- (1.) J. C. Gupta, J. Through this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 6-6-80 passed by the District Inspector of Schools (in short to be referred to as Inspector) and the order dated 23-1-82 passed by the Deputy Director of Education (in short to be referred to as D. D. E.) passed in the appeal filed by the petitioner before that authority.
(2.) THE relevant facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed on probation on 14-7-67 as Assistant Teacher in J. TC. grade. THE Committee of Management by the decision dated 26-5-69 terminated petitioner's services on the ground of un satisfactory service. THE petitioner made a representation to the Inspector, who by the order dated 30-8-69 issued a show-cause notice to the Committee of Manage ment as to whether any prior approval of Inspector was obtained before terminat ing the services of the petitioner. Later on by the order dated 17-9-69 the Inspector set aside the order of termination on the ground that prior approval of the Inspec tor was necessary. It appears that the Com mittee of Management again decided through resolution dated 2-6-70 to ter minate the services of the petitioner and this time before serving the notice of ter mination on the petitioner, the Commit tee of Management approached the In spector and obtained his prior approval on 6-6-70 and thereafter sent notice of ter mination. dated 8 6-70, which was served on the petitioner. On 9-6-70 the Commit tee of Management sent another notice stating that the petitioner's work was not found satisfactory. It further appears that the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from 1-7-70, The petitioner under legal advice filed civil Suit No. 623 of 1970 challenging the order of termination issued by the Committee of Management. The Com mittee of Management contented the suit. However, the trial Court dismissed the said suit on merits. The first appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and allowed the appeal quashing the two notices referred to above sent by the Committee of Management to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of first appellate Court, the Committee of Management preferred second Appeal No. 2082 of 1974 before this Court. The said appeal was allowed by the order dated 27-2-81. This Court did not prefer to enter into the controversy as to whether the plaintiff, present petitioner, was a probationer or a permanent employee on the date of the order made by the Inspec tor of because in its view under the relevant provisions the U. P. Intermediate Education Act the jurisdiction of civil court was ousted in such matter. The petitioner then immediately filed an ap peal before the D. D. E. on 4-3-81 praying for condonation of delay, but the said ap peal has been dismissed by the D. D. E. by the impugned order dated 23rd January, 1982, which is under challenge in this writ petition. The D. D. E. has also not gone into the merits of the case and has dis missed the appeal as beyond time. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
(3.) THE only point involved in this petition is whether the D. D. E. has com mitted any manifest error of law in dis missing the appeal as beyond time. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a litigant, who had been prosecuting his remedy under a legal advice should not have made remedy less simply on mere technicalities. Accord ing to him the order of Inspector dated 6-6-70 was never communicated to the petitioner and consequently the period of limitation would not run from the date of the order and thus the appeal filed before the D. D. E. was within time. The other lee of argument of petitioner's counsel is that in any view of the matter the Appellate Court of the D. D. E. should have con sidered this aspect of the case that issue regarding the jurisdiction and main tainability of suit was decided in favour of the petitioner by the lover Courts and it was only by the decision of this court dated 27th February, 1981 that it was held that the jurisdiction of civil Court was barred. This, on the face of it, proves that the petitioner had prosecuted the suit in good faith under a mistaken legal advice and for that, in law, the petitioner cannot be punished making him remedyless.;