P. N. Bakshi, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is a landlord. He filed an application under section 3 of Act III of 1947 for piaintiff filing a suit for ejectment of respondent No. 3. THE permission was granted. THE tenant filed a revision before the Commissioner which was rejected. THEreafter, he filed a revision under section 7-F of the old Act which was also rejected. A writ petition was filed in this court which was rejected. Special Appeal therefrom was also rejected. Act 13 of 1972 came thereafter. THE landlord then filed an application under section 21(1) of the Act, and prayed for eviction of the tenant. This application has been rejected on 18-3-1975 with respect to one out of the two shops which were claimed by the landlord. Hence this petition.
(2.) COUNSEL for the petitioner has placed reliance upon section 43(2) (rr) of Act 13 of 1972. This section runs as follows :- A perusal of the section clearly indicates that when a landlord has succeeded in securing permission under section 3 of the old Act but a suit for ejectment has not been filed, he is given a speedy remedy by filing an application under section 21(1) of the new Act. The Prescribed Authority is bound to order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy. It is not necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground. This order has also, been made final. The inclusion of these specific restrictions upon the powers of the Prescribed authority to reconsider the need of the landlord is a clear pointer to the fact that the Legislature intended that a landlord who has succeeded under section 3 of the old Act, should not be put to further harassment by continuing litigation and that he should be provided speedy remedy by way of filing a formal application under section 21(1) of the new Act I am clearly of the opinion that it is not open to the Prescribed Authority to re-enter into the question of the bonafide need of the landlord. Subsequent facts cannot be. taken into consideration in a case where there is an express prohibition by statute and a mandatory duty is cast upon the authority concerned to pass an order in only one particular way. In the instant case, the prescribed authority is bound to honour the decisions which have been arrived at under the provisions of the Old Act and is further bound to direct the eviction of the tenant. In my view, therefore, the impugned order suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for the respondent no. 3 has prayed that in case this petition is allowed he may be given sufficient time to find out an alternative accommodation for himself. This prayer is reasonable.
(3.) IN the result, therefore, I allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order of the prescribed authority (A.D.M.) Agra dated 18-3-1975. The respondent No. 3 is allowed three months time to vacate the premises and to deliver possession of the same to the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 is directed by writ of mandamus to evict the opposite party No. 3 from both the shops in dispute, on the expiry of three months from today and to deliver possession thereof to the petitioner. Parties shall bear their own costs.;