SUNIT VYAS Vs. VICE CHANCELLOR, ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY AND ANOTHER
LAWS(ALL)-1986-7-64
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on July 29,1986

Sunit Vyas Appellant
VERSUS
Vice Chancellor, Allahabad University And Another Respondents

JUDGEMENT

R.M. Sahai, J. - (1.) DOES a member of the Executive Council of the University elected by its Court under clause (f) of Section 20 of State Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) retain his seat after expiry of three years mentioned in sub -section (2) of Section 20 till his successor is appointed by virtue of sub -section (2) of Section 65 of the Act is the question which has been debated in this petition at some length. Executive council is one of the authorities of the University mentioned in section 19. Under section 20 it consists of Vice -Chancellor, Pro -Vice Chancellor, if any, two Deans by rotation, few selected members, four elected members of Court and four nominated members of academic eminence. Terms of deans and selected members is one year, of elected members 3 years and nominated members 2 years. Term of member of the Executive Council representing Court under clause (f) comes to an end after expiry of there years. It was probably for this reason that petitioner who was elected by the Court as one of the four representatives in its first meting held on 13th March, 1983 was not given intimation of the Executive Council meeting which was fixed in April, 1986. On coming to know of this petitioner approached this court for direction to opposite parties to treat him as a member of Executive council till his successor was appointed. Claim of petitioner is that action of opposite party was illegal as his successor has not been appointed till now. For this reliance was placed on sub -section (2) of section 65 of the Act, which for better appreciation is extracted below: - - 65(1) Any casual vacancy among the members, other than ex -officio members, of any authority or body of the University shall be filled in the same manner in which the members whose vacancy is to be filled up was chosen, and the person filling the vacancy shall be a member of such authority or body for the residue of the term for which the person whose place he fills would have been a member. (2) A person, who is a member of an authority of the University as a representative of another body, whether of the University or Outside, shall retain his scat on such authority for so long as he continues to be the representative of such body and thereafter till his successor is duly appointed.
(2.) IT permits a person to retain his seat on an authority of the University as representative member of another body as long he continues to be representative of that body and thereafter till the appointment of his successor. Therefore, one should be (i) a member of an authority of University (ii) he should be representative of another body (iii) and he should continue to be representative of that body to get benefit of this section to continue to retain his seat even beyond the period of his membership and till the appointment of his successor. By virtue of this sub -section, therefore, a member satisfying the conditions mentioned in it continues to retain his seat even after expiry of his term if his successor has not been appointed. It is not an extension of term which comes to an end after period mentioned in sub -section (2) of Section 20 but continuance for avoiding any break or absence of representation. That a member of the Executive Council of clause (f) of section 20 of the Act satisfies all the requirements cannot be seriously disputed as by virtue of being a member of Executive Council he is a member of an 'authority' of the University. Since he is elected from amongst various members of the Court to represent them he is a representative in the authority of another body. Therefore, a plain reading of section presents no difficulty in coming to conclusion that since petitioner was a member of the Executive Council as representative of the Court he was and is entitled to retain his seat not only till March, 1986 but thereafter till his successor was or is appointed. Problem, however, has arisen as it is part of Section 65 which deals with casual vacancies. Emphasis through various facts highlighted by learned counsel for University was to confine scope of this sub -section also to the field covered by sub -section (1). Prior to adverting to them it may be examined if its scope is circumscribed by its placement in a section which deals with a particular situation. Sub -section has already been extracted earlier. It provides the manner for filling up of casual vacancies and limits its period to the residue of the term. But there is nothing in it expressly or impliedly to connect it with sub -section (2). Scope of both is different. They operate in different field. One deals with manner of filling casual vacancy of any member representative or otherwise whereas the other with representative members of another body. Former limits the period of casual member to residue of the term. Latter permits retention of seat till appointment of successor. Sub -section (1) like sub section 2 of Section 20 fixes the term of a casual member. Whereafter operation of sub -section (1) of section 65 and sub -section (2) of Sec. 20 comes to an end. Normally a sub -section has to be read as part of the section and its meaning should be culled out by reading section in its entirety. But circumstances may negative it. Or by doing so the objective of purpose of its