Jawahar Nath Takru, J. - (1.) This is a petition by Amar Chand Kapoor praying that proceedings for contempt of Court be taken against the opposite -parties.
(2.) The facts of the case in so far as they are material for its decision, are not in dispute and stated briefly are as follows: The opposite -parties filed a second appeal in this Court against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court ordering their ejectment from a house in Moradabad and awarding compensation and mesne profits to the Petitioner. After conclusion of the arguments in this Court, the parties arrived at an agreement, which was incorporated in the judgment of this Court dated 1 -11 -1965, as follows : The learned Counsel for the Respondent has agreed not to execute the decree for a period of five months if the Appellant undertook to vacate the premises within that period. The Appellant has given an undertaking to that effect. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The Appellant, however, will not be evicted for a period of five months from to -day in view of the above undertaking. 4. For some reason or the other, the opposite -parties did not keep their promise and thereupon the Petitioner filed the present petition on 10 -5 -1966 for the relief stated above. On the petition coming up for hearing on 16 -5 -1966 notice was issued to opposite party No. 1 only and in response to it, he appeared on 18 -6 -1966 and took time for filing a counter affidavit. On 21 -7 -1966, however, the parties entered into a compromise whereby the Petitioner gave the opposite -parties time upto 31 -6 -1966, for vacating the premises in return for the opposite -parties agreeing to vacate the premises and paying the entire amount due from them by that date. It is admitted that both the undertakings were complied with by opposite -party No. 1 on 31 -7 -1966.
(3.) On behalf of the Petitioner it was contended that as opposite -parties did not abide by the undertaking given by them to this Court on 1 -11 -1965 they must be held guilty of committing contempt of Court. On behalf of the opposite -party No 1 it was however urged that as the undertaking in question was not given to the Court but was merely in the nature of a promise, opposite -party No. 1 cannot be held to have wilfully disobeyed any undertaking given by him to this Court so as to render him liable for contempt of Court. Thus from the rival contentions set out above it is clear that the decision of this case turns upon the interpretation which is to be placed on the aforesaid order it being undisputed that if it contains an undertaking to the Court then its wilful default would constitute contempt of this Court.;