R. M. Sahai, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition has been filed by the tenant against an order dated 28th April 1975 passed by I Additional District Judge, Allahabad allowing an application under section 21 of U. P. Act XIV of 1972. The application was filed by respondent on the ground that she was the owner and landlady of quarter No. 22 in No. 8-A, Divinity Compound, Kamla Nehru Road, Allahabad. It was alleged that her husband is employed as Telegraph In- charge, Northern Railway, Prayag, Allahabad. He has completed the age of 54 years and was due to retire sometime in November 1973. In these circumstances it was alleged that the need of the respondent was pressing, genuine and bonafide and the accommodation which is in possession of the petitioner may be released. THIS application was contested and one of the grounds alleged was that the respondent was neither the owner nor the landlady of the premises in dispute.
(2.) THE prescribed authority rejected the application of the respondent mainly on the ground that she was not the landlady and no right or title passed to her on the basis of a letter written by the Lucknow Diocesan Trust Allahabad dated 9th August 1963 filed as Annexure III to the counter affidavit. THE respondent filed an appeal and the Additional District Judge was of the opinion that the letter dated 9th August 1963 was admittedly issued by the Trust which was the landlord and as it indicated that the respondent had paid for the building in question and so she was authorised to realise the rent. From this coupled with the fact that the petitioner started paying rent to the respondent he inferred that the respondent became the landlady and was entitled to file an application under section 21. I have heard Sri K. B. Mathur for the petitioner and Sri K. M. Dayal for the respondent. The first question that arises for consideration is whether respondent was a landlady. Admittedly no sale deed or document has been filed on behalf of the respondent to show that the premises in dispute were transferred in her favour by the Trust. The only document on which reliance was placed before the courts below and which has been filed as Annexure-III to the counter affidavit reads as under ; " I am directed to inform that as you have paid in full for a plot of land measuring 1975 sq. yards consisting of Bachelors quarters, servants quarters, etc. and plot has been allotted to you, you are authorised to collect the rent from the tenant accordingly as per list enclosed with effect from 1-3-63. The tenants are being informed accordingly. The transfer is subject to the approval of the Collector Allahabad. Yours faithfully Principal Officer." This letter as is clear from the contents is only a communication by the Principal Officer to the respondent that she has been authorised to collect rent from the tenants as she has paid in full for a plot of land measuring 1975 sq. yards. This cannot be considered either as a document effecting any transfer or an agreement to transfer. Moreover as is clear by the letter the transfer was subject to the approval of the Collector Allahabad. It is neither stated in the counter affidavit nor any evidence has been filed to establish that the approval was finally granted by the Collector. The letter appears to be only a communication and from this it is not clear whether the amount that was paid was for transfer of the premises in favour of the respondent. The utmost that can be inferred from this letter is that the respondent was authorised to collect rent from the tenants. It may be true as has been held by the lower court that the tenant started paying rent to the respondent after the receipt of this letter. But it is difficult to agree that merely beacause the respondent was permitted by the trust to collect rent and the petitioner started paying rent in view of this communication received from the Principal Officer of the Trust, the respondent became landlord of the premises. Even accepting for the argument sake that the respondent was authorised to collect rent and she became an agent as contemplated in the definition of the word landlord, the question that arises for consideration is whether the application under section 21 was maintainable on her behalf on the ground that she needed the premises for her own personal need. A perusal of section 21 makes it clear that a landlord can file an application for release of the premises on the ground that they are needed bona fide for his or her need. If a landlord apart from the owner who is holding the premises for the benefit of the landlord makes an application under section 21 then he has to make out a case under section 21 on the ground that the need of the owner-landlord is pressing and genuine. The word landlord as defined in the Act is wide enough to include any person to whom the rent is paid or payable. As is clear even an attorney is included in this definition. I am not prepared to accept that for purposes of section 21 an attorney or an agent who becomes a landlord by virtue of the definition clause can file an application for eviction of a tenant on the ground that the need of attorney or agent is genuine. What is to be seen under section 21 is the need of the landlord-owner. It may be that the landlord may need the premises for his agent or for attorney. But that would be different from saying that the Act confers any right on the attorney or agent itself to file an application for release of the accommodation on the ground that the premises are needed by them for their own personal use. Moreover the respondent has not come in this case with a plea that she is an agent of the Trust and the application has been made by her for the benefit of the trust. On the other hand she has claimed to be an owner and landlady of the premises. As I have indicated above she has not been able to prove that she is the landlady of the premises, the application for release fails.
(3.) MR. K. M. Dayal appearing for the respondent has placed reliance on the following observations of a decision reported in S.M.G. Chetty v. Ganeshan, AIR 1975 SC 1750 at page 1752 ; "On the other hand, the Act with which we are concerned is a self-contained and complete code for regulation of the rights between landlord and tenants as defined in the Act- See M/s. Ravel & Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran, AIR 1974 SC 818. Thus a controversy that may arise between a landlord and others, who are not his tenants under the Act is, outside the ken of this Act. Even a possible dispute, imaginary or real, between the landlord and the remaindermen cannot effect adjudication of the claim of the landlord against his tenants under the provisions of the Act. It will also not effect the efficacy of the nature of the plea of bona fide on the part of the landlord, if otherwise so. Such questions as are raised in this appeal by the tenants are therefore irrelevant in a litigation between the landlord and tenants when a suit for eviction is instituted by the former on any of the grounds available to him under the Act. It is clear that when the objection on the score of the landlord being a holder of life interest and hence incapable of invoking section 14(1) (b) fails the suit must be decreed." The only controversy that arose before the Supreme Court was whether holder of a life interest in the property is entitled to evict the tenant under section 14(1) (b) of the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1869. It was held by their Lordships that even holder of a life interest is included within the definition of landlord as such the suit was maintainable. It was in this context that the observations relied by the counsel for the respondent were made. I fail to understand how these observations are in any manner helpful for the controversy with which we are concerned.;