G.K. Mathur, J. - (1.)The Petitioners claim to be bhumidhars of the plots in dispute while the Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 claim to be sirdars thereof. A suit No. 448 of 1953 was filed by the Petitioners in the civil court for a declaration of their bhumidhari rights. On 24 -3 -1953, an application was filed before the court, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure 'A' to the writ petition. The application was signed by the Petitioners and by Respondents 5 to 10. Respondents 8 and 9 were minors and the application was signed on their behalf by one Panna Lal. It was stated in the application that the parties had arrived at a settlement that the Petitioners were bhumidhars of the land in dispute and were in possession thereof and that the Respondents had no connection with these plots. The prayer that was made in the application was that the suit may be consigned to the records without judgment. It is difficult to imagine what decree could be passed on the basis of this application. But it is the Petitioners' case that on 29 -7 -1953 a decree was passed on the basis of this application decreeing the Petitioners' suit and declaring them to be bhumidhars of the plots. A suit No. 316 of 1955 was filed on behalf of Sri Chand and Evaz Singh, minors, for setting aside the decree in suit No. 448 of 1953 but the suit was dismissed for default on 14 -8 -1957. It appears that proceedings Under Ch. IX -A of the UP ZA and LR Act were taken in respect of the land in dispute and by an order of the Compensation Officer dated 28 -12 -1959, it was held that Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 were the sirdars of the plots. When consolidation proceedings started in the village the Petitioners filed objections Under Sec. 9 claiming to be bhumidhars of the plots. These objections were opposed by Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 on the ground that they had become sirdars of these plots and that the Petitioner's rights, if any, had been extinguished. The Petitioners relied mainly upon the compromise decree in suit No. 448 of 1953 in support of their bhumidhari rights. The Consolidation Officer rejected the Petitioners' objections. The Petitioners then filed an appeal, but the appeal was dismissed by the Settlement Officer. The Settlement Officer held that the compromise decree in suit No. 448 of 1953 having been passed without taking the leave of the Court as required by Order XXXII, Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure could avoided by the minors and was not binding. He further held that the contesting Respondents were in possession over the plots continuously from 1359F and had first become adhivasis and then sirdars thereof. Against the judgment of the Settlement Officer the Petitioners filed a second appeal. The Deputy Director affirmed the decision of the Settlement Officer and dismissed the second appeal. He further observed that the order of the Compensation Officer Under Sec. 240 -C dated 28 -12 -1959, holding the contesting Respondents to be sirdars of the plots was binding upon the parties. Thereupon the Petitioners filed a revision. The revision application has also been dismissed by the Commissioner. He was also of the view that the compromise decree of 1953 was voidable at the option of the minors and that the question regarding the binding nature of that decree should have been raised in the compensation proceedings. He, affirmed the decision of the Deputy Director and dismissed the revision.
(2.)The Petitioners have challenged the judgments and orders of the consolidation authorities on the ground that the compromise decree dated July 29, 1953 in suit No. 448 of 1953 was binding upon the parties and the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to go behind it. The contention is that such a decree could only be avoided by the minors by filing a suit and could not be challenged in any other proceedings. I am unable to accept this contention. In my opinion, it was open to the minors to take the plea that the compromise decree was not binding as a defence in a subsequent suit or proceeding provided their right to challenge the decree was not barfed by limitation. In Mst. Mariam v/s. Mst. Amina : AIR 1957 All 65 it has been observed by Sulaiman, C.J.:
It is open to the minor to bring the matter up in revision to the High Court or to get a declaration in a separate suit that for want of leave, the reference, the award and the decree are not binding upon him or to take such a plea in any suit in which he may be impleaded as a Defendant.

In Mahtab Singh v/s. Raja Durga Narain Singh, 1936 AWR 1017 Rachhpal Singh, J. has observed:

Now there are several ways in which a minor can avoid such an agreement. The first is by making an application for review of the decree. The second method is to prefer an appeal against the decree which was passed in the case.... Another method is to institute a suit at once to set aside the decree through a guardian ad litem and next friend or on attaining majority and yet another way of avoiding the compromise is to take a plea to that effect in defence when a suit is instituted to enforce the terms of a compromise. I am not aware of any rule under which a suit instituted on an agreement arrived at in total disregard of the provisions of Rule 7, Order XXXII Code of Civil Procedure a minor cannot in defence plead that the agreement and the decree passed on the basis of that agreement are not binding upon him. To me it appears that he can always take such a plea so long as he does not allow his right to do so to become barred by limitation.

There can, therefore, be no doubt that it was open to Sri Chand and Evaz Singh, minors, to avoid the compromise decree by taking a plea in defence if a suit had been filed against them. There is no reason why they should not have the same rights in the consolidation proceedings which are also proceedings in which the title of the parties is determined. It has not been contended before me that on the date on which they took this defence in the consolidation proceedings their right to avoid the compromise decree had become barred. It was, therefore, open to the consolidation authorities to hold that the compromise decree was not binding if they came to the conclusion that it had been passed in violation of the provisions of Rule 7 of Order XXXII, Code of Civil Procedure. There is another aspect of the case. After the passing of this compromise decree compensation proceedings started in the village under Chapter IXA of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. As already observed, in these proceedings an order was passed on December 28, 1959 holding that the congesting Respondents had become sirdars of the plots in dispute. It was open to the Petitioners in those proceedings to raise the question that by virtue of the compromise decree they were bhumidhars of the plots and the contesting Respondents were not adhivasis or sirdars. No such contention was raised there. The order of the Compensation Officer is not final and binding upon the parties. It was not contended by the Petitioners either before the Deputy Director in second appeal or before the Commissioner in revision that the order in the compensation proceedings was passed without serving any notice upon them or that it was passed without observing the formalities prescribed by law; nor has any such grievance been made in the writ petition. A statement has been made in the rejoinder affidavit that notice of the compensation proceeding was not served upon the Petitioners. This statement cannot be accepted now. It should have been raised either' before the Deputy Director or before the Commissioner.

(3.)The orders of the consolidation authorities do not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or from any manifest error of law. The writ petition is without force and is hereby dismissed with costs.