BROOME, J. - (1.)THIS writ petition filed by Messrs. Tarzan Hosiery Private Limited of Kanpur against the Income-tax Officer of district I(B) Ward of Kanpur, has been referred to us for decision at the instance of Pathak J. on the ground that it raises questions of great importance. The facts of the case are as follows : On June 22, 1964, the petitioner received a notice dated April 8, 1964, from the respondent under section 139(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, requiring a return of total income for the assessment year 1964-65, to be filed by July 25, 1964. On July 24, 1964, the petitioner applied for extension of time up to August 30, 1964, but this was refused by the respondent, with the result that the petitioner was unable to file the return within the time allowed and became liable for the payment of interest and to the imposition of penalty.
(2.)THE petitioners contention is that, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act, the petitioner was entitled to file its return of income up to September 30, 1964, and that the respondent had no right to demand a return to be filed earlier under sub-section (2) of the section.
The relevant sub-sections of section 139 (omitting the provisos) run as follows :

139. "(1) Every person, if his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax, shall furnish a return of his income or the income of such other person during the previous year in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed -

(a) in the case of every person whose total income, or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act, includes any income from business or profession, before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year or where there is more than one previous year from the end of the previous year which expired last before the commencement of the assessment year, or before the 30th day of June of the assessment year, whichever is later;

(b) in the case of every other person, before the 30th day of June of the assessment year :......

(2) In the case of any person who, in the Income-tax Officers opinion, is assessable under this Act, whether on his own total income or on the total income of any other person during the previous year, the Income-tax Officer may, before the end of the relevant assessment year, serve a notice upon him requiring him to furnish, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, a return of his income of such other person during the previous year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed....."

In the case of the petitioner, whose income is derived from business and whose accounting period corresponds with the financial year, the time for filing the return of income under sub-section (1) of section 139 was up to September 30, 1964 (i.e., before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year); but the respondent, acting under sub-section (2), has demanded a return by July 25, 1964. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that sub-section (2) of section 139 only comes into play when the period prescribed for the voluntary submission of the return under sub-section (1) of the section has expired and that, consequently, the notice served on the petitioner requiring the return to be filed by July 25, 1964, was illegal. Alternatively, it is argued that if sub-section (2) is construed as meaning that a demand for the return can be made before the expiry of the period prescribed by sub-section (1), there will be an infringement of article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the Income-tax Officer will have been given an unfettered discretion to discriminate between assessees similarly placed by requiring one to submit a return before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1), while allowing the other to file a return after the expiry of that period.

(3.)ON a plain reading of the two sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 139, we find no force in the argument that sub-section (2) can only operate after the period prescribed by sub-section (1) is over. The two sub-sections in fact deal with two distinct and different aspects of the procedure for submitting returns : sub-section (1) imposes an obligation on all persons whose income is assessable to tax to furnish a return within a certain specified time without being asked to do so; while sub-section (2) confers a power on the income-tax authorities to demand a return at any time before the expiry of the assessment year. We find no incompatibility or repugnance between these two provisions and we see no reason why both of them should not operate simultaneously to their full extent. Reading the two sub-sections harmoniously together, we are of opinion that the intention of the section is that all persons liable to assessment should be under an obligation to furnish a return of income within the time prescribed by sub-section (1) (i.e., either by 30th of June or by 30th of September of the assessment year), provided they have not already been asked by the Income-tax Officer to furnish a return by means of a notice under sub-section (2). There is nothing in the wording of these two sub-sections themselves that would lead to the inference that sub-section (2) was not meant to operate during the period prescribed for the submission of the return under sub-section (1).
Furthermore, it is clear from sub-section (7) of section 139 that a return under sub-section (2) can be demanded and furnished before the return under sub-section (1) is due. This provision is as follows :

(7) No return under sub-section (1) need be furnished by any person for any previous year if he has already furnished a return of income for such year in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2)."