Chandrashekhar, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal from the order of K.N. Seth, J., in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10322 of 1975. The appellant was petitioner therein. The material facts are not in dispute. The appellant was a ministerial official in the court of the District Judge, Bijnor In the year 1962, he was promoted to the post of Munsarim. In the year 1971, he was further promoted to the post of Record-keeper. While working as Record-keeper he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar in September, 1972. In February, 1975, he was posted as Second Clerk. In pursuance of a letter received from the Government, the District Judge considered the appellant's record of service in July 1975, and recommended to the Government that in view of his (the appellant's) honesty and efficiency it was not necessary or desirable to take any action by way of compulsory retirement under Rule 56 of 'the U.P. Fundamental Rules. However, in pursuance of a subsequent letter of the Government dated August 14, 1975, a Screening Committee consisting of the District Judge and two other Judicial Officers, again considered in September, 1975 the appellant's record of service and recommended that he be retired compulsorily under clause (c) of the aforesaid Rule. In pursuance of the aforesaid recommendation he was compulsorily retired from service. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10322 of 1975 the appellant challenged the validity of the order retiring him compulsorily. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that in view of the over all performance of the appellant, the Screening Committee could reasonably come to the conclusion that it was necessary to retire him in public interest. In this appeal, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that there was no fresh material in the appellant's record of service on the basis of which the Screening Committee could have come to a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the District Judge earlier in July 1975, on the question whether the retirement of the appellant was necessary in public interest. Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that as the District Judge's conclusion that it was not necessary to retire the appellant in public interest, was reached after examining his record of service, the conclusion of the Screening Committee that his retirement was necessary in public interest, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary and capricious. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel who appeared for the respondents (the District Judge, Bijnor, and the State of U.P.) contended that there were several adverse remarks in the appellant's record of service, that on the basis of those remarks the Screening Committee was entitled to recommend his retirement and that the mere fact that the District Judge had, in July 1975, expressed the view that such retirement was not necessary in public interest, could not be an impediment for the Screening Committee taking a different view. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that under clause (1) of the Explanation under Rule 56 as amended by the U.P. Fundamental Rule 56 (Amendment and Validation Act, 1975, the only requirement to exercise the power to retire an official compulsorily is that it should appear to the appointing authority that it is necessary to do so in public interest and that there is no other restriction on the exercising of such power by the appointing authority. It is true that in the aforesaid Explanation it is not expressly stated that the appointing authority cannot alter its earlier decision on the question whether an official should be retired compulsorily. Even so, if the subsequent decision which is contrary to the earlier decision, is not based upon any new material which was not available when the earlier decision was taken, or if no material fact was overlooked when the earlier decisions was taken or if there was no mistake of fact or law when the earlier decision was taken, such contrary decision would, in our opinion, be capricious or arbitrary. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it is not explained why the Screening Committee took a view contrary to the view taken by the District Judge in July 1975. It is noteworthy that the District Judge who had made the recommendation against compulsory retirement of the appellant, was also a member of the Screening Committee which recommended his compulsory retirement two months later. The power conferred on the appointing authority under Rule 56, should, in our opinion, be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily, or capriciously. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Union of India v. J. N. Sinha A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40 at p. 42, though the appropriate authority had absolute right to retire a Government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so, it is open to the aggrieved party to contend that it is an arbitrary decision. In State of U. P. v. D. N. Sharma 1975 A.L.R. 399, a Division Bench of this Court held that even an administrative action is open to challenge if it is arbitrary or capricious and that it is open to the Court to examine the circumstances to discover if an order of compulsory retirement is passed upon relevant considerations. v In the circumstances we hold that the recommendation of the Screening Committee which was contrary to the earlier recommendation of the District Judge, and which was not based on any new material, was arbitrary. Consequently the order of compulsory retirement based on such recommendation, is clearly unsustainable. In the result we allow this appeal, reverse the order of the learned single Judge, allow the writ petition and quash the order of the District Judge dated September 10, 1975, retiring the appellant compulsorily from service. The appellant will get his costs in this appeal as well as in the writ petition.;