RAM PRATAP SINGH Vs. DISTRICT DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION CUM COLLECTOR ALLAHABAD AND
LAWS(ALL)-1976-8-37
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on August 05,1976

RAM PRATAP SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
DISTRICT DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION CUM-COLLECTOR ALLAHABAD Respondents

JUDGEMENT

M.N.Shukla, J. - (1.) TWO important questions have arisen for decision in this Writ Petition: (1) Whether a decision by a Deputy Director of Consolidation in a revision filed under Section 48(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) can be set at bought by another Deputy Director of Consolidation in subse quent proceedings purporting to be in the nature of a reference under subsection (3) of Section 48 of the Consolidation of Hold ings Act? (2) Whether a decree passed on June 14, 1951 by a revenue court in a suit under Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act can be cancelled by the consolidation authorities in such reference pro ceedings?
(2.) THE petitioners claim to be the Sirdars of plot No. 707 of village Deoria, Pargana Jhussi, district Allahabad. The contention of res pondents Nos. 2 and 4, Lal Bahadur Singh and Gaon Sabha of said village, is that the aforesaid plot is actually a tank and therefore no Sirdari rights could accrue to the petitioners with respect to the same and that it vested in the Gaon Sabha. On the other hand, the peti tioners have stated that prior to the date of vesting, one Syed Mo hammad, was the Zamindar of this land. The petitioners filed a suit for declaration that they were hereditary tenants of the plot, and a decree was passed on June 14, 1951, prior to the date of vesting, whereby the petitioners were declared to be hereditary tenants of the plot. It was alleged that after the abolition of Zamindari the petitioner became Sirdars of the plots and it was recorded as Sirdari holding of the petitioners in the Khataunis of the years 1363-65F. Accordingly, when consolidation operations commenced in the vill age the petitioners were recorded as Sirdars in the basic year. Res pondents 2 and 3 filed objections under Section 9 of the Act to the effect that the entry in favour of the petitioners should be expunged and their own names be recorded as Bhumidhars. These objections were dismissed by the consolidation authorities as time-barred. It appears that the objectors went up in appeal, although no appeal lay, and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, remanded the case with the direction that the Consolidation Officer should give opportunity to the objectors to have their explanation considered with respect to the bar of limitation and that the Gaon Sabha was a necessary party. Thereafter the Gaon Sabha was impleaded in the case. It was held by the Consolidation Officer that the objections were beyond time and that the objectors had not made out a good case for condonation of delay. The objectors preferred a revision against this order and the revision was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on October 13, 1970. Even though the first phase of the proceedings apparently came to an end with the passing of the above order in revision, it appears that Lal Bahadur, respondent No. 2, was not in a mood to be appeas ed and the tenaciously sought to reopen the proceedings. He made a miscellaneous application to the Deputy Director of Consolidation, praying that this land be declared as the property of the Gaon Sabha. On that application, Sri S.M. Sant, the then Deputy Director of Con solidation, passed the impugned order dated March 20, 1970 holding that neither Bhumidhari nor Sirdari rights could be acquired by any of the contesting parties in respect of the land in dispute and direct ing that the name of the Gaon Sabha be entered over the same. It is significant that in none of these proceedings the Gaon Sabha came forward to assert its rights. The contention of the petitioners is that the rights of the parties were finally adjudicated by the previous or der of the Consolidation Officer dated October 13, 1970 and the im pugned order subsequently passed could not cancel or supersede the order passed in the earlier judicial proceedings which became final.
(3.) SRI K.B. Garg appearing for the Gaon Sabha strenuously tried to defend the impugned order on two main grounds: Firstly, he sub mitted that Deputy Director of Consolidation was competent in the exercise of his powers of reference under Section 48(3) of the Act to pass such order. Secondly, he urged that in the previous order there was adjudication of the rights of the parties and hence it could not Act as a bar to the later proceedings. He also asserted that at all events there was no adverse order passed against the Gaon Sabha and hence its rights could again be decided by the Deputy Director of Consolidation I am unable to accept any of these submissions. It is evident that even assuming that the proceedings com menced by the miscellaneous application given by Lal Bahadur Singh were in the nature of reference proceedings, they were entirely ille gal and the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not competent to pass the order dated March 20, 1972. Section 48(3) runs as follows; "Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of be ing heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Di rector of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1)." ;


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