- (1.) This petition is directed against an order passed by the labour court under section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner was an employer and was governed by the. U. P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishtan Adhiniyam (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam), Opposite parties nos. 2 to 5 were the workmen working with the petitioner. The petitioner gave to the workmen a notice on September 1, 1967 terminating their services. According to the workmen they were entitled to the benefit available to a retrenched workman under section 6-H of the U. P, Industrial Disputes Act. They accordingly moved an application under section 6 H (2) of the Act. The labour court has computed the benefit. It is that order which is challenged by the petitioner.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable as the petitioner's concern was a shop and was governed by the provisions of the Adhiniyam. There is no merit in the contention. The U. P. Industrial Disputes Act defines Industry to mean any business, trade, undertaking manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workman. 'Commercial establishment' under section 2 of the Adhiriiyam means 'any premises wherein any trade, business, manufacture etc. is carried on for profit Under section 2 (16) of the Adhiniyam "shop" has been defined to mean "any premises where any wholesale or retail trade or business is carried on". The commercial establishment or shop will thus be an industry within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The workmen working ia the industry will be workmen according to the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, Learned counsel has not been able to show any provision of law which might exclude the applicability of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act to the workmen employed in a shop or commercial establishment governed by that Adhiniyam. The contention, therefore, must be overruled.
(3.) The next contention of the learned counsel is that the application under section 6.H (2) was not maintainable as the claim of the workmen was disputed by the employer. According to the learned counsel unless there is an award the labour court has no jurisdiction to proceed to compute the benefit under sec. tion 6 H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Section 6-H (2), however, does not make any reference to a prior award or adjudication. It provides: "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1)." The plain reading of the section makes a distinction between 6.H (1) and 6-H (2) of the Act for purposes of computation of benefits in terms of money. Under sub-section (2) there is no requirement of a prior award. All that it needed is that the workman should be entitled to seek from the employer a benefit which may be capable of being computed in terms of money. Where a workman claims the benefit by reason of a provision of law no award is required. The workmen claimed compensation on the basis of the conditions mentioned under section 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act which by its own force confers on the workmen a right and title to receive from the employer the amount. Such an application could not be deemed to be barred under section 6-H (2) of the Act.;