K.C. Agrawal, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the judgment of Sri Narain Das, 10th Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 23-9-1974, allowing the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 under section 22 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (briefly stated as the Act). Respondent No. 1 is, admittedly, the owner of house No. 79-A, Lukerganj, Allahabad. A portion of this house was in her occupation, whereas the remaining part thereof was in occupation of the petitioners as tenants. She filed an application under section 21 of the Act for release of the portion in occupation of the petitioners on the ground that she required the same for her use and occupation. She also stated in the application that as apart of the aforesaid house was in possession of the petitioners, the remaining part of which was in her occupation for her residence, therefore, her requirement for the release of the portion in occupation of the petitioners had to be construed as bona fide under Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) of the Act. The application was resisted by the petitioners. The Prescribed Authority rejected it, against which an appeal Was filed by respondent No. 1 before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the impugned judgment with the finding that the respondent No. 1 was in occupation of one room in the house in question for residential purposes and as the remaining portion of that house was in occupation of the petitioners, the need of respondent No. 1 must be deemed to be genuine under Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) of the Act. The learned District Judge also found that in view of the application of the aforesaid Explanation, the question of consideration of the need of the petitioners did not arise. On this view, the appeal was allowed by him. Consequently, the application made by respondent No. 1 stood granted. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have come to this Court.
(2.) AT the time of hearing, having found that the questions involved were of general importance, two questions, mentioned below were referred for decision by a larger Bench : "1.Whether Explanation (iv) of Section 21(1) (a) raising the irrebuttable and conclusive presumption, rules out enquiry about bona fide requirement of the building by a landlord, the remaining part whereof is in his occupation. 2.Whether the prescribed authority is required to weigh the real need of the tenant even in a case covered by section 21(1) (a) of the Act with the inconvenience that the tenant will suffer by grant of the application for release." The reference has now been decided by a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Hon. Satish Chandra, J. The answer given is in favour of respondent No. 1. Consequently, in accordance with the decision of the Division Bench, it has to be held that Explanation (iv) of Section 21(1) (a) of the Act precludes a party from adducing evidence to establish the state of affairs which may be destructive of or purporting to be destructive of the bona fide need of the landlord. Hence, the need of respondent No. 1 being genuine and bona fide, the application made by her for release under section 21 of the Act was rightly allowed. Before parting with the judgment, I wish to deal with observations of the learned Additional District Judge deciding the appeal, that the decision given by this Court in CMW No. 8265 of 1973, Roshan Lal v. Smt. Rama Devi decided on 22-8-1974 = (1975 AWC 124), was not binding on him. In this decision a learned Single Judge held that comparison of the need of the landlord with that of the tenant was imperative before an application for release on the ground of personal need of the landlord could be allowed by the Prescribed Authority. The learned Additional District Judge has given three grounds for having not decided the appeal in terms of the aforesaid decision. They arc : (i) that in cases provided for in the Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) (a), Rule 16 did not require the comparison of needs, (ii) that the aforesaid decision having not been reported in an authorised journal, the certified copy of the said judgment could not be taken note of, and (iii) that the facts of the case before him were different from that which were the subject matter of decision in the aforesaid case decided by the High Court. Coming to the first ground, it may be mentioned that Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act lays down that the question of likely hardship to the tenant as against the likely hardship of the landlord need not be considered in cases covered by Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, but I do not find any justification for the view that the aforesaid provision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge deciding Roshan Lal's case. Apart from the above, the requirement of comparison of the need of the landlord with that of the tenant was found essential under the general principles as well. The learned Additional District Judge was, therefore, not right in ignoring the aforesaid judgment on this ground. So far as the second ground is concerned, it may be noted that what was filed by respondent No. 1 before the learned Additional District Judge was not an unauthorised report of the decision but a certified copy of the judgment of the High Court. Section 3 of the Indian Law Reports Act, 1875, provides : "No court shall be bound to hear cited, or shall receive or treat as an authority binding on it, the report of any case decided by any of the said High Courts on or after the said day, other than a report published under the authority of any focal Government."
(3.) ALL that this Act ensures is that the judges who have no access to the decisions themselves shall be provided with their accurate copies. Mere reporting of a ruling does not give any greater sanctity than it had before. A certified copy of the judgment, when produced before a court, establishes its authenticity and correctness. On such a copy being produced, the lower courts are bound to treat the same in the same way as reported judgments. Section 3 of the Indian Law Reports Act, 1875, as stated above, only provides that a court should not look into unauthorised reports. The obvious intention behind it is that as there is no presumption of correctness of the judgments reported in unauthorised reports, it is not safe to rely on the same. As stated above, what is binding is the decision of the High Court and not a report. Hence, the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in ignoring the certified copy of the judgment on the ground mentioned above. In this regard one has to keep in mind that all the judgments approved for reporting by the High Court or otherwise decided cannot be reported in approved journals. Therefore, if section 3 of the Indian Law Reports Act is construed so strictly as done by the learned Additional District Judge, the same might have a very undesirable result. The third ground given by the learned Additional District Judge for not following the decision that the facts were different, is also not tenable. What was laid down by the learned Judge in Roshan Lal's case was the law applicable to an application by a landlord under section 21 of the Act. The principles laid down in the aforesaid case have nothing to do with the facts of that case. As stated by the Privy Council in Paltu Lal v. Mussammat Parbati Kunwar, XIII ALJ 721, the judge of a subordinate court in India is bound to follow the decisions of a Bench of the High Court to which he is subordinate unless that decision has been overruled by a decision of a Full Bench of that Court or by his Majesty in Council, or unless the law has been altered by a subsequent Act of the Legislature. In my opinion, the learned District Judge was under an obligation to decide the appeal in accordance with the decision of this Court given in Roshan Lal's case. He should not have ignored it. To say the least, it was not proper. The fact that the judgment given in Roshan Lal's case has not been overruled by a Full Bench in Chandra Kumar Sah v. Additional District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 AWC 50, is not at all relevant inasmuch as this judgment of the Full Bench was given much after the decision of the appeal by the learned Additional District Judge in the present case.;