Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - (1.) THE following question has been referred to this Division Bench for answer: "Can the propriety of an order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act admitting an application under Section 15 (2) after the expiry of the prescribed period of six months be raised in an appeal by an employer against a direction under Section 15 (3) of the Act."
(2.) THE question arose in two connected civil revisions which came up for hearing before Mathur J. The learned Judge did not note any conflict in decisions relating directly to the question, but he found a conflict in decisions on a matter having a vital bearing on it, and he thought it necessary that the conflict be resolved. He accordingly directed that the papers be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the question to a larger Bench. That is how the question has been referred to this Bench. In his order for reference Mathur, J. mentioned, two cases arising under the PAYment of Wages Act; Prem Narayan Amritlal Verma v. The Divisional Traffic Manager AIR 1954 Bom 78 decided by Chagla, C. J.and Civil Revn. No. 603 of 1961 of this Court decided by Manchanda, J, In the former case it was held that the order of the Authority condoning delay in the making of an application under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act could not be challenged in appeal against a direction made under Section 15 (3) of the Act. The latter case dealt with a situation in which the Authority had found that the application made under Section 15 (2) of the Act was within lime and it was held by Manchanda, J. that the application having been found to be within time and in any event the delay in making the application having been condoned the order passed by the Authority in this respect could not be the subject matter of an appeal or be questioned in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act. The view taken in these cases on the question under reference was, therefore, the same. After mentioning these cases, however, Mathur, J. proceeded to observe that it was settled law that the delay in making an application under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act could be condoned only on grounds similar to those contemplated by Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that led to the consideration of the question whether the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be challenged in second appeal against the decree passed in the First appeal, and since there was a conflict in decisions on the aforesaid question and on similar questions arising under other statutory provisions analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act the conflict should be resolved. Obviously, the learned Judge was of the opinion that resolution of this conflict was necessary for answering the question under reference We may, with respect, mention that in Sheo Prasad v. Addl. District Judge Moradabad AIR 1962 All 144 Oak, J. expressed disagreement with the view of Chagla, C. J. in AIR 1954 Bom 78 (Supra) and held that it is open to the appellate authority to enter into the question whether the Claim Commissioner was justified in condoning the delay under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act. It is evident that this view is also opposed to the view taken by Manchanda, J, in the aforesaid civil revision of this Court. There is thus a conflict even in decisions relating directly to the question under reference. It appears that AIR 1962 All 144 (Supra) was not cited before Mathur. J., even as it was not cited before us.
(3.) THE relevant provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, are as follows: "Section 15 (1)...... (2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under Sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under Sub-section (3): Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 3. When any application under Sub-section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under Section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted or the payment of the delayed wages together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding ten rupees in the latter: 17.(1) An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub- section (2) of Section 15, or against a direction made under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) of that section may be preferred, within thirty days of the date on which the order or direction was made, in a Presidency-town before the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere before the District Court- (a) by the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees, or (b) by an employed person or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from the employed person or from the unpaid group to which the employed person belonged exceeds fifty rupees, or (c) by any person directed to pay a penalty under Sub-section (4) of Section 15. (2) Save as provided in Sub-section (1), any order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, or a direction made under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) of that section shall be final". ;