O. P. Trivedi, J. - (1.) THIS is defendant's appeal and arises from a suit which was filed by the respondents against him for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages. The respondents came to court with the allegation that the appellant's tenancy had been terminated by a notice which was duly served, that the appellant was in arrears of rent for more then three months, and that he had failed to pay the same inspite of service of notice of demand. Other grounds were also raised but they are no longer relevant and may not be stated.
(2.) THE main pleas raised in defence were that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, that notice was not served and that there was no default in payment of rent, for rent September and October 1967 had been deposited by the appellant under section 7-C of U. P. Act III of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). THE trial court decreed the suit. THE defendant appealed but the appeal was dismissed. The submission of Sri H. D. Srivastava, appearing for the appellant, is that the defendant was not in default because he had already deposited rent for September & October 1967 under section 7-C of the Act. It was no doubt proved by the tenders (Ex. A1 and paper No. 22-Ka), but the notification of 8th September 1949 referred to by the lower appellate court showed that the provisions of U. P. Act HI of 1947 were extended to the Town Area Akbarpur only to a limited extent and the provision of section 7-C of the Act was not extended to Akbarpur, with the result that the rent deposited by the appellant under section 7-C of the Act could not be treated as valid deposit. It is only a valid deposit or a deposit made in accordance with law which can be deemed to be payment to the landlord and if a deposit is made under section 7-C of the Act when the benefit of that section was not available to the tenant or the deposit was not made in accordance with the terms of section 7-C of the Act, then such a deposit cannot be regarded as a valid deposit under law and such a deposit, therefore, cannot be taken into account for determining whether the tenant has committed default within the meaning of section 3 of the Act. This was the only point pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant. On this point I think the lower appellate court came to a correct conclusion.
(3.) THE appeal is without any substance and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondents. Appeal dismissed.;