Dwarka Nath Jha, J. - (1.) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Avadhesh Narain Trivedi who is the tenant on the ground floor of house No. 84/147, Katra Maqboolganj, Lucknow the premises in dispute. Opposite party No. 3 Sri Mahabir Prasad Prajapati had filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The prescribed Authority after considering the averments, cross -averments, rejoinder and additional affidavits allowed the application of the landlord and at the same time granted six months' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. This order was passed on 9 -4 -1981.
(2.) THE petitioner went up in appeal but the same was dismissed by the Special Judge, Lucknow vide order dated 31st May, 1986. The learned Special Judge had directed the petitioner to hand over the vacant possession of the accommodation in question to the respondent No. 3 by 8th July 1986. Instead of delivering the possession the petitioner has presented this petition today in this Court impugning the validity of the orders passed by the authorities mentioned above. At the stage of admission I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length and I have no hesitation in observing that all the submission put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner are devoid of merit. It is vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that father of opposite party No. 3 Sri Basant Lal had executed a will and the property has been bequeathed to Shankarji (Mahadeoji Maharaj) and, therefore, the property in dispute was a trust property and the Courts below erred in allowing the application under Section 21. The will is purported to have been executed in 1968 and is subject -matter of dispute. The fact remains that twelve years have expired and the trust has not taken possession of the trust property. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to an inspection report in order to show that some "Murtis" have been found by the Prescribed Authority at the time of inspection. This inspection note is of 1983 while the order of the Prescribed Authority is dated 9 -4 -1981. I fail to understand how this report is relevant so far as the present dispute is concerned. Moreover there is nothing on record so show that Prathishtha had been performed with respect to the alleged idols. It had also been conceded that rent was collected by opposite party No. 3 after the death of Basant Lal sometimes in 1968. The assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was being collected on behalf of the trust. The fact remains that respondent No. 3 is not one of the trustees of the said trust and, therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that opposite party No. 3 was collecting rent for the benefit of the trust does not appeal to reason. It appears to me that on the figment of imagination learned counsel has tried to challenge the status of opposite party No. 3 as landlord of the said premises. He placed reliance in support of his contention on a decision of the Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1113. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that mere collection of rent was not sufficient for opposite party No. 3 to present the petition for eviction of the tenant. The decision has elucidated the definition provided in the said Act. In the instant case opposite party No. 3 is the son of Basant Lal and, therefore, he is undoubtedly, unimpeachable character as owner of the property unless it is found otherwise by a competent court of law. In the instant case by reason of fact that he is the son of Basant Lal who was undoubtedly the owner of the property and that opposite party No. 3 had been collecting rent regularly from the petitioner I do not think that there is any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that petition under Section 21 was not maintainable by opposite party No. 3. It may be mentioned that both the Courts have considered at length the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and they recorded a concurrent finding rejecting the pleas set up by the petitioner. Almost an identical line of argument was adopted before this Court and in view of aforesaid discussion the said submission fails to inspire any confidence. It being devoid of is accordingly rejected.
(3.) IT was next submitted that the learned Courts below failed to take into account the hardship that was to accrue to the petitioner in case the application was allowed. I fined that both the courts have devoted to this aspect of the matter and it cannot be said that the reasoning adopted by the Courts below was contrary to the evidence on record. In order to substantiate his argument learned counsel pointed out that petitioner resided at Mohanlalganj and he had a house in Trivediganj, district Barabanki. This place is 55 kilometers from his office and it was not possible for him to attend duties at 7 a.m. The petitioner is working in Government Press, Aishbagh while the opposite party No. 3 is working in Railway Wagon Department. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is wholly misconceived. What the Appellate Court has observed is that the petitioner previously used to reside at Mohanlalganj and was coming daily from Mohanlalganj to attend his duties. Moreover, admittedly the petitioner had a house in Trivediganj, District Barabanki. It is, therefore, evident that there was no confusion that instead of Trivediganj it had used the residence at Mohanlalganj. The appellate Court was aware of the entire situation and had clarified that formerly the petitioner used to reside at Mohanlalganj. Above all this glaring feature that emerges out from the order passed by the Appellate Court is that petitioner resided in House No. 84/17 previously and vacated the same without any notice or action on the part of the landlord. On the other hand on discovery of facts the Court was of the view that the accommodation in occupation of the landlord was much small, it consisted of only one bed room and one sitting room with one small kothri. The number of family members consisted of twelve. On appreciation of facts it cannot be said that the Courts fell into error. In my opinion there is no room of doubt that any apparent error in appreciation of evidence has been committed by the respective authorities. The entire dispute in my opinion is concluded by rank finding of fact and the orders impugned in the petition calls for no interference by this Court.;