any exercise to determine the facts leading to the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority on the basis of the situation then existing. It was for the licensing authority to decide the same according to his own discretion and wisdom. In the present case, nothing has been shown as to how the said satisfaction is perverse or based on no material. Because there has been a concrete incident in which the brother of the petitioner was involved, the question does not rest in the realm of suspicion or possibility or likelihood, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the given situation, a finding has been arrived at by the authority concerned which had been scrutinised by the appellate authority who had also affirmed the same rendering the character of concurrent finding which can only be interfered with by this Court only when perversity is brought to its notice which is absent from the materials placed before this Court.;