Brijesh Kumar, J. - (1.) THE main question involved for consideration in this writ petition is whether the benefit of free railway passes and privilege ticket orders (P.T.Os.), admissible to the railway employees, can be computed in terms of money under the provisions of Section 33 -C of the Industrial Disputes Act, or not. The facts giving rise to the controversy are that the opposite party No. 2 was a railway employee working as Assistant Loco Foreman in Northern Railway, Lucknow, at the relevant time. On December 21, 1982, he applied for three sets of free passes from Lucknow to New Delhi and back, from Howrah to Jammu Tavi and back and from Varanasi to Rameshwaram and back for himself his wife, his son aged 17 years and two unmarried daughters. The passes, according to opposite party No. 2, were not issued as a result of which the benefit of free passes for the calender year 1982 lapsed after 31 -12 -1982. There is no dispute between the parties on the point that a Railway employee is entitled to these sets of free railway passes and six P.T.Os. in one calendar year. The benefit of passes and P.T.Os. lapses with the end of the each calendar year. The opposite party No. 2 moved an application under Section 33 -C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of benefit of three sets of free passes, wrongly not issued to him, in terms of money to the tune of Rs. 12,560/ -. A true copy of the application has been filed as Annexure -2 to the writ petition.
(2.) THE claim of opposite party No. 2 was contested on behalf of the Railway Administration. A copy of the written statement has been filed as Annexure -3 to the writ petition. In the written statement, it was not denied that opposite party No. 2 was a railway employee and was also entitled for the passes as claimed. However, in reply to para 5 of the petition, wherein it was asserted that opposite party No. 2 had applied for three sets of passes, it has been stated in para 2 of the written statement that para 5 as framed was not admitted. As a matter of fact there is no specific denial of the fact that such an application was moved. It has been pleaded in the written statement that opposite party No. 2 had moved the application under Section 33 -C(2) of the Act after two and a half years, thus, the claim was time barred, as according to para 11 of Pass Manual, the applications are preserved for a period of one year and the relevant registers for two years following the year to which the passes relate. Due to weeding out of the record as per provisions of Pass Manual, the relevant record was not available. Another point raised, was that the benefit was not computable in terms of money under Section 33 -C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Presiding Officer, Central Labour Court, Kanpur, by order dated 17 -12 -1985 allowed the application of opposite party No. 2 and computed the benefit of free passes in terms of money, as claimed, for a sum of Rs. 12,560/ -. The Tribunal, in its order, has observed that the main contest on behalf of the Railways was on the ground of want of record. It has also been observed that it is a common ground that no pass was issued to opposite party No. 2. The Tribunal found that the pass Index Card Register is a register only relating to entry of passes which are issued, and it is to be maintained for two years. It is not a register for entering applications for issuances of passes. It has also been observed that there is no rule that the applications for passes should be destroyed within a year or two. The application for passes moved by opposite party No. 2 was received by the despatch clerk Sri S.K. Bharti in the Loco Foreman's office at Lucknow. He was not examined by the Railway Administration to deny the fact of receipt of the application. It is also observed that no limitation is prescribed for moving Labour Court under Section 33 -C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the above facts and findings recorded on their basis by the Labour Tribunal, it is not possible to hold that as such application was moved merely on the ground that the application was not available with Railway Administration.
(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the applications should not have been entertained by the Labour Court and the claim should have been treated as time barred. In this connection he has placed reliance on : A.I.R. 1963 Bombay, page 201, Ramkrishna Ramnath Biri Manufacturing, Kamptee v. Presiding Officer Labour Court. This case lays down that over stale claims should not be encouraged, but the question whether there is or is not unreasonable delay, is to be decided by the Labour Court in its discretion. It may be noted that no limitation is prescribed for moving an application under Section 33 -C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act therefore, there is no question of the application being barred by limitation, as urged. The limitation will not depend upon the provision for weeding out records in office of the petitioner. All that has to be examined is whether there has been unreasonable laches in moving the application. The question whether the claim was belated or not, was considered by the Tribunal and it chose to entertain the claim and decided it on merits. Since the claim has been decided on merits, in my view it will not be appropriate to throw out the claim of opposite party No. 2, at this stage on the ground that it was a belated claim.;