K.N.Singh, J. - (1.) PETITIONER was in the service of the State Government as Inspector of Boilers in permanent capacity. On September 18, 1974. The. State Government in exercise of its powers under Fundamental Rule 56 (a) retired the petitioner compulsorily from service by giving him three months' salary in lieu of period of notice. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the State Government's order in the present petition. Learned 'counsel for the petitioner urged that though the impugned order is unexceptionable in form, but in substance the order was passed as a measurement of punishment on the report of the Vigilance Department without giving any opportunity of defence to the petitioner. Respondents have denied this contention, they have asserted that a High Powered Screening Committee was constituted by the State Government to scrutinise the cases of all the Gazetted officers of the Labour Department who had completed 25 years of service or had attained 55 years of age. The Committee consisted of Labour Commissioner, Secretary, Labour Department and Director of Training and Employment. The Committee scrutinised service record and character roll of all the officers of the Labour Department. The Screening Committee recommended that the petitioner's work and conduct was not above average and that he was not fit to be retained in service. The State Government accepted the recommendation and thereupon it issued the impugned order retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service on his attaining the age of 55 years without assigning any reason or casting any stigma to him. Learned Standing Counsel further urged that the order of retirement was issued under Fundamental Rule 56 without holding the petitioner guilty of any charges or without casting any stigma to him. The impugned order was not passed by way of punishment and the petitioner was not entitled to any opportunity. There is no dispute that under Fundamental Rule 56 the State Government has absolute power to retire a Government servant in public interest on his attaining the age of 55 years if his work and conduct is not found satisfactory. If on an overall assessment of work and conduct of a Government servant the State Government bona fide forms opinion that his retention in service beyond the age of 55 years is not in public interest, it is always open to it to retire the Government servant by giving him three months' notice or three months' salary in lieu of period of notice. The order of compulsory retirement in such a case cannot be questioned by the Government servant before court of law. But if the order of compulsory retirement is passed mala fide or the requisite opinion is formed arbitrarily without there being any relevant material on the record, the order would be vitiated. Further if the order of compulsory retirement is passed as a measure of punishment and the Government servant is not given any opportunity of defence as contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution, the order would be invalid. In the instant case the order is unexceptionable in form, it does not contain any words casting stigma to the petitioner but the form of the order is not conclusive. It is well settled that if challenge is made on an order of termination of service issued in unexceptional form, it is open to the Court to go behind the order, to consider the facts and circumstances leading to the issue of the order with a view to adjudge the true nature of the order, the form of the order is therefore inconclusive. Sri Shanti Bhushan learned counsel for the petitioner urged that averments contained in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government show that the Screening Committee founded its recommendation against the petitioner on a report of the Vigilance Department which contained findings against the petitioner's integrity. In accepting the report of the Screening Committee the State Government took into consideration the report of the Vigilance Department, this would be clear from the averments contained in paragraphs 5, 13 and 20 of the affidavit of Bhola Nath Gupta filed on behalf of the State Government. The report of the Vigilance Department has not been placed before the Court. The counter-affidavit, however, states that the Vigilance Report was against the petitioner which indicated that the petitioner was a corrupt officer, that report was considered by the Screening Committee in making its recommendation against the petitioner. On a perusal of the original Government file as produced before me by the learned Standing Counsel, I find that there were serious allegations of corruption and bribery against the petitioner, the Vigilance Department was directed to hold enquiry into these allegations. The enquiry was not completed but the Vigilance Department submitted an interim report to the Government which indicated that the petitioner was a corrupt officer as his assets were disproportionate to his known sources of income. This report was placed before the Screening Committee and it placed reliance on this report in making recommendation that the petitioner was not a fit person to be retained in service. The Screening Committee, however, suggested that the Vigilance enquiry should be dropped before the petitioner is compulsorily retired. The State Government accepted the report of the Screening Committee but it did not drop the enquiry pending before the Vigilance Department, instead it proceeded to retire the petitioner compulsorily, the Government file containing the notes and recommendations of the Screening Committee clearly shows that the material furnished by the interim report of the Vigilance Department contained findings against the petitioner involving moral turpitude and the Screening Committee as well as the State Government both acted upon that report in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was not fit to be retained in service. These circumstances leave no manner of doubt that the impugned order was founded on the findings recorded against the petitioner in the report of the Vigilance Department. In view of the above facts and circumstances the order of compulsory retirement though passed in unexceptionable form was founded on the allegation of misconduct against the petitioner, as such the order must be held to be an order of punishment. In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192, validity of an order of termination issued in unexceptionable form was considered. The Supreme Court held that since the order of termination was passed after obtaining report from the Vigilance Department against the Government servant which contained reports of misconduct involving moral turpitude against him, the order must be held to be an order of punishment. The rule laid down in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) is fully applicable to the instant case. I am therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment and since the petitioner was not given any opportunity of defence, the order is not sustainable in law. Learned Standing Counsel then urged that the report of the Vigilance Department was not the foundation for the issue of the impugned order, instead the report was taken into account by the Screening Committee to judge the petitioner's suitability in service. He further urged that the Screening Committee as well as the State Government both considered the petitioner's service record and character roll entries and thereupon the State Government formed opinion that the petitioner's work and conduct was not above average, the State Government found that since petitioner's integrity was stated to be doubtful during the years 1971-72 and 1972-73, the petitioner was not fit to be retained in service. It is true that the Screening Committee and the State Government both considered the petitioner's work and conduct and thereupon they formed opinion that the petitioner's work was not above average, but at the same time both the authorities namely, the Screening Committee and the State Government took into account the report of the Vigilance Department. In that situation it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the Screening Committee and the State Government were influenced by the report of the Vigilance Department. One cannot say with any certainty that in the absence of the report of the Vigilance Department, what recommendations would have been made by the Screening Committee, and what decision would have been taken by the State Government. The State Government while exercising powers under Fundamental Rule 56 forms opinion in a subjective manner, as such it is difficult to hold that the State Government was not influenced by the report of the Vigilance department or that it passed the impugned order merely on assessment of petitioner's work and conduct. Formation of the opinion by the authorities on subjective satisfaction would be vitiated if extraneous matter is taken into account along with the relevant materials. The report of the Vigilance Department which contained findings of misconduct against the petitioner was not relevant for the purpose of exercising power under Fundamental Rule 56-A even though the report could be relevant for taking disciplinary action against the petitioner. The relevant material for exercising powers under Fundamental Rule 56 was the petitioner's service record as contained in his character roll and personal file. Since the State Government took into account the Vigilance re-port against the petitioner its subjective satisfaction stood vitiated. I am therefore of the opinion that even though it was open to the State Government to retire the petitioner compulsory on an assessment of the petitioner's service record, but since it took into account the report of the Vigilance Department which contained findings of misconduct involving moral turpitude against the petitioner, the order stood vitiated as the order ceased to be an order of compulsory retirement simpliciter. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that the impugned order was passed as a measure of punishment and since the petitioner was not given any opportunity of defence as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution, the order is rendered void. I, therefore, allow the petition and quash the impugned order dated September 18, 1974. The petitioner shall be treated in service. He is entitled to his costs.;