M. N. Shukla, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition challenges the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 2-7-1976 (Annexure 5 to the Writ Petition) passed under Section 21 read with Section 43 (2) (rr) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter to be referred to as the new Act).
(2.) RESPONDENT No. 2 Narain Das and his son Bhagwan Das, who is respondent No. 3, were the joint owners of house No. 22, Lukerganj, Allahabad. They had obtained permission under Section 3 of U. P. Act III of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 30-8-1971 which was eventually confirmed by the State Governnent under Section 7-F of U. P. Act III of 1947 by its order dated 1-6-1972. The case of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in brief was that they were refugees from Sindh and after partition they came to live in Gaya (Bihar) but later shifted to Allahabad and had been living in a rented house on a monthly rent of Rs. 300. They purchased the house in question on 25-9-1969 and the sale deed of the same was registered on 28-9-1969. The house was purchased for their personal use and occupation. The application under Section 3 of U. P. Act III of 1947 was made on the ground of personal need and it was alleged that the house was required for the residence of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and their family. The allegations made in the application under Section 3 were that the family of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 consisted of Narain Das and his son Bhagwan Das, the mother of Narain Das viz. Smt. Chatur Devi, wives of Narain Das and Bhagwan Das and Sewak Ram (another son of Narain Das) and six sons and five daughters of Sewak and Bhagwan Das. Besides Daryana Mal, brother of Narain Das, his two sons out of whom Udho Das was married, his wife, and three daughters and five sons were also living with respondents Nos. 2 and 3. In this manner twenty- seven members comprised the family of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The permission was accorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and ultimately confirmed by the State Government on the finding that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 required the house in question for their own residence and that of their family and that the need of the said respondents was greater than that of the tenants. It appears that before proceedings could be taken for the actual ejectment of the tenants (who are petitioners in this writ petition) the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was passed and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 made an application under Section 21 read with Section 43 (2) (rr) of the new Act on 2-2-1976 praying that the accommodation in dispute be released in favour of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 by the eviction of the present petitioners. The petitioners, however, raised an objection that the original permission granted by the Rent Control Authorities and confirmed by the State Government under Section 7-F of U. P. Act III of 1947 could not be validly executed under Section 21 of the new Act. The objection was overruled by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 2-7-1976 which has been impugned in this writ petition. Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the permission originally obtained by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 was not obtained on any of the grounds specified under sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the new Act and therefore, the Prescribed Authority could order eviction of the tenants from the building under tenancy only after satisfying itself afresh as to the existence of the ground on which permission had been initially obtained. Section 3 of Act III of 1947 did not specify the grounds on which permission could be granted to a landlord for filing a suit of ejectment against a tenant if the grounds were other then those on which no permission was required for filing a suit. It was, therefore, common for the landlords to apply for permission on the ground of personal need such as residence of the landlord himself or members of his family or both. The old Act did not define the term 'family' though it contained the definition of the word 'landlord'.
(3.) THE position is different under the Act of 1972. The relevant part of Section 21 of this Act reads : "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant- (1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exist- (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust......" An analysis of the above provision indicates that the applications contemplated by it can be classified into four broad categories. An application may be made for the eviction of a tenant from the building under his tenancy by a landlord for occupation by himself, or for occupation by any member of his family or for occupation by any person for whose benefit it is held by him or for occupation by himself and others falling in any of the remaining three categories. It is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which the landlord may not be requiring any accommodation under tenancy for occupation by him personally but only for a member of his family. It will be apparent that the essential prerequisite for passing an order under S. 21 (1) (a) of the new Act is the bond fide requirement of the building for occupation by either the landlord himself or any other person of the categories enumerated above. The case of a bond fide requirement falling into any of these three categories is sufficient to justify an order under Section 21 (1) (a) of the new Act. The legal considerations which would affect the decision on an impugned order would vary according as the case falls into one or other of these various categories. The instant case deals with the position in which the permission under Section 3 of the old Act was founded on two grounds, namely, the need of the landlords, respondents Nos. 2 and 3, for their personal occupation as well as the need for occupation by other members of their big families.;