- (1.) SUDHIR Narain, J. The petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 4-9-1995, passed by respondent No. 1, rejecting the objection of the petitioner filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the order dated 16-9-1995, passed by respondent No. 1, dismissing the revision against the aforesaid order.
(2.) THE facts in brief are that respondent No. 3 is landlord of the premises in dispute. He filed suit No. 57 of 1985 for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages against the petitioner on the allegation that the petitioner was a tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 100 per month, He failed to pay rent since 1-10- 1980. Respon dent No. 3 sent a notice dated 30-11-1983/1-12-1983, demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy of the petitioner. THE notices was served upon the petitioner on 6-12-1983. THE petitioner gave a reply to the said notice. THE petitioner filed written statement on 28-11-1985. It was stated by him that the shop in question was taken on rent in the year 1965 at the rate of Rs. 20 per month. It was enhanced to Rs. 25 per month in the year 1972. He paid the rent to the landlord- respondent for the period till 4-12-1983 but the landlord did not issue any rent receipt. For the period 5- 12-1983 to 4-12-1985, it was alleged that he was going to deposit in Court. During the pendency of the suit the petitioner and respondent No. 2 entered into compromise. THEy filed compromise application dated 17-7-1986 before the Civil Judge exercising the power of Judge, Small Causes Court, Mathura. THE terms of the compromise were as follows : (1) THE suit for ejectment be decreed but the plaintiff shall not execute the decree for a period of two years and in case the defendant does not vacate the disputed shop, it will be open to the plaintiff to obtain the possession through execution of the decree. (2) THE plaintiff shall pay Rs. 8,000 to the tenant as the defendant had affixed certain furniture in the shop in question, the cost of which is Rs. 8,000. THE amount shall be payable. at the time the possession is taken by the landlord. (3) THE suit for recovery of arrears of rent shall be dismissed regarding recovery of rent and damages. (4) THE defendant shall pay damages at the rate of Rs. 25 per month for the period of two years during which he continued in occupation of the shop in ques tion. This compromise was signed by the petitioner and respondent No. 3 and their counsel. It was verified by the court. THE suit was decreed in terms of the compromise on 17-7-1986. The petitioner did not vacate within two years from the date of passing of the decree as provided under the terms of the compromise. Respondent No. 3 filed application for execution of the decree before the executing court. The petitioner filed objection under Section 47 before respondent No. 2 in the execution case. In the objection the petitioner stated that the compromise was got signed by him against his wishes forcibly and secondly, the suit could not have been decreed in terms of the compromise unless the court was satisfied with the existence of the grounds for eviction as mentioned under Section 20 (2) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). Respondent No. 2 dismissed the objection vide order Dated 4-9- 1995. The petitioner preferred a revision against the said order. Respondent No. 1 dis missed the revision on 4-9-1995. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the compromise was fraudulently obtained by respondent No. 2 and, as such, compromise is not binding upon him. The petitioner has annexed copy of the objection filed before respon dent No. 2 as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. In paragraph 3 of the objection it has been stated' that the plaintiff had put undue pressure upon him and obtained signature on the compromise and thereafter got it filed in the court. The petitioner has not given the details as to how the plaintiff had put pressure upon him in obtaining signature on the compromise application. The petitioner has admittedly signed the compromise application. There also appears the signature of counsel for the petitioner. It was duly verified and thereafter the court had passed the order deciding the suit in terms of the compromise. The petitioner has further not stated that he was not aware of the compromise decree which was passed by the court. The suit was admittedly pending in which he had filed written statement. The suit was decided in terms of the compromise on 17-7-1986. The petitioner continued to occupy the disputed shop for two years in pursuance of the terms of the com promise and it is only when the application for execution of the decree was filed on 10th March, 1989 that he filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 24-10-1989. There is no material to indicate that any fraud has been practised upon the petitioner.
(3.) THE second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable and the suit could not have been decreed unless the trial Court was satisfied that the grounds for eviction exist as enumerated under sub-section (2) Of Section 20 of the Act. THE court passed the decree in terms of the compromise without recording any satisfaction that any ground exists for decreeing the suit as enumerated under Section 20 (2) of the Act and unless the court was satisfied of the existence of any such ground, the decree passed in terms of the compromise was a nullity. The legal position as to when the decree in terms of the compromise in a suit for eviction can be decreed and enforcible in respect of the accommodation which is governed by the provisions of Rent Acts has been considered in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mai and another, AIR 1970 SC 794, wherein the landlord had filed an application for eviction under Section 13 (1) of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act on the ground that the tenant had sublet the accommodation but later on the par ties entered into the compromise and the suit was decreed for recovery of posses sion. It was held that the court was not competent to pass the decree solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties and such compromise shall be treated as nullity under the execution of the decree. Similar view was taken in Smt. Kaushatya Devi and others v. K. L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838.;