K.N.Seth, J. - (1.) IN October, 1965, a number of routes in Meerut and Bareilly Regions were amalgamated and an inter- regional route Meerut-MowanaMiranpur-Bijnor-Lawan-Ph-alauda Khatauli was created. One Ganga Saran held a permanent stage carriage permit on the said route which was to expire on 11-101967. On 24-7-1967 he applied for renewal of his permit. On 19-8-1967 the appellant Mithan Lal made an application for grant of a permanent stage carriage permit on the aforesaid route. The renewal application of Ganga Saran and the application of Mithan Lal were published in the U. P. Gazette dated 23-9-1967 inviting objections. On 13-10-1967 Mithan Lal filed objections to the renewal application of Ganga Saran. Objections were filed by other persons also to the renewal application of Ganga Saran. The Regional Transport Authority considered the renewal application of Ganga Saran and by its order dated May 8/10, 1968, rejected the objections and renewed Ganga Saran's permit. Mithan Lal's application for grant of a permit in his favour was rejected, Mithan Lal preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P. (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). During the pendency of the appeal Ganga Saran died. The permit was transferred in the name of his widow, Smt. Sumitra Devi. The Tribunal, by its order dated 7-5-1973, allowed Mithan Lal's appeal and granted one regular stage carriage permit to him on the route in question. The Tribunal did not interfere with the order of the Regional Transport Authority renewing the Permit of Ganga Saran which had been subsequently transferred in the name of his widow Smt. Sumitra Devi. The order of the Tribunal was challenged in this Court by Rahimuddin, an existing operator on the route. The learned single Judge allowed the petition and quashed the order of the Tribunal granting a permit to the appellant. The learned single Judge held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in granting one additional permit to Mithan Lal on the reasoning that the application of Mithan Lal was tied up to the vacancy likely to arise due to the expiry of the permit of Ganga Saran and it could not be treated as an independent application. The learned Judge did not consider it necessary to decide two other questions which were canvassed in support of the petition, namely, (1) that the legal representatives of Ganga Saran were not brought on record in the appeal before the Tribunal and consequently the appeal had abated and (2) that the period of validity of the permit, which had been renewed, expired in May 1971 and hence Mithan Lal's appeal was rendered infructuous.
(2.) ON merits the controversy Centres round the question whether the application of Mithan Lal for a permit in his favour was an independent application or it was tied up to his objections to the renewal application of Ganga Saran and formed a part and parcel of the objections. It was urged that the application was made on 19-8-1967, much before the objections were filed. It had been published in the U. P. Gazette inviting objections as required by law. When the application was taken up for consideration by the Regional Transport Authority, it could be considered with regard to any vacancy that existed on that date. The application should have been considered on the test of eligibility of the applicant but the Regional Transport Authority committed an error in treating the application as tied up to the renewal application of Ganga Saran and rejected it by wrongly applying the test of comparative merits of the claimants. The error committed by the Regional Transport Authority was rectified by the Tribunal which took note of the correct position of law that Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act was not applicable to an inter regional route, as also the change in law brought about by the Motor Vehicles (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1972, (U. P. Act No. 25 of 1972). The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal was legally correct and it was within the competence of the Tribunal to direct grant of a permit in favour of the appellant. It was further urged that the judgment of the learned single Judge was vitiated on account of a misconception that the application of Mithan Lal had not been published and objections invited according to the provisions of the Act and on that account it could not be treated as an independent application. On behalf of the contesting respondents pointed reference was made to the Gazette notification relating to the application of Mithan Lal wherein it was stated that "the applicant has desired that this application should be considered along with the application for P. St. P. 1121." Reference was also made to the memorandum of appeal of Mithan Lal wherein it was asserted that the appellant had also applied for grant of a fresh permit in the vacancy to be caused by the expiry of the permit of Ganga Saran and that the application of the appellant was rejected as the permit had been improperly renewed. The prayer made was that "the appellant be granted a permit in preference to respondent No. 2 in vacancy caused by the discontinuance of permit No. 1121." It was urged that the learned single Judge rightly came to the conclusion that Mithan Lal did not make any application for the grant of an additional permit on the route in question and his application was confined to the vacancy which was likely to arise on the refusal to renew the permit of Ganga Saran and in this view of the matter the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant any permit to Mithan Lal.
(3.) WE do not consider it necessary to enter into the controversy whether the application of Mithan Lal was an independent application for a permit or it was tied up to his objections to the renewal application of Ganga Saran for, in our opinion, this appeal must succeed on the objection to the maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of a person who has no locus standi in the matter. It was urged by Mr. Kacker that no legal right of the petitioner, who is an existing operator on the route in question, has been infringed by the impugned order of the Tribunal and as such he is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.;