N. D. Ojha, J. - (1.) THE applicant Ram Dhani Lal instituted a suit in the Court of Judge Small Causes for the ejectment of the opposite parties and also for damages. THE suit was decreed exparte on 14th September, 1975. THE decree was thereafter put in execution and possession was delivered to the applicant on 30th September, 1975. On the same date an application was made by the opposite parties for the setting aside of the exparte decree on the ground that they had not been served with the summons of the suit and had no knowledge either of the suit or of the decree prior to 30th September, 1975, namely the date on which the decree was executed. This application was put up for orders on 1st October, 1975, before the Judge Small Cause Court. On that date an order was passed directing notice to be issued to the applicant. It may be mentioned at this place that the applicant had engaged two counsels in the trial Court namely Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla and Sri Sushil Kumar Srivastava. In pursuance of the order dated 1st October, 1975, directing notice to be issued, three notices were simultaneously issued, one to the applicant personally and two to his two counsels referred to above. THE application was to be taken up on 20th October, 1975. THE notice which was issued to the applicant could not be served personally on him. THE process-server made a report that the applicant was not found and was reported to be out of station and that a copy of the notice had been affixed on the residential house of the applicant the door of which was open. It appears that Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla was the senior counsel for the applicant whereas Sri Sushil Kumar Srivastava was his junior. THE notices which were meant for service on these two counsels were accepted by Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla. On both these notices he made an endorsement that he received the notice at 9.30 A.M. on 20th October, 1975 and that it may be sent to the client. When the case was taken up on 20th October, 1975, the application for setting aside the exprate decree was ordered to be put up on 22nd October, 1975. On that date Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla made an application with the prayer that the summons may be issued to the plaintiff-applicant. In this application after accepting that he had received the summons Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla stated that the poceedings had ended and he was not in the know of the whereabouts of his client.
(2.) THE order sheet of 20th October, 1975, mentions that the counsel for the plaintiff-applicant is informed. Obviously this order was passed in the presence of the counsel for the applicant. On that date it was not stated by the counsel that he was not aware of the whereabouts of his client. Even though in the application dated 22nd October, 1975, a prayer was made that the summons may be issued to the opposite party, the Court was apparently not inclined to accept this prayer and took the service of notice on the counsel as sufficient. THE Judge thereafter proceeded to decide the application and allowed it on the finding that he was satisfied that the defendants had not been served with the summons of the suit and the fact stated by them in the application for setting aside the exparte decree was correct. Against that order a revision was filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act to the District Judge which was dismissed by the Vth Additional District & Sessions Judge on 17th November, 1975. He agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the defendants had not been served with the summons of the suit. Aggrieved by these orders, the plaintiff has preferred the present revision. It was urged by learned counsel for the applicant that after the suit had been decreed exparte and the decree had been executed the authority given to Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla to appear in the suit ipso facto came to an end and the service of the notice of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree on Sri Shukla could not be deemed to be service on the client. It was urged that Order 3, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure only permitted a presumption to be raised in favour of service of notice on the client if such notice had been served on his counsel. According to learned counsel this presumption was rebuttable and stood rebutted by the application made on 22nd October, 1975, referred to above stating that the counsel was not in the know of the whereabouts of the client. In support of the submission that on the decision of the suit the authority given to Sri Shukla came to an end reliance was placed on Mohammad Jamil v. Bibi Tufailan, 63 Indian Cases 47, Rangildas v. Burjorji, AIR 1932 Bombay 337 and Parthasarthi Appa Rao v. Turianati Subba Rao, AIR 1924 Madras 840. In reply reliance was placed by learned counsel for the defendant opposite parties on two decisions of this Court in Jwala Devi v. Bhrigunath Sahai, ILR 44 Allahabad 592 and Jyoti Prasad v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1963 Allahabad 374. In the case of Parthasarathi Appa Rao (supra) it was held that there was no such thing as a standing relation of a legal practitioner to a man. A legal practitioner does not stand in a permanent relation to his client as a chaplain does to a nobleman or body having a chaplain. A man is a pleader for another only when that other has occasion to employ him as such. That employment may be either to conduct a suit or to advice him about some matter in which legal advice is required, but there is no such general relationship as that of pleader and client of a standing and permanent character upon all occasions and for all purposes.
(3.) IN my opinion, the aforesaid case is not an authority direct in point and only lays down a general proposition of law. The other two cases relied on by learned counsel for the applicant do to a certain extent support the submissions made by him but in preference to these cases I am inclined to agree with the decisions of this Court in the two cases referred to above. IN Jwala Devi's case (supra) it was held that a vakalatnama in the usual terms would necessarily imply the power to do everything that was necessary for the proper conduct of the case, and if the case had been decided exprate to have that order set aside and the case heard on the merits. IN Jyoti Prasad's case (supra) it was held:- "The proceedings in a suit do not come to an end by a mere dismissal of the suit for default and consequently where a counsel has been engaged for the conduct of a suit and the suit has been dismissed for default his duty cannot be deemed to have come to an end. If he is a pleader for the plaintiff he can apply fox restoration of the case without filing a fresh vakalatnama and if he is a pleader for the defendant he can be served with a notice of the application for restoration and he can further contest the restoration application without a fresh vakalatnama. Similarly if the suit has been decreed exparte, the pleader who represented the defendant can apply for setting aside the exparte decree without filing a fresh vakalatnama." IN this case after referring to the decision in Muhammad Jamil's case (supra) it was further held :- "If the learned Judges meant to lay down that the proceedings in the suit had ended by the passing of an exprate decree, then with due respects I am unable to agree with the view of the learned Judges and it cannot be accepted that the aforesaid authority lays down any goodlaw." I am, therefore, of opinion that notice of the application made by the opposite parties for setting aside the exparte decree had been sufficiently served on the applicant in view of its service on his counsel Sri Jagdish Narain Shukla. The view which I take also finds support from U Oak v. Makhin, AIR 1941 Rangoon 314 and Panna Lal v. Ballram Basia, AIR 1957 Rajasthan 391. Order 3, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that any process served on the pleader of any party or left at the office or ordinary residence of such pleader, and whether the same is for the personal appearance of the party or not, shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents and unless the Court otherwise directs shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person. As already seen above, in the instant case, the Judge Small Cause Court took the service on Sri Shukla to be sufficient.;