M. N. Shukla, J. - (1.) THIS is a tenant writ petition directed against the order of the prescribed authority and appellate authority allowing the landlord's application for release under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
(2.) THE opposite party no. 3 Munna Lal is the owner of the house no. 35/ 39, Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad. It is a double storyed building of which the entire first floor and the whole of the ground floor excepting two rooms are in the petitioner's tenancy. THE landlord is in occupation of only two Kotharis on the ground floor. He applied for release of the portion in occupation of the petitioner under Section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act on the grounds that the said portion was required by him for his personal use and occupation and that the entire house was very old and dilapidated and required reconstruction. It may also be mentioned at this very stage that while the outer room of the ground floor had been purchased by the landlord through sale deed dated 3rd January, 1968, the inner room was later acquired by him by means of another sale deed executed in April 1970. THE landlord's case was that he was using the other room as a shop for purposes of his business whereas he was residing in the Kothri adjacent to it inside the ground floor portion. THE landlord also claimed the benefit of Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The application was resisted by the petitioner on the grounds, inter alia, that the outer shop was in occupation of another tenant Pyare Lal and the inner room, though occupied by the landlord, was not used for residential purposes but as a godown, that explanation (iv) was not applicable to the facts of the case, that the house was in a sound condition and it was not necessary to demolish it. The application was allowed by the prescribed authority which recorded the findings that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required reconstruction, that explanation (iv) was attracted, that the need of the landlord was genuine and the accommodation was bona fide required by him. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act but the appellate authority confirmed the order of the prescribed authority and affirmed its findings. These two orders have been impugned in this writ petition. The first ground of attack was that explanation (iv) of Section 21 (1) (a) was not applicable to the facts of the case. The controversy revolves round the language of explanation (iv). The application of the opposite party no. 1 was admittedly made under Section 21 of the Act, the relevant portion of which along with the explanation reads as follws : "(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely......... (2) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction ; Explanation-In the case of a residential building- (iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential Purposes shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord." (Emphasis added)
(3.) THE word 'building' should not give rise to any difficulty of interpretation as it is defined in Section 3 (i) of the Act as follows-: " 'building' means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes- (i) any land (including any garden), garages and outhouses appurtenant to such building ; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building ; (iii) any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof ; This statutory definition is not in any manner inconsistent with the normal meaning of the term 'building' as used in popular parlance i. e. an edifice or structure. THE U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, however, did not define the term 'building' but defined 'accommodation.' According to the settled usage; of these two expressions in the English language it can be safely inferred that while 'building' denotes a larger entity, 'accommodation' may signify only a part of it. In my opinion the word 'building' which occurs thrice in explanation (iv) was not intended to be used in the ordinary sense of the term, but was intended to bear a more restricted meaning so as to equate it with 'accommodation'. THE term 'building' has been defined in the Act, but the defining provision i. e. Section 3 itself opens with the words "unless the context otherwise requires". Considering carefully the context in which explanation (iv) has been incorporated in the scheme of the Act, it appears to me that whenever the term 'building' occurs in this explanation, it should be deemed to be a synonym for 'accommodation.' Thus, if the whole building is either occupied by the landlord or let out to the tenant, the whole of the building becomes 'accommodation'. On the other hand, if the entire building is split into several parts, each one of which is let out to a particular tenant, the building shall be deemed to consist of several distinct accommodations. If two parts of a building are structurally or otherwise so distinct from each other as to be regarded as completely independent in themselves, each one of them would constitute a distinct accommodation and not part and parcel of one accommodation. THErefore, the test that I would formulate for determining whether or not the two portions in dispute in the instant case can be regarded as parts of the same accommodation is whether the portion sought to be vacated and the one already in occupation of the landlord are so interlinked as to form one compact unit. This conception of a single unit may be the result of a variety of factors, such as structural compactness, proximity of situation, contiguity or even the sharing of certain indispensable, common amenities, such as a common use of water tap, bathroom, staircase, passage etc. In my opinion the right approach for giving effect to the scheme and object of explanation (iv) is to examine as to whether the portion occupied by the landlord and the portion sought to be vacated can be taken as forming a single independent, allottable unit. This test, to my mind, can be directly related to the underlying object of explanation (iv). It is notable that the applicability of explanation (iv) is confined to cases where any accommodation is occupied by the landlord for residential purpose and not for commercial or other purpose. THErefore, the underlying purpose of the explanation seems to protect certain interests of the landlord, such as his privacy, his claim to exclusive occupation and his anxiety not to be disturbed in his possession. If the landlord were residing in an accommodation along with a tenant who happens to be troublesome, there would be abundant source of friction between them arising from such things as joint user of certain amenities. This would obviously become a very distracting factor for the landlord. It was in order to guard against such undesirable consequences that the Legislature choose to incorporate in the Act certain provisions which would guarantee a basic protection to the landlord. THE essential purpose and objective of framing such rule was summed up by the Full Bench of this Court in R. K. Singh v. State of U. P., 1970 ALJ 592 at page 611 in these words : "THE diversity of cases in which the question of application of the rule will arise will be vast and therefore no hard and fast test can be laid down for determining when the portion falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the landlord can be regarded as portions of one accommodation, but the guiding principle will no donbt be the underlying idea behind the framing of the rule, namely that the two portions should be so situated or should be so governed by such circumstances that the owner is likely to be seriously inconvenienced if he is not allowed to have a tenant of his choice either because the proposed tenant is troublesome or otherwise unacceptable to the landlord or because the common living in portions of the accommodation is likely to bring about friction between the owner and the tenant unless both are accommodative." Although the Bench was dealing with Rule 7 framed under Act III of 1947, yet the same observations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the provisions of the present Act. THErefore, in my opinion the expression 'building' in the present context should be regarded as synonymous with 'accommodation'. A contrary interpretation would give rise to anomalous results. When the word 'building' is used for the second time in explanation (iv), the word should be construed as signifying an accommodation. If this restricted construction were not adopted, it would lead to an absurd position. These words are immediately followed by the words "the remaining part whereof". If 'building' occurring in the second and third places were identified with the whole structure or edifice, the explanation would be completely excluded unless the entire remaining portion of the building irrespective of contiguity etc. was in the exclusive occupation of the landlord. This would manifestly unjust. To take an illustration, if a building consists of twenty rooms out of which eighteen are occupied by the landlord himself, one by a tenant against whom an application under Section 21 has been made, and another occupied by another tenant, it cannot be said that the remaining part of the building is in the occupation of the landlord alone. The remaining part would be in the occupation of the landlord besides one other tenant. Still, however, if the room occupied by the landlord is contiguous to the one in dispute or approachable through a common passage or a common latrine, bath room etc., have to be shared by the inmates of the two, there is no reason why the landlord should not be able to invoke the benefit of explanation (iv).;