- (1.) VIJAY Bahadur Singh has filed this writ petition under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The prayers contained in this writ petition are basically two-fold. First, certiorari is prayed for quashing auction notice dated 12-12-1995. Second, another certiorari for quashing the order dated 28-9-1995 (Annexure II) granting right to the petitioner to realise toll tax only for a period of six months ending with 31-3- 1996 and mandamus commanding the respondents to continue the period atleast and until 31-3-1997.
(2.) WHEN this writ petition was filed, Dr. R. G. Padia, learned counsel for the petitioner was permitted to file supplementary affidavit which he had already filed. He has been heard at sufficient length in support of this writ petition. Sri S. G. Hasnain has also been heard on behalf of opposite parties. It may be stated here that according to the pleadings, the petitioner responded to the advertisement regarding realisation of toll tax in respect of bridge, namely, Dona Nala Bridge, situated at Manahajpur Chiraiyacote Marg, District Azamgarh. Duration shown in an advertisement was 1 1/2 years. It is pleaded that the petitioner's bid though second, being highest, was accepted because first highest bidder did not respond. Therefore, it is said that vide order dated 23-9-1994 the petitioner was given right to realise the toll tax for a period of 1 1/2 years. It may be mentioned that on the action taken by respondents which is supported by Standing Counsel, this fact is denied and the original order in favour of the petitioner indicates that the period for which ultimately the petitioner has been asked to realise the toll tax was six months only, i. e. , October 1995 to March 1996. There is reference to two other petitions filed by the petitioner in this Court being Writ Petition No. 33811 of 1994 and other one of which number has not been noted in the writ petition but it is said to be of the year 1996. One writ petition was concerning the alleged demand of the respondents for payment of stamp duty whereas second writ petition was with the request to enhance the period. Dr. R. G. Padia said that the petition of 1995 was not related with the controversy of the present writ petition. However, these niceties are not to detain this Court any further. The reason being that the petitioner had never sought any mandamus for a direction for execution of the lease-deed in his favour well within time if he had to execute the lease-deed in pursuance of some alleged order of the Commissioner dated 23-9-1994. In this connection reference has been made in Annexure III to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner. This happens to be the document which bears the date 28-6-1993. Dr. R. G. Padia, however, said that the aforesaid date carries a typographical error and year should be 1994. For the aforesaid discussion, let it be accepted that the letter is dated 28-6-1994. This letter is allegedly written by Additional Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner and is addressed to the Executive Engineer. It narrates that Vijai Bahadur Singh's bid being the highest was accepted by the Commissioner. It further contends a narration that as if the Commissioner has desired that the necessary formalities be completed before 30-6-1994. It further narrates that if the bidder does not complete the formalities within stipulated period, the security deposited be forfeited. This, however, is not the original order of the Commissioner but purports to say that the contents of the order of the Commissioner look like that.
(3.) IF the petitioner could come to the Court on two earlier occasions, it is not understandable why he had not made the prayer of such type which he is making today. The date on which the petitioner had obtained interim order concerning the payment of stamp duty is 21-10-1994 in the writ peti tion No. 33811 of 1995. I the petitioner was really granted the permission by the Commissioner prior to 20-10- 1994 referred to above, the communica tion must have been addressed to him and it is absolutely ridiculous to think that if such an order had been passed by the Commissioner, the same would been communicated to him. It appears that for this reason though the petitioner made some ancillary prayer, he did not pray for the type of prayer he has made in the writ petition. As per the latest decision of the State Governments as communicated through the G. O. of 1993, the' Government has required that the auction for realisation of toll tax should necessarily end by 31st March of the subsequent year. This notification narrates that if there was any existing bid before that period for a longer period, it should be brought down lawfully to end with 31st March. Under the circumstances, it is obvious that the petitioner's bid had not been accepted by the Commissioner prior to the impugned order dated 28-9- 1995 (Annexure II to the writ petition) indicating to the petitioner the validity of the bid for a period of six months ending 31st March, 1996. IF the petitioner's allegations were correct the period of one and a half year would have begun on October 1994 and ended on 31-3-1996. In view of the policy decision of the State Government, the aforesaid directions contained in Annexure II appear to fortify the said decision. Absolute silence on the part of the petitioner in respect of the execution of the lease-deed in his favour causes enough doubt about the validity or the genuineness of the grievances now sought to be raised by the petitioner. Dr. R. G. Padia has placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench dated 2-9-1993 in which a direction was issued which was to the effect that the original period of three years as was settled with the petitioner therein was restored and the Commissioner's direction reducing the said period to one year from three years was quashed on the aforesaid analogy. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in the instant case 1 and i years original period advertised should be restored to the petitioner also and he should be permitted to continue the said lease till 31st March, 1997 and it should not be terminated by 31st March, 1996.;