- (1.) S. H. A. Razaand And S. Dikshit, JJ. This special appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 20-3-96 coupled with the order dated 20-2-96 and 3-11-95 passed by an Hon'ble Single Jiidge of this Court in writ petition bearing No. 4330 (S/s) of 1995 : in re: Jagat Narain Vishwakarma v. State of U. P. and others.
(2.) THE case of the respondent Sri Jagat Narain Vishwakarma in the writ petition was that he was appointed as English Lecturer and had been continuing to perform his duties as a teacher in Khalsa Inter mediate College, Lucknow, since 1989, but was not paid salary. THE Principal Sri Sujan Singh after taking over as the Principal in connivance with the Inspector of Schools has even stopped Sri Jagat Narain Vish wakarma from working as English Lecturer. Sri Jagat Narain Vishwakarma filed a regular suit, before filing this writ petition, for payment of salary before the Civil Courtand the Civil Court directed the payment there of during the period he was working in the Institution. It has been brought to the notice of this Court, that objection against the application for injunction, which is in the nature of mandatory injunction, was preferred before the Civil Court, but despite the lapse of considerable time, matter still hangs on before the Court. In view of the fact that neither the salary was paid to the petitioner, nor he was allowed to function as lecturer after Srim Sujan Singh has taken over as Principal, the petitioner filed the present writ petition praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus command ing the respondents, to allow the petitioner to work on the post of lecturer in English, in the said Institution and the respondents may also be directed not to interfere into the function of the petitioner, on the post of English Lecturer. THE petitioner also satak-ed his claim for payment of salary with effect from 20-7-89and prayed that the respon dents be directed to make payment of salary to the petitioner, for the post of lecturer in English, in the said Institution regularly. From the side of the respondents who are the appellants in Special Appeal No. 70 (SB) of 1996, it was contended; that the relief which has been sought in the writ petition, is similar to what has been sought in the suit itselfand only for that reason the Civil Court, passed an ex pane order for payment of salary on 12-5-93. Thus the main question which has arisen in this special appeal is as to whether despite the pendency of the Civil Suit bearing No. 233 of 1993, involving the basic question as to whether the petitioner was validly appointed or not, the same question can be agitated in the writ petition bearing No. 4330 (S/s) of 1995. The pendency of the Civil Suit and the order of the Civil Court for payment of salary to the petitioner itself was noticed by Hon'ble the Single Judge, in his order dated 20-3-96 but it seems that while passing the impugned order dated 20-3-96 the attention of Hon'ble the Single Judge was not drawn towards the fact that on account of the pen dency of the civil suit for more or less on the same ground the writ petition would not be maintainable. The Hon'ble Single Judge has also mentioned in his order, dated 20- 3-96, that when the writ petition was filed, this Court instead of issuing directions, to make the payment directed the Director of Education, to decide the petitioner's repre sentation, as to whether the petitioner was working as stated by him since 1989, as English Lecturer, in the institution in ques tion. The Director of Education in pur suance of the order dated 3-11-95 decided the representation on 26-2- 96. Hon'ble the Single Judge has indicated in the order that the Director of Education did not consider the case of the petitioner, to that extent, that he had been working as English Lecturer since 1983 (1989) and has not been paid salary as per the directions of the learned Munsif dated 12-5-93. Hon'ble Single Judge also observed in the order that the Director of Education has only examined as to whether the petitioner's appointment was valid or not but as the suit was still pending in the Civil Court, Director was directed to reconsider the matterand pass appropriate order, on the representation of the petitioner, as to whether the petitioner has been working in the College since 1989and he had not paid salary since then. The ques tion as to whether the appointment was validly made or not was left open to be considered in the appropriate forum, e. g. Civil Court, but a direction was issued that the order dated 12- 5-93 passed by the Civil Court must be complied with, by the authorities concernedand they would allow the petitioner to work and continue to pay him salary until filial orders would be passed by the Civil Court.
(3.) WE are of the view that generally nobody should be permitted to invoke the powers of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to get an order of the Civil Court executed by this Court. The Code of Civil Procedure provides adequate provisions for execution of the orders passed by the Civil Courtand if the orders passed by the Civil Court are not executed, it could be either executed through the process of the Court or the contempt proceedings can be initiated. Although, this Court even in exercise of its powers can issue directions in extraordinary situations under its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, but this Court would not relegate itself to the level of an executing court of a civil jurisdiction. The question of validity or invalidity of the appointment of the petitioner is the subject-matter of a suit which is pending in the Civil Court. The issue of payment of salary in the suit is inter-linked with the validity of the appointment of the petitioner. Similarly the right of the petitioner, if any, to work as English teacher in the Institution is also derived from the nature of his appointment. If the court would ultimately find that the appointment was not validly made, the Civil Court may dismiss the suit of the petitioner, but if the court would come to the conclusion that the appointment of the petitioner was perfectly valid the suit would be decreed.;