- (1.) RAVI S. Dhavan, J. This order or judgment would not be completed and is only an appendix to the order of the Court dated 26 May, 1990, which was a repercus sion to the framing of the charges against the parties arrayed, but the record bears out that in unionism the parties who were under notice acquiesced, conceded and re quested the Court that no charges be framed as they understood the order. As this submission was made on behalf of the contemners when they themselves pleaded thatthey were clearly conscious of the issues before the Court, the matter proceeded into hearing.
(2.) THIS case has been pending since very long. It ought to have been concluded earlier, but it did not as the Court in be tween sat in other jurisdictions, thus, the matter had to be taken up only on the days when the Court could convene specially when the Court was shown on Board with the case. An aspect of the record which needs to be noticed is that, compatible with the array of parties in the writ petition in which the'order of 7th April, 1989 was passed, the breach of which was alleged by the petitioner, Union of India was arrayed as a party respondent to these contempt proceedings and this aspect became an aspect wiuiout any issue between the par ties. It was understood by ail parties present that the record could not be alienated from the proceedings out of which these contempt proceedings arose. Truly, but for a defect of the manner in the which civil contempt jurisdiction is struc tured, these proceedings ought to be part of the proceedings in the writ petition which saw the order of 7th April, 1989. However, a civil contempt case at the Al lahabad High Court is tried beyond the record of the case itself. An aspect of breach of any order or judgment is judged away from the record. In the circumstan ces, in so far as this case is concerned, as this is not the Court which delivered the order of 7th April, 1989, the breach of which is alleged, ''e matter would have to be judged strictly within the parameters of the order which occasioned the contempt proceeding. Simpliciter, the order of 7, April, 1989 notices the aspect that in the past statutory complaints which may have been made by the petitioner, at that time a serving officer with the army in the rank of a Lieutenant Colonel, were disposed of criptically. The Division Bench which passed the order cautioned the Union of India and the army establishment that this time the complaint of the petitioner must, not be disposed of, but the consideration of it must see objectivity and reasons on record on whatever may be the decision. The second aspect was that the repre sentation of the petitioner must see result within thirty days. The facts are already noticed in the order of 26 May, 1990. Thus, the Court is not repeating the facts again. The only change which has happened in that after the Opposite Party Nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Naresh Chandra, I. A. S. and the Sub-Area Com mander, Brigadier P. K, Gupta, had already placed their defence on record, after the order of 26 May, 1990, another affidavit, a supplementary defence was filed.
(3.) THE issues before the Court as the matter went into hearing then became one of the degree of contempt, which may have been occasioned by (1) the Union of India, (2) the then Secretary, Defence, Government of India, Mr. Naresh Chandra, I. A. S and (3) Brigadier P. K. Gupta, the then Sub-Area Commander, Allahabad. THE party played by the three on the issues which are before the Court in this civil contempt action is as below: (1) THE obligation of the Urro" of India to ensure that the order of the High Court of 7 April, 1989 was complied with, (2) THE personal responsibility of Mr. Naresh Chandra, I. A. S. as Secretary, Defenceand (3) THE answerability of Brigadier P. K. Gupta, as head of the formation to set the process in motion to give effect to the order of the High Court dated 7th April, 1989. THE Court will take up the cases of the opposite parties one by one. Before that all that needs to be kept'in mind is that the petitioner being at the relevant time a serving army officer filed a writ petition complaining that the procedure which prescribes for redressal of grievances is not being adhered to and despite orders of the Court on his writ petitions on more than one occasion his representations are being disposed of without application of the mind with one phrase or one word orders like 'disposed of or 'rejected'. In the circumstances, the petitioner in yet a subsequent Writ Petition No. 8545 of 1989 received an order of 7th April, 1989, already referred to. This time, the High Court reminded the respondents that the complaint of the petitioner must be con sidered with objectivity and reasons must be recorded on the result of the petitioner's representation. Secondly, the representation ought to see result within thirty days. THE reason, the High Court had indicated time and the manner of its decision is that the petitioner was to retire on 30 June, 1989 and in the circumstances, whatever may be the decision on the petitioner's representation before the Central Government the result ought to be handed down to the petitioner before his retirement so that he knows where he stands in service and whatever be his com plaint in service. On the face of it the record as it stands, again the Central Government repeated the formula orders. As far as the petitioner is concerned it was conveyed to him in formality but by a formula communication that his representation was Dejected. This is the order dated 3 August, '9, otherwise not contained in the con tempt petition for the simple reasons that it was filed in May 1990, when the matter was taken up for hearing. The order on the result of the petitioner's representation on whatever stated it lay was filed during the pendency of the contempt petition and, thus, is contained as an annexure to the counter, affidavit of Opposite Party No. 2, Mr. Naresh Chandra, I. A. S. Defence Secretary. The result on the petitioner's representation as conveyed to him by the Government of India. Ministry of Defence, letter dated 3 August, 1989, is already referred to in the Court's earlier order dated 26 May, 1990 and, thus, are not being repeated here.;