- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. An adverse entry was entered in the service record of the petitioner by an office order, dated 15-12- 1992 (Annexure-12 to the petition) which has been challenged by the petitioner, by means of this writ petition. Before making the said adverse entry, the petitioner was asked to show cause by letter dated 21-3-1992 (Annexure-2 to the petition ). It is al leged that the question related to the execu tion of the agreement with M/s G. D. Shukla Construction Company, entered into on 18th October, 1986 by the Chief Engineer, who was empowered to execute such an agreement by resolution dated 23-4-1979. The proposal for the lay-out plan relating to the schedule of tender for 128 LIG House was approved by resolution No. 493 adopted in the meeting of Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad ( here in after referred to as ADA), held on 31-1-1987. But the contractor having refused to execute the work at the old rate on 5th March, 1987 the Executive Engineer by Let ter dated 7-3-1987 decided to discuss the matter with the Chief Engineer. By letter dt. 23-4-1987 the Secretary, ADA asked to start the work after development work is com pleted, which is Annexure-9 to the petition. On the basis of said letter, the petitioner was inducted into the site on 28-4-1987.
(2.) ON this background Sri A. K. Yog, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in no manner the petitioner could be held responsible for the alleged misconduct as indicated in the show-cause notice dated 21-3-1992, Annexure-2 to the petition. Therefore, the order dated 15-12-1992 can not be sustained. Secondly, the contends that it was the Chief Engineer and the Ex ecutive Engineer who were to deal with the Contractor with regard to forfeiture of security deposits, etc. The petitioner did not have any such jurisdiction. The learned Standing Counsel on the other hand contends that the matter being an administrative decision based on the material, which is clearly finding of fact, this Court should not interfere with the same. The learned counsel for ADA on the other hand contends that there is no bar in inflicting enhanced punishment than proposed, if the material produced before the authority warrants the same. According to him the petitioner having not challenged the validity of the proceeding, he cannot re-open the same. The contention of the learned Coun sel for ADA that the petitioner did not chal lenge the proceeding on account of any in firmity is misconceived. Since Sri Yog had made it clear that despite repeated repre sentations inspection of the relevant docu ments were not allowed to the petitioner.
(3.) BE that as it may as, it appears from the fact that the Chief Engineer is a person responsible for executing the agreement and, fresh agreement having been entered on 25th June, 1987 by the Chief Engineer, any right which he could have under the agreement dated 18-10-1986, appears to have been waived. Inasmuch as it is not disputed that the agreement dated 25-6-1987 was entered into through negotiation with the Contractor by the Executive En gineer and the Chief Engineer, as would appear from Annexure-9 to the petitioner. The superior officer without taking steps for forfeiting the security deposits indulged in further negotiation culminating into fresh agreement whereby the agreement dated 18th October, 1986 stood either revoked or renovated, as the case may be. It does not appear that in the said process the petitioner was ever associated. It is also not the case either of the learned Standing counsel or the learned counsel for ADA. Apparently, therefore, it is very difficult to accept that the petitioner had any respon sibility towards that end and on the other hand it seems that his superior officers who should have taken steps had avoided the same and sought to inflict uncalled for in jury in the service career of the petitioner, in order to save their own skin. It is apparent from the facts disclosed the petitioner can not be said to be responsible for the same, particularly when he came into picture only on 28-4-1987, pursuant to the order dt 23-4-1987, Annexure-9 to the writ petition. The contents of Annexure-9 to the petition clearly indicates that there was specific order that the work should be started after completion of the develop ment work and that the same should be complied with completely and accordingly the Chief Engineer was requested to ask the concerned Executive Engineer to ensure compliance of the order that construction should be started after completion of all the development works. A reading of the said order clearly reveals that the respondents had sought to blow hot and cold in the same breath inasmuch as in the one hand the Chief Engineer is being requested to start construction work after completion of development work and the Executive En gineer was directed to be instructed by the Chief Engineer, as aforesaid. The Executive Engineer since forwarded the said letter to the petitioner on 28-4-1987, there was no scope for the petitioner to disobey the said order. He being the Junior Officer he was bound to carry out the orders as contained in Annexure-9 to the petitioner. There was no scope for him to take steps contrary to the said order by forfeiting security amount for not starting the work within time stipu lated after 18-10-1986, the date when the work order was signed. The same would have the effect of overridinthe negotiation initiated by letter dated 7-3-1987, being An nexure-9 to the petition. Therefore by no stretch of imagination the petitioner can be held responsible for the alleged inaction, as pointed out in the letter dated 21-3-1992 (Annexure-2 to the petition ).;