N.D. Ojha, J. - (1.) The appellant instituted a suit for injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from interfering with his possession over a portion of certain property and also restraining them from transferring the said property to anyone else. The case of the appellant in brief was that the defendants had entered into an agreement with him on 11th January, 1983 to execute a sale of the said property for a sum of Rs. 60,000/- and a sum of Rs. 11,000/- was paid as earnest money. According to him possession over a portion of the property was also delivered to him in pursuance of the said agreement. An application for temporary injunction was also filed seeking the same relief as was the relief in the suit. The defendants put in appearance and filed written statement as also objection to the grant of temporary injunction prayed for. The case of the defendants inter alia was that the plaintiff had failed to get the sale deed executed after performing his part of the contract and that the agreement was accordingly cancelled and the appellant was informed about the cancellation of the agreement by a letter dated 12th January, 1984. After hearing counsel for the parties and considering the material produced by them the trial court has dismissed the application for injunction by its order dated 25th July, 1986. It is this order against which the present First Appeal From Order has been preferred.
(2.) Having heard counsel for the appellant we are of opinion that no case for the grant of injunction preyed for has been made out on the findings recorded by the trial court. Granting temporary injunction is in the discretion of the court. In Babu Ram v. Antarim Zila Parishad (A.I.R. 1964 All 534) a Full Bench of this Court has held that a court of appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court below, if the discretion has been exercised in good faith, after giving due weight to relevant matters and without being swayed by irrelevant matters. If two views are possible on the question, then also the Court of appeal would not interfere, even though it may exercise discretion differently, were the case to come initially before it. The exercise of discretion should manifestly be wrong. On the facts of the instant case we find it difficult to take the view that the trial court has either ignored relevant matters or been swayed by irrelevant matters. We are also of the opinion that the exercise of discretion in the instant case cannot be said to be manifestly wrong. That apart, the suit as initially instituted was not for specific performance of the agreement relied on by the petitioner. It is true that now an application for amendment of the plaint has been made on which no final order appears to have been passed so far. In case the defendants are restrained from selling the property to a prospective purchaser from whom they may be expecting valuable consideration and ultimately the suit is dismissed, irreparable injury is likely to be caused to the defendants inasmuch as they at that stage, may not be able to get an equally good prospective purchaser, on the other hand, if a sale deed is executed by the defendants the plaintiff appellant will at best be required to implead the subsequent transferee in the suit and if the suit succeeds the defendants as well as the subsequent transferee will be obliged to execute a sale deed in favour of the appellant in pursuance of the agreement relied on. That way the appellant will not be put to any substantial prejudice. From this view point also it is not a fit case for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of granting a temporary injunction in favour of the appellant. In other words the balance of convenience is apparently not in favour of the appellant.
(3.) As regards the prayer for injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from interfering with the possession of the appellant over a portion of the property over which according to him he was put in possession in pursuance of the agreement, we are of opinion that on the facts of the instant case and the finding recorded by the trial court, with which we agree, the order of the trial court does not deserve to be set aside on this score also.;