enactment may be defeated. Therefore, mere placement of sub -section (2) as part of section 65 in absence of any other indication cannot by itself result in holding that it deals with casual vacancies only. Principal reason to disagree with such construction is the usual consequence of limiting the term of member under sub section (2) of Section 20 to the period specified but extending the same beyond residue of term for members coming in place of casual vacancies. Any interpretation or construction in absence of express words leading to startling results has to be avoided. No rationale which would lead to extension of term of casual member and limiting it to regular member could be put forward. Section 65 is one of the sections in Chapter XIII which deals with Misc. Matters. Purpose of the chapter is to provide for matters which could not be dealt with in other chapter either because it could not be provided or because instead of appending a proviso or explanation to every section it is incorporated at one place to apply to all. Various sections of the Chapter illustrate it fully. Section 65(1) is illustration of latter. That is, it is a provision which applies to any and every situation contemplated in it. It applies to any vacancy occurring in any authority or body of the University. In other words it is of general application. Similarly sub -section 2 extends the term of every representative member till appointment of successor. It incorporates principle of continuity of representative member, normally essential in elective offices. In absence of it many of the authorities, may at times, be reduced to official members only. It stands illustrated by Statutes 4.13 framed by the University which fixes term of a member of Court to three years from the date of first meeting takes place. If the election of the Court is delayed or its first meeting does not take place for long then it may cease to have its representative on the Executive Council. For instance, last election of Court took place in April, 1982. But its first meeting was held in March, 1983, that is nearly after one year. In absence of sub -section (2) the functioning of Executive Council could have been without representative of the Court. That surely could not be legislative intent. A construction which defeats the objective of representation of various bodies on an authority of the university due to of chance of delay in elections of the body, not unusual these days, has to be avoided. In absence of explicit language if narrower construction of provision results in strange consequences, which is avoided by giving it wider construction then the latter should be adopted. It can be legitimately urged, as it was, that language being clear the Court should refrain from swelling in the intention and must confine to the apparent meaning. Principle cannot be disputed provided the language leaves no room for doubt. The sub -section does not even remotely manifest any interrelation between two sub sections like sub -sections 2 to 5 of section 68A or sub section (2) of section 70. No word or expression has been used in sub -section (2) which could establish its link with sub -section (1). For accepting argument of learned counsel for University the word casual shall have to be read before the word member in sub -section (2). Such course is permissible if the language is ambiguous. And not to narrow down a section. The two sub -sections appear to have been put together for one reason that they deal with continuity subsection (1) by providing for continuance for the residue of terms of casual vacancy and sub -section (2) till appointment of successor. In fact it is in nature of independent section which has been put as sub -section (2) may be because it existed at same place in the earlier Act. In State of Orissa v. Debaki Devi : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1413 even provision since it did not refer to principal clause and the language was of general application. (See also Sales Tax Commissioner v. P. Krishna, : A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 59). And as said earlier if the sub section is read as independent provision extending term of all representative members of a body or authority till appointment of successor then it not only avoids incongruity of giving this benefit to those who come in casual vacancy and denying to what may be described as full time members but also has the advantage of providing for continuity of representative members. The contention is also strengthened by section 25 which by Act 5 of 1977 provided that term of members Academic Council shall be subject to section 65. It dispels any doubt if there was any that legislature treats section 65 as of general application and not confined to casual vacancy only.
(3.) MUCH was attempted to be made out of the word representatives used in sub -section and stretching it to be a technical word confined to limited class such as mentioned in Section 22, ignoring that no such word has been used in sub -section (1) even. If the word representative is understood as technical word which can apply to those members only such as are specifically described as representative member in sec. 22 then sub -section (2) shall be rendered surplus age. It would not apply to any member of Executive Council, Academic Council or any other authority. If on the other hand the word is understood in its ordinary meaning then it applies to all members who are sent to represent a body on an authority of the University.;


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