N. D. Ojha, J. - (1.) THE petitioner in each of these two writ petitions (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) is the tenant of an accommodation of which respondent no. 1 is the landlord. An application was made by respondent no. 1 under section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947, for permission to file a suit for ejectment against the petitioners. THE application was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but Was allowed by the Commissioner. A representation was made by the tenants before the State Government under section 7-F. That representation too was dismissed. In the meantime the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, came into force and in place of filing a suit for ejectment against the petitioners an application was made under Section 21 (1) (a) of the new Act by respondent no. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. An appeal was filed by the petitioners. THE appeal having been dismissed, they have instituted these two writ petitions.
(2.) IT was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the requirements of Section 21 had not been fulfilled and consequently the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge were not justified in granting the application made by respondent no. 1 under section 21. At this place it will be relevant to point out that the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge have taken the view that the findings recorded in the proceedings under section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act were conclusive in view of Rule 18 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. In this view of the matter they have not recorded any independent finding of their own. IT was urged by counsel for the petitioners that a perusal of the application made by respondent no. 1 under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, a copy of which has been filed along- with the writ petition as an annexure, would indicate that the application had been made only on the ground that the accommodation in question was in a dilapidated condition and it required reconstruction. According to the learned counsel under Rule 18 it was only the finding recorded in the earlier proceedings u/Sec. 3 which was conclusive and since the application for permission had been made on the ground that the accommodation required reconstruction after demolition the present application for release could not be treated as an application under Section 21(1) (a) and it was indeed an application under Section 21(1) (b) of the new Act. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that there is no substance in this submission. The Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge have both held that the application under section 3 by respondent No. 1 had been made on the ground that he needed the accommodation for his own use and occupation after reconstructing it. In view of this finding it was Section 21(1) (a) and not section 21(1) (b) of the new Act which was applicable. The submission made by counsel for the petitioners that the application under section 3 had been made only on the ground that the accommodation was sought to be demolished and reconstructed does not appear to be sound even otherwise. A copy of the application has been filed as an Annexure to both the writ petitions. In Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application it was stated that the eldest son of the applicant with his wife and six children had been residing on the ground floor of the accommodation in question but since the walls and the roof had given way and were likely to fall down any time he had to vacate the accommodation occupied by him and to shift in another accommodation on a monthly rent of Rs. 160/-. In paragraph 4 the extent of the accommodation at the disposal of the applicant was stated and it was further stated that the family of the applicant consisted of the applicant, his two sons, two daughter-in-laws, one widowed daughter-in-law & seven grand children. All these facts were wholly unnecessary to be stated in the application unless permission was sought on the ground that the respondent no. 1 needed the accommodation for his own use. If the only ground on which permission was sought was that the accommodation in question was in a dilapidated condition and required reconstruction, it was not necessary to have stated all these facts. It is, therefore, not right to say that the permission was sought by respondent no. 1 only on the ground that the accommodation required to be reconstructed after getting it demolished. A copy of the order of the State Government passed under section 7-F has also been filed with the writ petition. This order too indicates that the application made by respondent no. 1 was treated by the State Government to be an application for permission on the ground that he needed the accommodation for his own use after reconstructing it. The order further shows that the hardship which was likely to be caused to the tenants in the event of the permission being granted was also considered and it was only after comparing the needs of respondent no. 1 and the tenants that the permission was granted. For all these reasons it is apparent that the application which had been made by respondent no. 1 before the Prescirbed Authority had rightly been made under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. Rule 18 of the Rules inter alia provides that where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for eviction under section 3 of the old Act on any ground mentioned in Section 21(1) has been (sic) allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act, whether by the District Magistrate or on revision by the Commissioner or the State Government or under clause (i) or clause (m) of section 43(2) by the District Judge, and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application under Section 21 on the same grounds within a period of six months from such decision or from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive. As seen above the ground on which application had been made by respondent no. 1 under section 3 of the old Act was that he needed the accommodation for his own use .after reconstruction. This is a ground covered by Section 21(1) (a) of the new Act. The order passed in the application under Section 3 had become final when the application under Section 21(1) (a) was made by respondent no. 1 before the Prescribed Authority. In these circumstances the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge were right in taking the view that the findings recorded in the proceedings under section 3 are conclusive. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioners that in spite of those findings it was necessary for the Prescribed Authority to have considered the hardship likely to be caused to the tenants as required by the newly added proviso to Section 21 (1) of the new Act by Amending Act No. 28 of 1976. In my opinion there is no substance in this submission either. Even under the old Act an application under Section 3 on the ground that the landlord needed the accommodation for his personal use could not be granted unless the needs of the landlord and the tenant were both considered and a finding was recorded that the need of the landlord was greater. This is precisely the requirement under Section 21(1) (a) even after its amendment by Amending Act No. 28 of 1976. This having already been done in the proceedings under Section 3 and the findings recorded in those proceedings have been made conclusive it was not open to the Prescribed Authority to go into the matter again and record another finding. No other point has been pressed.
(3.) IN the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed. IN the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs. The petitioner in each of these two writ petitions is granted one month's time to vacate the accommodation. Petition dismissed.;