JUDGEMENT
P.N.Bakshi, J. -
(1.) THIS is a tenant's writ petition. An application was filed by the landlord respondent No. 3 for eviction of the tenant petitioner under U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act of 1947. THIS application was allowed. In revision the Commissioner set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case with a direction that parties be given an opportunity to adduce evidence. While the proceedings were pending before the trial Court, the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force on July 15, 1972. As such, the proceedings were converted under Section' 21 (1) of Act 13 of 1972. On a consideration of the evidence the Prescribed Authority carne to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was genuine. An appeal filed before the District Judge was dismissed on July 31, 1975; hence this writ petition. The main point which has been submitted by the petitioner's counsel is that the application under Section 21 of Act 13 of 1972 is not in accordance with law in as much as it has not been verified in the manner prescribed by rule 15 of the Rules trained under the Act. THIS contention was raised before the District Judge but has been repelled by him. Rule 15(2) of Act 13 of 1.972 runs as follows: - "The application or its reply shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under rules 14 and 10 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. If there are more than one landlord, the application shall be signed by all the co-landlords." The submission is that the application in question has not been verified in accordance with the rules prescribed under Order 6, C. P.C. In my opinion this submission must be rejecting for a number of reasons. The District Judge observed that the procedure prescribed under Rule 15 for the verification of an application filed under Section 21 would apply only to fresh applications filed under the Act 13 of 1972 and not to applications which were originally pending under Section 3 of Act of 1947. THIS seems to be a reasonable interpretation of rule 15. From a perusal of rule 15 (1) it is clear that every application for release under Section 21 has to specify the grounds on which the tenant is sought to be evicted and such an application has to be verified in the manner prescribed under rules 14 and 15 of Order 6 of the 1st schedule to the Code of C.P.C. The language of this section refers to the making of application in presenti and not to applications which are already pending under the Act and which by virtue of the amendment have been transferred under the New Act by the Prescribed Authority. Moreover this objection was not taken before the Prescribed Authority. Under Rule 22 (d) framed under the Act, the Prescribed Authority has been empowered to allow amendment of an application pending before it. No explanation whatsoever has been given by learned counsel as to why this objection was not taken before the Prescribed Authority before whom the original application under Act 3 of 1947 was transferred and was treated as an application under Section 21 of the New Act. If this objection had been taken there, this procedural error would have been corrected, at the appropriate stage. The petitioner has deliberately avoided to take this objection before the Prescribed Authority, obviously for the reason that he wanted to utilise it as a last straw at a later stage. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that it is not open to the petitioner to raise this technical procedural objection at this stage. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that at the worst an omission to verify the plaint in the manner prescribed under Order 6 of the C.P.C. call amount to an irregularity and it would not vitiate the entire proceedings. He has placed reliance upon Section 99 of the C.P.C. Even though this section might not have been made specifically applicable to proceedings under Act 13 of 1972 the equitable and just principle embodied therein would be clearly applicable to these proceedings. On this technical ground, therefore, the landlord cannot be non-suited at this stage. In my view, therefore, there is no force in contention (?) raised by the petitioner's counsel. On the merits, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below is that the need of the landlord is genuine. Learned counsel has submitted that in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court, it is not possible to urge that the comparative needs of the landlord and tenant should be taken into consideration. THIS finding of fact qua the bona fide and genuine need of the landlord has to be accepted and cannot be challenged in this writ petition. Lastly, the petitioner's counsel submits that in view of the second proviso, to Section 21 of Act 13 of 1972, the tenant is entitled to the award of compensation by the landlord equal to an amount of two years rent. The respondent's counsel has no objection to paying this compensation to the petitioner. The rent of the premises admittedly is Rs. 9|- per month. Calculated at this rate, the total amount of compensation payable comes to Rs. 2161-. The landlord respondent No. 3 shall pay the amount of Rs. 2161- as compensation to the tenant prior to the vacation of the premises by the petitioner. As prayed for by petitioner's counsel, he is allowed two months time from today to vacate the premises. Within this period, the compensation awarded against the landlord shall also be paid to him. THIS writ petition is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.;
Click here to view full judgement.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.