- (1.) This petition is directed against order of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court holding that the three persons Sarvasri R. S. Kela, P. N. Kapoor and S. V. Singhal were entitled to represent the employer in proceedings before the Labour Court arising on a reference under S. 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The objectiton raised by the employees was that they were not entitled to represent the employer as they were not the representatives contemplated by S. 6-I of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act read with rule 40 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Rules. The Labour Court has held that they were Officers within the meaning of R. 40 (1)(ii) (c) of the Rules.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the finding is erroneous in law as the necessary ingredients which make an "officer" have not been found as existing to permit these three persons to represent the employer. In support of his contention learned counsel relied on observations in the case of Sarbeshwar Bardoloi V/s. U. K. Gohain, 1954 AIR(Gau) 148. It was a case of a legal practitioner. The Court directed the Labour Court first to decide whether he was an officer of the concern or not. Both the learned Judges were of the opinion that even a legal practitioner can be an officer. Ram Labhaya, J., held that for being an officer he must be a regular officer of the employer's Association. According to him: "While a legal adviser of an association may possibly be an officer, it cannot be stated as a matter of law that every legal practitioner who is a legal adviser of an association, becomes an officer of the association. The appointment of a legal adviser can be of a casual nature. Where such is the case, he would generally not be an officer of the association. On the other hand, duties may be assigned to a legal practitioner which may invest him with the status or the position of an officer of the company or association." Deka, J., was of the opinion: "The legal advisers may not necessarily be officers of their clients. Holding of office would primarily indicate some sort of official responsibilities than that of a law adviser. Either he (the officer) must have some stake in the company or concern, some pay or remuneration attached to the office, terms of appointment or discharge, period or tenure of appointsment, or some administrative responsibilities, or obligation to render some explanation for his conduct in discharge of his duties." The learned Judges were considering whether a lawyer could be an officer when the engagement of a legal practitioner as such was not permitted by law. They have however not laid down any exhaustive rule as to when a lawyer can be deemed to be an "officer of a concern".
(3.) In the present case, the three persons were not legal practitioners. The Labour Court has found that the three persons were part-time employees (Labour Officers) to perform intermittent duties if and when required. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the statement of one of the partners of the employer firm. He stated that these three persons were officers of the concern and were paid monthly remuneration. The payment of monthly remuneration is sufficient to indicate the employment of the persons in the concern. Wholetime employment is not necessary for a person being an officer within the meaning of R. 40 which provides that an employer can be represented by an "officer of the concern".;