G.D.Sahgal, J. - (1.) THIS second civil appeal has come up before this Bench for disposal. The learned single Judge before whom it came up referred it to a Full Bench in view of the conflict between two Division Bench cases of this Court, viz. Hub Lal v. Mst. Dulara, 1954 All LJ 762 and Durgapal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh, (8) 1957 All 257 as according to him, the result or the appeal depends on whether one or the other of the two decisions was correct.
(2.) THE dispute relates to plots Nos. 558/1, 558/2, 565/1, 566/1, 566/2 and 567/2. The plaintiffs- respondents Nos. 1 to 5 filed a suit against the defendants-appellants with respect, among others, to these plots for possession and damages. They claimed that they were the sirdars of these plots and were in possession having obtained the same on the 19th of October, 1947, in execution of a decree in a suit for ejectment against the appellants filed in the year 1946. They claim to have been dispossessed thereafter in the year 1955 as a result of which this suit was filed. The claim of the defendants- appellants, however, was that they were the subtenants of these plots and had continued to be so all along without ever being dispossessed and as such they had become adhivasis under Section 20(a) (i) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and subsequently became sirdars. This plea of theirs has been negatived by the learned Civil Judge in the first appeal who held that they had been elected in the year 1947 and had not been in possession till they dispossessed the plaintiffs in the year 1955 when the latter had to file the suit giving rise to this appeal. Their case, in the alternative, however, was that by virtue of being recorded as occupants in the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 Fasli they had acquired the status or adhivasis under Section 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Their names had in fact continued to be recorded in column No. 6 of the Khasra even though they had been ejected, and were so recorded in the year 1356 Fasli. As there is a finding of fact which cannot be challenged in second appeal, to the effect that the appellants had been ejected in the year 1947 and had not been in possession since then till the year 1955 when they dispossessed the plaintiffs they were no longer sub-tenants. On behalf of the appellants, therefore, it has not been urged that they had become sirdars under Section 20(a) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The only plea that lias been pressed before us is that by virtue of the entry as occupant in the year 1356 Fasli in their favour they were adhivasis and in view of the provisions of Chapter IX-A Section 240B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act they had become sirdars. This plea was repelled by the lower appellate Court on the ground that the plaintiffs-respondents having obtained a decree for possession from a competent Court against the appellants and having actually taken possession over the plots in execution of their decree in the year 1947 and the decree having become final before the date of vesting. Explanation III of Section 20 of the Act applied with the result that the appellants would be debarred from claiming adhivasi rights under Section 20(b). This view of the first appellate court was challenged by the learned counsel for the appellants on the ground firstly that Explanation III had to be read along with Explanation II which in express terms confined itself to a correction made under or in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Laud Revenue Act and as such it could apply only in a case where there had been an order for correction in a proceeding under the Land Revenue Act. The second ground urged by him was that the decree of the Civil Court relied upon by the first appellate Court being without jurisdiction, was a nullity and should not have been relied upon in order to attract the application of Explanation III.
(3.) THE learned Single Judge rejected the first contention. Explanation III of Section 20 reads as follows: "For the purposes of Explanation II an entry shall be deemed to have been corrected before the date of vesting if an order or decree of a competent Court requiring any correction in records bad been made before the said date and had become final even though the correction may not have been incorporated, in the records." According to him the expression "order or decree of a competent Court" and the expression "requiring any correction in records" occurring in Explanation III one after the other were significant. There would be no occasion for there being a decree of a competent Court if Explanation III were to be confined only to proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, According to him a distinction had to be made between the expression "an order or decree of a competent Court directing correction in records" and the expression "an order or decree of a competent Court requiring any correction in records". In the case of the former there would be no occasion for correction unless the order or the decree specifically directs correction whereas in the case of the latter expression an occasion for correction would arise if it is found necessary in consequence of the order or decree passed by a competent Court to do so. In his oninion the words actually used in Explanation III were not to be confined only to a case where the order of decree specifically directed correction but were wide enough even to cover a case where correction was necessitated as a consequence of the order or decree passed in the case. He was of the view that the order or decree passed by the Civil Court in the year 1946 which was executed in the year 1947 and as a result of which the plaintiffs-respondents obtained possession over the plots against the defendants- appellants necessitated the correction of the records in which the names of the dcfandants-appellants stood recorded in column 1. Explanation III, therefore, was attracted if this was a decree of a competent Court.;